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**THE DRAMA IN
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA-
THE BEGINNING OF THE END OR
THE END OF THE BEGINNING?**

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INTRODUCTION

Professor Anton Zabkar has had a distinguished naval and academic career and is an adviser to the Government of Slovenia. He now gives us a second series of studies of aspects of the conflict in the Balkans. The first volume - **Analyses of the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia** - was published in April 1994 and contained five extended essays. The dealt with: the possibility of the creation of a "New Yugoslavia"; changes in the defence doctrine of Serbia and Montenegro; the re-birth of the old Yugoslav People's Army as the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the "Divoselo" operation mounted by the Croatian army in autumn 1993; and it's Maslenica adventure in January 1993.

The current volume which, to this writer, seems even more incisive, deals with four matters. They are: the realities underlying the Bosnian situation as it stood in late 1994 (and we can now see with what insight Professor Zabkar and identified the major factors there); civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (containing a remarkable "inside view" of the interaction of Serb politics and politicians with the unstable Yugoslav army and police force; and of coups, and rumours of coups). He concludes with two essays of originality and brilliance on, first, the situation of the Eastern Adriatic, having regard to its historical, economic and political, as well as strategic implications - not hesitating to bring forward some disturbing prognoses. He concludes with a paper entitled "Bosnia-Herzegovina - the End of the Beginning, or the Beginning of the End of War". In this, the author makes a persuasive comparison between the conflict situation which preceded and surrounded the Berlin Congress of 1878, and the current situation in Bosnia; contemplating also the differences, and how the present scenario might well evolve.

As this brief summary shows, Professor Zabkar (who also holds the rank of captain in the Slovenian navy) has brought an unusually broad range of talent and experience to his work. As even outsiders who have been exposed to the most recent Balkan tragedies can confirm, it is difficult, so close to events, for those who have participated to retain objectivity and perspective. Yet, as the author parades his cast of characters, each more vivid, larger than life, and manipulative than the last, it is impressive that one with such close knowledge of recent events can also marshal and deploy these *personae* so coolly. It is not always easy to be detached concerning the genocidal proclivities of some of these protagonists. The

reader should also be forewarned that the author does not waste a sentence. Thus, what follows is a concise, tightly-reasoned work meriting very careful study. It makes an invaluable contribution to what will ultimately be a large library concerning the events of recent years in the former Yugoslavia.

Cedric Thornberry

DECEPTIVE CALM IN BOSNIA (military-strategic outline)

Ljubljana, September 1994

"If the war is to be stopped through political means, something must happen within the international community. Until such time only one option remains, namely, a total military defeat of Četniks in this region."

Fadil Husaković, Commander of the operational group "Bosna"

1. BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

The media attention given to such events as the Pope's visit to Zagreb, the escalation of the political conflict between Karadžić and Milošević, the numerous incidents in Kosovo (where there were 9 recorded armed attacks against Serbian police and soldiers by September of this year), and the worsening relations between Greece and Albania (Greece has already deported approximately 30,000 Albanians who are only the first of the 300,000 Albanian workers that Greece has announced it will deport), as well as the first casualties in incidents on the Macedonian-Serbian border, pushed the September news reports dealing with the events in B-H into the background. The reports were reduced to brief descriptions of local skirmishes taking place in different parts of B-H, the continuation of ethnic cleansing, and other similar topics in the sorry day-to-day reality of Bosnia, which is why many have begun to think that the situation on the Bosnian battlefields has finally begun to calm down.

The aim of this report is to give an broad account of certain changes which took place in the past few days at the heart of the crisis area of the former Yugoslavia, and thus contribute to a better understanding of possible future developments in the short-term.

2. THE ENIGMA OF GENERAL MLADIĆ

At the time of the escalation of the conflict between Karadžić - who is an adamant defender of the project establishing a Greater Serbia (the unification of all Serbs under one state and retention of 70% of B-H territory) - and Milošević - who now seems to be satisfied with a minimal version of this project (49% of the B-H territory should be sufficient) - the Serbian and Montenegrin public began speculating on what stand would be taken by

General Mladić. Both Milošević and Karadžić supporters considered that his personal stance, coupled with the military influence which he exercises over the armies under his command, would be the deciding factor in tipping the balance of power in the contest of political strength between the two Serbian leaders. This rather idealised and simplified approach did not take into account that the structure of Serbian authority in B-H is different from that currently in effect in Serbia and Montenegro. Both Karadžić and General Mladić are to a large extent dependent on local political and military leaders (who each face specific circumstances in their own areas, and who gained all the territories currently under occupation through their own skills and military force), unlike Milošević, who has until now often shown and proved that he can easily eliminate all those who try to oppose him (or stand in his way), even personalities such as Prime Minister Milan Panić, Dobrica Ćosić, his "natural ally" Dr Vojislav Šešelj, the Chief of the General Staff Radoje Adžić and Života Panić. Even though Karadžić and Mladić are only first among equals, their political and military influence on the future turn of events should not be disregarded. This is especially true for Mladić, because if the military situation in B-H begins to deteriorate, Karadžić and his supporters will become increasingly dependent on the decisions made by the Bosnian Serb military elite.

As an illustration of the speculations about Mladić outlined above, the reports carried by the Belgrade tabloid press, which last month published "classified information" on the preparations for a coup d'état against Milošević, can be cited. The information was based on the report that in Serbia, on the slopes of Mt Kosmaj, a "Serbian National Army" is being formed (consisting of members of the Četnik's "White Eagles" units, the Serbian Četnik Movement, the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian People's Renewal Party), with a leadership comprising its commanding officer, the retired YNA General Andrija Biorčević (who was the commander of the Novi Sad corps and is known for his radical views) and its Chief of the General Staff, the retired General Radovan Radinović (who was the head of the Centre for Strategic Studies, and is known for supporting the idea of establishing "patriot cells" in the Army of Yugoslavia, representing a kind of "patriotic substitute" for the former organisation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia). It was also announced that after the coup a "Duchy of Serbian Lands" would be formed under the leadership of Tomislav Karadžordžević, a prime minister, Radovan Karadžić, and a minister of defence, the inevitable General Ratko Mladić.

with the police) in order to discredit the Radicals amongst the Serbian public by exposing them as traitors, thus exonerating their elimination. They tried to substantiate this assertion by saying that the Serbian police have of late placed the Radicals under investigation, confiscating weapons (which were part of the "war booty" taken from the front) during house searches, and putting many of them on trial for theft, smuggling, illegal dealing and other similar activities.

The rumours about the practices and the behaviour of Ratko Mladić also suggested that he would be likely to be offered a high post in the hierarchy of the AY. With his "transfer" to the AY he would evade prosecution as a war criminal (which would instead fall on Karadžić and his remaining followers). But because none of this is true, since Ratko Mladić has remained with Karadžić, it can be concluded that they have stayed together because of common interests that bind them even after the breakup of the association between Karadžić and Milošević (who is himself backed by the Chief of the General Staff of the AY). This symbiosis between the symbol of "Serbian resistance" in B-H and the "architect of major Serbian victories" leads to a conclusion that as the situation in B-H grows more critical and the military factor takes on a more significant role, Mladić's influence will also increase accordingly (or vice-versa).

3. MILITARY FACTORS THAT COULD INFLUENCE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

3.1 Military balance of power

The Army of the "Srpska Republika" (SR) has approximately 100,000 members in 50 to 60 brigades. They in turn form six army corps (each corps deploys two to three operational units) operating within distinct zones. As Serbian armies control approximately 35,000 km² of Bosnian territory, it could be concluded that an average corps controls 5000 to 6000 km². In practice, however, the corps differ substantially in their military strength - the Banja Luka corps consists of 15 brigades, the Romania corps (who hold Sarajevo under siege) has 10 brigades, the Drina corps 9 brigades, the Semberija corps 8 brigades, the Drvar corps 7 brigades, and the Herzegovina corps 5 brigades. Three categories of soldiers are employed: the professionals who are permanently under arms; the conscripts who are called to the front lines for 14 days, are given two to three weeks' leave from active duty and are then sent back to the front lines; and paramilitary

units from Serbia proper who are formally under the authority of the Army of the SR, but often conduct operations independently. In view of the substantial Serbian casualties to date (estimated at 100,000 dead, mostly soldiers) and the fact that approximately 300,000 people have left B-H (including prospective army conscripts), Serbian manpower resources are lower than the theoretical numbers being provided. As a consequence, the periods of leave granted to soldiers are becoming shorter.

A key strategic handicap of the Army of the SR is that the military corps are able to manoeuvre only over the geographical regions within which they were conscripted, being tied to their home areas because they have to defend the "liberated territories" against their neighbours. General Mladić - following the example of the Croatian Army which formed eight professional brigades - failed in his attempt to form a similar strategic core that would be able to fight in any region.

In addition, the weakness of the Bosnian Serb army also manifests itself in low fighting morale, a lack of active officers at the front lines (they are usually stationed at headquarters and behind the front lines), a lack of discipline, and other problems. Although together the Bosnian Army and the Croatian Defence Army (HVO) are stronger in numbers (outnumbering the Serbian forces 2:1), the Serbs have between a 2:1 and 3:1 advantage in armour and support artillery.

Furthermore, the Bosnian Serbs have a large number of anti-aircraft guns and missiles which can also be used to attack targets on the ground, further increasing their fire power. They also possess FROG surface to surface missiles (which can alternatively be deployed at the Banija bases in the Serbian Republic of Krajina (SRK) for attacks on Zagreb), 30 planes for air support (which due to "Operation Deny Flight" are grounded) and approximately the same number of helicopters.

It is evident from the above that the Army of the SR has so far shown that they have only a limited capability for conducting extensive offensive action, for instance they are not able to deploy mobile forces larger than a corps and transfer them from Banja Luka to Herzegovina. However, they are strong in defence where they can rely on fortified front line positions, numerous mine fields and other barriers, as well as the strong firing power of their ground and anti-aircraft artillery.

3.2 Additional strategic factors

If Karadžić and Mladić - relying on the referendum results - continue to depend on the decisive defence of the "liberated territories", they will have to take account of the consequences of some events which took place in the first half of this year, namely:

(1) the restriction of road links at the border between the SR and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which - if strictly implemented (the border is not only supervised by international observers but also by satellites and NATO aircraft as part of Operation Deny Flight) - will definitely disrupt the logistic operations (import of ammunition, oil and other important goods), without which the armies of the SRK and SR would not have been able to achieve what they have. Furthermore, the leadership at Pale can no longer count on air and infantry support from the FRY in the event of escalation, nor on the shipments of recruited refugees (who escaped from B-H to Serbia and were later returned to B-H);

(2) the advance of the 5th corps of the Bosnian Army which took control of Abdić's "autonomous region", and proceeded to take control of an important part of SRK territory (cutting off the railway connection between Banja Luka and Knin), thus threatening the vital links between the SRK and the SR and possibly creating an advantage for Croatia (if it decides to solve the Krajina problem thorough military means);

(3) the September agreement in Zagreb between President Izetbegović of B-H and the Croatian President Tudjman (on the formation of a "joint command for Bosnian and HVO Armies), which indicated that President Tudjman finally supports military cooperation between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Army, and implicitly implied that Croatian Adriatic ports and road links connecting the coast with central parts of Bosnia will be opened if the arms embargo on B-H is lifted;

(4) the statement made by President Clinton who announced that he will unilaterally lift the arms embargo if the SR does not agree to withdraw its forces from 30% of the occupied territory; although this action was not supported by Russia, Great Britain or France, the Serbian leaders must nevertheless take it seriously since they know all too well that the US secret services have under more difficult circumstances in the past successfully supplied arms to Afghanistan, the supporters of Jonas Savimbi in Angola, the Contras in Nicaragua, etc.

4. CHANGE IN SERBIAN STRATEGY IN B-H - 'PRO ET CONTRA'

The present concept of "passive defence" was successful because the more numerous forces of the B-H and HVO armies did not possess heavy weapons with which they could neutralise the advantage of the SR in armour and artillery. If the USA make good their promise, the balance of power will break down; the Bosnian Army would nevertheless need at least 6 to 12 months (depending on the type of weapons) in order to gain the ability to use the new weaponry, train its troops on their use, develop the necessary logistic infrastructure and prepare the command headquarters and staff for the methods of warfare that would correspond to the capabilities and limitations of the weapons supplied.

If General Mladić and his army continue to use the present strategy of passive defence of the "liberated territories", waiting for the Bosnian Army to equip itself with new technology, and only then attempting to defeat it by defensive warfare, it will be signing their own death warrant. It can thus be expected that the Serbian intelligence services will do all they can to initiate conflicts between the Croats and the Muslims in central Bosnia (where distrust between Croats and Muslims in Mostar is still strong - an example of this is the attack of the "drunk" Croatian policemen on EU representative Košnik who was supposedly under their protection) and elsewhere, as well as encourage the conflicts and rifts between the Muslims themselves (Fikret Abdić was given refuge in the SRK). If another round of (un)spontaneous clashes between Muslim factions or between Muslims and Croats occurred, General Mladić could continue with the present concept with which, 'urbi et orbi', he could demonstrate his "peaceful intentions".

If the federation in Bosnia does not break up, and Bosnian Serb leaders continue to refuse to give up the "liberated territories", General Mladić will be faced with the following alternatives: wait for the decisive attack of the opposing side, or initiate a pre-emptive offensive in order to gain control of the airports (where military assistance for B-H could be landed) and road links leading from the Adriatic ports to the areas controlled by the Bosnian Army. This antilogistic operation would have to be carried out within a three to four month period after the lifting of embargo.

Another possibility is an indirect version of the offensive option which would include either taking the UN forces hostage, or threatening Croatia with missile and artillery attacks on Zagreb and other cities (the list of targets was announced by General Novaković of the SRK Army in 1993

during the operation codenamed "Divoselo") if Croatia was unwilling to prevent the supply of arms to the Bosnian Army and the HVO over its territory.

The announcement made by Karadžić in September on general mobilisation (which means the cancellation of leave for conscripts between their periods of active duty) contains elements which indicate that the Army of the SR are strategically preparing for pessimistic case because they do not wish to be caught unprepared after the arms embargo is lifted.

At the same time, Serbian units on the ground are tactically exercising greater caution (because they fear that any forceful actions could trigger NATO air strikes) and are being more cooperative with UNPROFOR. They are aiming to instigate activity by the Bosnian Army and portray themselves as the side assisting UN peace keeping efforts.

If General Mladić decided to carry out a pre-emptive attack (aimed at precluding the military supply of the coalition forces), he would have to sever the road links between Split and the western-most regions of Herzegovina, and between the port of Ploče and Mostar, Sarajevo and Tuzla. At the same time, he would have to pay attention to the northern front and prevent a possible attack on the Sava corridor which remains an Achilles heel in the entire Serbian defence system.

The latest military actions around Konjic (where the Serbs lost 100 km² of territory) and Bihać indicate that the Serbian armies no longer possess their former strength and are facing increasing resistance from the Bosnian Army. The operations at the beginning of September, codenamed "Breza" and "Prsten", that were intended to defeat the 5th corps of the Bosnian Army, involved five brigades from the SR and one brigade from the SRK. Although the forces were under the command of Generals Ratko Mladić and Momir Talić, the attack was nevertheless entirely unsuccessful. Because the military report issued by the 5th corps of the Bosnian Army stated that a staff car containing documents belonging to General Mladić was captured, a conclusion could be made that he was wounded. Whatever the case, this represents a significant victory for the Bosnian Army because its forces succeeded in entering Banija territory (which belongs to Croatia) and held their ground (at the moment of writing the situation remains unchanged).

5. CONCLUSION, OF SORTS

At present the situation on the ground in B-H consists of local upheavals of weak intensity, but with tension rising daily the atmosphere is like the calm before the storm. The strength of force that the SR would need to deploy for carrying out a deep pre-emptive attack over the inhospitable southern karst terrain, where - in view of NATO's "Deny Flight" operation - they would not be able to engage their airforce, will force the Bosnian Serb military leadership to gather all its available resources by the end of next month and use them for a risky preventive strategic offensive action, or leave the initiative up to the Bosnian Army, forcing them to watch the enemy growing in strength and waiting for the right opportunity. At present, time is not on the side of the SR Army because the Bosnian Army is being rapidly reinforced.

In view of the weariness of the SR and SRK armies and due to the fact that neither can count on support from the AY, it is probable that the Serbian forces will, "volens nolens", continue with the present strategy of defending the "liberated territory". At the same time various efforts will be made in the diplomatic, intelligence and all other fields aimed at weakening the ring encircling the SR and SRK and re-establishing the conditions that existed in 1992 and 1993, when the present accomplishments were achieved.

Given attempts to "soften" Milošević, Karadžić's supporters can possibly rely on frightened Serbs in Kosovo and Sandžak who are asking whether they are the next in line, now that the "peace-loving" Milošević has abandoned Karadžić. They can also rely on the Serbian Radical Party and other apologists for the Greater Serbia concept who have until now assisted them economically and with paramilitary forces. It is widely-recognised that no border can be supervised or closed so completely as to prevent crossings by groups of volunteers, smugglers and so forth who for monetary or other reasons would be prepared to take the risk.

A very important issue for Karadžić is how to influence Milošević so he would again be prepared to open the borders and support the SRK and SR. Incidents in Kosovo and Sandžak that could be triggered by the Radicals, thus instigating (un)spontaneous uprising by Albanians and Muslims, create a possibility for the break out of war in Serbia and Montenegro. This war would - in all probability - very quickly make Karadžić and Milošević forget their disagreements (which many still believe were just a pretence in order to deceive the international community and lead to the lifting of sanctions

against Serbia). To prevent this happening, Milošević has tightened his control on the borders with the SR, and in Kosovo and Sandžak (including the border with Macedonia).

The weariness of the Serbian armies in the SR and SRK lends support to the view that at this stage of metamorphosis of the war, the most powerful devices (the "secret weapons") for Karadžić are the discords within the international contact group (between those for or against the lifting of the arms embargo on B-H, as well as between those who are for or against lifting sanctions against the so-called FRY), antagonism between Croatian extremists in the HVO (the anti-Muslim "military lobby") and those who are in favour of cooperation with the Bosnian Army, antagonism between Muslims who support Abdić and those who support Izetbegović, and the conflict between Serbs and Montenegrins who support Milošević's minimalistic programme and those who are in favour of realising Greater Serbia "here and now". The military situation and centres of Serbian power presented in this paper have already played out their role, and can in the future be represented within this complex mosaic as only a fragment whose activity will due to non-military aspects be reinforced or weakened. Above all, however, the resolution of the non-military conflicts outlined above will certainly play a decisive role.

But because neither Karadžić nor Mladić can affect the resolution of these conflicts, their strategy is becoming evermore adventurous and hazardous, resembling the behaviour of Saddam Hussein prior to the outbreak of the Gulf War. This is in complete contrast to their spiritual father Milošević, who from the "Balkan Butcher" (as portrayed by some western journalists and commentators) of yesterday, has begun slowly but surely changing into a collaborator of the UN and the international contact group, and who - believe it or not - is considered in international circles a significant factor for the stabilisation of the Balkans.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE SO-CALLED FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

(a case study)

Ljubljana, September 1995

1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the role of its army, the YNA, in this process, and the progress of the war in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been the subjects of many symposiums and roundtables. Political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, psychologists, criminologists, economists, and military and other specialists, have described in great detail and analysed from their own points of view the events which accompanied this process of collapse.*

It was obvious that almost all who addressed the issues outlined above would have to concern themselves with the YNA in one way or another, for the Army played an extremely important role in this process of collapse. However, it is also clear that there are very few studies dealing with those remnants of the YNA which withdrew from Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro to become the core from which the army of the new Serbian-Montenegrin Federation was created.

This paper attempts to fill in these blank spots, and is composed of three sections: the first describes aspects of the normative standardisation of civil-military relations in the newly formed federation; the second describes the disharmony between these standards and reality, and the third gives some concluding thoughts on the possible development of these relations in the coming short-term period.

* The role of the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) in the collapse of the former SFRY is described in detail in Dr Anton Bebler's study "The Yugoslav National Army and the Collapse of Yugoslavia" (proceedings "The Parting of the Ways of National Security", Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana, 1992).

2. ASPECTS OF NORMATIVE STANDARDISATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The Army of Yugoslavia received its new name on 20 May 1992, through a decree founded on the previously accepted first Constitution (the so-called *Žabljački Ustav*) of the newly founded Serbian-Montenegrin Federation (the Constitution was adopted on 27 April 1992). On 20 May 1992, the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence and the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the former Yugoslav National Army (YNA) were given the task of forming a new army, the Army of Yugoslavia (AY), from the units of the YNA which were already in Serbia and Montenegro and the units of the YNA which had withdrawn and/or were withdrawing into Serbia and Montenegro from Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The entire process was designated with the term "transformation of the YNA into the AY" and will last until the end of 1995.

The key fields of transformation were determined as follows:

- (1) Civil supervision by the Ministry of Defence and etatisation of all defence functions (these were formerly regarded as being socially-owned according to marxist standards of all people's defence);
- (2) Cutting the AY to a size corresponding to the demographics, size and economic capabilities of the new country;
- (3) A revision of defence plans with an emphasis on changes in the mobilisation system and the relocation of units to new operative/tactical directions (to the west and south);
- (4) Adaptation of the defence system to a multi-party society and to an economy in which the privatisation process is underway;
- (5) Defining a new defence doctrine;
- (6) Reorganising the system of leadership and command, military education, training, insurance of property and health insurance; and
- (7) Adaptation of the military industry and those elements of it which the FRY evacuated from other republics for a new role, with the simultaneous consideration of the need that a part of production be reoriented to the civilian market.

The transformation was approached as an all-encompassing and comprehensive process which included strategy, tactics, leadership and command, organisation, staff policies, motivation and troop morale, drilling, education, doctrines, etc. The Army of Yugoslavia after its transformation was to become an organisationally and operationally ordered whole, coherent

with the capacities of the new country, coordinated, functional and stable.

Within the framework of this process, General-Staff of the YNA, as the executor of this process in cooperation with the existing Federal Secretariat for People's Defence, was to prepare a proposal for suitable defence legislation, taking into account the new reality (a multi-party system, new economic relations, privatisation and the new Constitution), which would then be verified in the regular assembly procedure of both houses of the federal assembly. The results of this process were the Law on Defence and the Law on the AY, which were passed at the end of 1993. They are based on Articles 77 (points 7 and 12), 134 (paragraph 4) and 137 (paragraph 1) of the Constitution of the FRY. The old legislation had seven laws and 1,200 provisions and decrees determining the domain of the YNA; this is now accomplished by only one law, with 364 articles divided into seven chapters and 20 sub-chapters.¹

Both laws were based on the assumption that the AY should be entirely rid of ideology and depoliticised, and that relations within the AY should be based on the standards of the military profession; here account was taken of the armed forces' designation as a specific organisation with a minutely detailed constitutional function and role, which 'ipso facto' dictated relations within the AY. There was constant stressing that the laws created the prerequisites for the transformation of the YNA into a contemporary armed force, with the intention and capability of consistently performing its constitutional function of defending the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the FRY. The laws were somewhat delayed by Serbian demands for greater jurisdiction over defence causing friction between General-Staff and the government of Serbia (the main thesis of opponents was that "Serbia is not protectorat of FRY").²

2.1 Command

The drafts of the law proceeded from the axiom that the AY should be based on highly professional officers, civilians employed by the AY (meaning experts) and a 50 per cent share of professional soldiers in its peacetime composition (which, together with recruits in training would create the peacetime core of the AY, capable of carrying out all defence tasks).

The new legislation devoted special attention to the precise division of leadership and command, taking into account the negative experiences so characteristic of the former SFRY (in which the commander-in-chief of the

armed forces was the collective body of the Presidency of the SFRY, which was never able to reach a consensus, thus causing the paralysis of the entire leadership structure). The commander-in-chief of the AY is the President of the FRY, who performs this duty in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC), over which he presides. The presidents of both federal units (Serbia and Montenegro) are also members, and if necessary, the Chief of General-Staff of the AY, the President of the Assembly, the Minister of Defence and others can also be summoned. The President of the FRY (who is also the President of the SDC) does not command the units directly, but through the Chief of General-Staff, who in turn commands the units. This differs from the previous system, where the jurisdictions of the Chief of General-Staff and the Minister of Defence (who was also a professional military man), were not clearly divided.

The Supreme Defence Council has twelve meetings per year, and three to four issues are discussed at each meeting. Last year, it was announced for example that, 56 generals were retired, and 26 colonels promoted to general; the prominent role of politics in the selection of generals is evident.³

The Minister of Defence is now a civilian. Interestingly, the first President of the FRY, Milan Panić, was simultaneously also the Minister of Defence. This post is now held by Pavle Bulatović, the former Minister of Internal Affairs. The Minister of Defence does not and may not command the AY, and his/her authority has been trimmed to the shaping of defence policy, administrative and financial affairs, administrative supervision and so on.

General-Staff has been reformed to become the highest specialised command body for running the Army during peacetime and for its mobilisation during war. The Chief of General-Staff is also authorised to verify regulations, commands, instructions and other internal acts referring to the training of the Army and its deployment during hostilities. General-Staff is now qualified for all leading functions: organisation, operations, logistics, intelligence, security and even R&D.

The Defence and Security Board was founded to supervise the work and condition of the AY. The members and president are chosen by the federal assembly, on the basis that all major political parties in the assembly should have a representative on the board. The board not only concerns itself with analyses of relations between the armed forces and civil society and the situation within the armed forces (insofar as this has an influence) but also with the work of and relations within the police.

2.2 Depoliticisation of the Army

It must be noted that the legislation was framed with the assumption that the AY should be a single entity, without party affiliations, and that their function should be based on the demand for the highest possible combat-readiness. In compliance with this, the entire territorial defence (including all partisan and territorial units) was abolished, and replaced with newly formed departmental, district and regional commands, subordinate to higher army commanders. All have suitable headquarters and military police units, signal units, units for infrastructural logistical organisation, units for maintaining equipment in warehouses and other units at their disposal. The AY also retained military hotels, the elements of military industry and associated elements and its own housing fund.

In their efforts to replace old ideological approaches to the military profession with new ones, the AY organised a number of discussions with the emphasis on defining the "new patriotism".⁴ This was to be founded on:

- (1) National and civil liberties;
- (2) Awareness of national values (as created by their predecessors);
- (3) Military and other traditions from previous serbo-montenegrin wars; and
- (4) Faith and trust in their own development potentials and a better future.

The sensitive issue of the place and role of political parties in this "new patriotism" (which, according to former president Dobrica Ćosić, was to be "the most powerful and most forceful military factor in the FRY") was resolved in such a way that the AY were established by law as the "armed force of all parties" and, at the same time, also "above political parties".

The role of the military security service also had to be changed in line with the officially accepted concept (removal of ideology and depoliticisation of the Army); this service, in the former YNA, was oriented towards the collection of data on political statements, the private life of military personnel and so on. In compliance with the new regulations, it is to redirect itself from repressive measures into locating and preventing the activities of foreign intelligence services, the prevention and prompt discovery of renegade military cells and terrorist activities, and the detection of crimes concerning the property of the Army.⁵ Furthermore, although not openly declared as its task, it will also be required to ensure that "anti-patriotic parties" do not infiltrate themselves among Army personnel (what actually constitutes a "patriotic" and a "anti-patriotic" party is, of course, decided by the military leadership or the chiefs of the counter-intelligence service).

Within civil society, the former subject "Defence and Civil Protection" (a compulsory subject in secondary and higher school curricula) was removed from school and university programmes. With this the Beograd's Faculty for General People's Defence lost its 'raison d'être'.⁶ In place of this ideological subject, the AY achieved the enforcement of 14-day drills for secondary school and university students during their holidays, placing emphasis on specialised learning, in the form of camps under the supervision of AY experts.

2.3 Professionalisation

The Constitution of the FRY (Article 134) generally determines that the AY are composed of permanent and reserve units and, on the matter of their permanent composition, only states that they are composed of "professional soldiers" and "conscripted soldiers". The Law on the AY defines this in greater detail, stating that "professional soldiers" are professional officers, professional non-commissioned officers, officers on contract, non-commissioned officers on contract and private soldiers on contract. The category of "professional members of the AY" does not only include "professional soldiers" but also civilians in the employ of the AY. Officials who are employed by the Ministry of Defence are classified as "employees of bodies of the federal administration". The status of professional soldiers working in state-owned companies (as production controllers of products for the AY etc.) is also defined; they are still dealt with as though they were "professional soldiers", although not active in AY units.

It is especially interesting to see how pluralist society (such as the FRY is now) and the AY have defined conditions for new military professionals. Military professionals can only be persons holding Yugoslav citizenship; this citizenship can be obtained by people who were not born in Serbia or Montenegro only if they have resided in the so-called FRY for the last two years. Newcomers who have retreated from other republics do not have the possibility of remaining in the AY. All military professionals must prove their identity with a civil identity card (in the former YNA active and retired military professionals had only military ID cards). They are also permitted to travel abroad in the same manner as other citizens (permission is now granted by brigade commanders).

Other novelties include the 40-hour working week and the wearing of uniform during work hours becoming non-compulsory (they are only worn when stipulated). Military professionals are also allowed to purchase five

years of their retirement period, and are explicitly forbidden to be members of any political party, or to perform duties within these parties (i.e. secretary, treasurer etc.). Striking, organising trade unions and participation in meetings, demonstrations, events and similar political activities are also forbidden. The same holds for any work through which fees, royalties or awards are acquired.

A new right of military professionals is the right to demand an order in written form if they assess that it may be illegal (through which lower-ranking officers should avoid being blamed for the mistakes of their superiors). The jurisdictions of the military security bodies, the military police and the military judiciary over activities within the AY remain.

Military recruits are called up when they reach the age of 21 and they serve 10 months. Seven years after the completion of their military service, recruits are called to a 21-day refresher drill. Call-ups then follow each other in cycles until the age of 42, so that military recruits wear their uniform an average of 3 days every year.⁷ Drilling is organised in such a way that during military service recruits take part only in company and platoon drills; only after being called up as reservists do they take part in drills of larger units.

Longer exercises (of 14 or 21 days) are the consequence of experience gained in the war (1991/92), which showed that soldiers in mobilised units were unfamiliar with one another, that officers did not know their men, that there was no battle cohesion etc. The contents of battle unit exercises are classical and include mobilisation, target practice, preparation for battle tasks, marches and tactical exercises and the disbanding of units.

During professionalisation, account was taken of the negative experiences from the war in 1991/92, when it became evident in practice that:

- (1) Mobilisation of the units was very difficult, as it depended on political circumstances. Because war had not been declared on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, lack of response amongst the men liable to military service could only be regarded legally as "failure to attend military exercises". For this reason, the penalties for failing to respond to call-up were relatively mild, as were the penalties for desertion;
- (2) All documentation on citizens liable to military service and the corresponding funds for mobilisation were kept by municipalities, so in the

event that the Army did not have the support of the local authorities of a given municipality, mobilisation could not be carried out within that municipality;

(3) Even when mobilisation was successful, the units could not be deployed immediately, as the newly-mobilised soldiers were not familiar with the weapons, the equipment, the commanders (or the commanders with the soldiers), their fitness was poor and so on, all of which made additional training of the units necessary;

(4) There was constant friction between the mobilised personnel from Serbia and Montenegro who supported Serbian and Montenegrin nationalist parties, and the active officers, almost all of whom were members of the Movement for Yugoslavia in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the LC MY, which was comprised of generals and was therefore also referred to as the "Generals' party"). Initially, it was headed by the former Chief of the YNA General-Staff, Stevan Mirković. The mobilised reservists often left the Army demonstratively, by throwing down their arms and equipment and going home.

The factors listed above strongly influenced the conclusion reached in General-Staff of the AY that in a divided, multi-party and multi-national society at a time when the political conditions for civil war were ripening and the political leadership was in no condition to declare war or clearly announce its goals, mobilisation was an impossible task.

This was followed by the resolution that the AY should consider the experience gained by the police, and have reliable units already at its disposal in peacetime, just as the Serbian army has. Professionalisation therefore does not include only professional commissioned and non-commissioned officers, but also military personnel under contract. Recruits still in training and mobilised personnel (who brought the "spirit of dissension from the terrain" into the Army) are evidently not the appropriate "human resource" for fighting undeclared wars, stifling unrest and similar policing tasks. This is why the AY have set themselves the goal that their ranks should be 50 per cent professional - also in peacetime - by 1995.

2.4 Democratisation of the Army

The democratisation process also had an influence on the approach to military duties. Under the new Constitution, recruits are allowed to serve in the AY in a non-combat role (in the eventuality that they do not wish to serve in a combat role, due to their religious beliefs or conscientious objection, they can be employed as cooks, barbers, bakers, workers in organisations for the rehabilitation of invalids etc. or perform their military service in a civilian job. In the first case the recruits serve double the usual military term, and in the second the length and place of service is determined by a special commission.⁸ Changes have also been made to the penal policies of the Army; instead of the former penalty of being confined to barracks, a monetary fine is levied (five to ten per cent of pay is deducted for one to two months). A fine is also used in place of degradation to a lower rank (instead, ten to twenty per cent of pay is deducted for a number of months).⁹

There was great resistance amongst the AY leadership to the general amnesty granted to all those who had avoided serving in the Army from 1991 to 1992, and those who had escaped from units because they did not want to take part in the fighting,¹⁰ but the AY eventually had to accept the amnesty, although the Chief of General-Staff warned that there would be a lot of harm caused by this (expressing the opinion that in the future all recruits will know that service can be avoided without the fear of reprisals).

A prime illustration of the process of depoliticisation and abolition of ideology is the simplified text of the military oath, which is now: ", I, (name and surname), pledge with my honour and my life that I shall defend the sovereignty, territorial independence and constitutional order of the FRY". The new word "honour" has appeared, and the ideological references to the defence of the "Socialist FRY", the clause on protecting "brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities" (multinational SFRY), the commitment "to give their life if so necessary" etc. have been omitted.

Since the former YNA was a closed institution which communicated with the public by issuing stereotypical bulletins (in which it always described itself as "defender of the achievements of the revolution and the National Liberation War"), and always lagged behind events, an information service for General-Staff of the AY was formed. Representatives operate in the three military services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and also in the Air Defence and in units directly under their command (in corps).

It is expected that this network will open the Army of Yugoslavia to the public. The public is kept informed about manoeuvres, celebrations and holidays relating to the armed forces and events within units, although it is almost powerless to explain "extraordinary occurrences" (such as murders or suicides in the barracks, other tragic incidents, thefts, incidents of drunk and disorderly conduct and so forth), which are increasing in number.

Although the AY should, in accordance with the standards prescribed, adopt the same position and attitude to all political parties, the Army's past (the undeclared wars against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the polarisation of the political parties (into those for and those against the war) have forced the top-ranking officers of the AY to adopt a position as to how to proceed. Instead of the unconditional support the YNA always offered the League of Communists (LC), the statements of the leading figures in the AY now refer to giving actual support to "all patriotic forces". These were always exclusively the forces supporting Milošević's plans for a Greater Serbia. For this reason, members of the opposition often accuse the top-ranking officers of continuing the tradition of the former YNA and of supporting one party only, in this case, Milošević's SPS.

2.5 Status of Military Professionals

The standardisation provisions with which rights are assured to military professionals are also important. In future, wages are to have five adaptable elements: the first part is to be defined on the basis of hierarchy (rank); the second is to be defined on the basis of function ("position"); the third is to be defined on the basis of seniority (years of employment); the fourth is to be defined on the basis of "special work conditions" (e.g., paratroopers, frogmen, pilots, etc.) and the fifth is to depend on additional burdens (various duties, readiness etc.). The range of salaries of military professionals is also determined, namely from 2.6 to 4 times the average monthly wage in the FRY (the average is always - as a consequence of inflation rate - determined on the basis of the past month).

There are also many changes in promotion procedure, in order to encourage the promotion of more capable officers.¹¹ A second lieutenant who acquires his rank with a university degree (University of the AY) is to become a lieutenant after one year, a captain after four more years, a captain 1st class after another five years, and a major after a further four years. Assuming four years of university studies, soldiers can attain the rank of major at 36

years of age. Since a major can be promoted to a lieutenant-colonel after four years and to a colonel after another four years, the rank of colonel can be attained at 44 years of age (an additional condition is attendance at the General-Staff academy). The colonel can then reach the rank of general after four years (a special condition being that he holds the post of general for one year and that he graduates from the School of National Defence), which means that he would then be 48 years old.

From this description of promotion, it is evident that exams for the rank of major have been abolished (in comparison with the old YNA system) and that promotion to higher ranks has been accelerated after 36 years of age. Such a system is intended to allow for the creation of the youngest possible staff of generals; "exceptional promotion" is possible, but only as an exception, and the new system is formed in such a way that the "rejuvenation" of the leadership is possible through normal means.

This model of staff selection and the permanent education of staff (all officers are to spend from 10 to 15 days at various courses each year¹²), which allows for the promotion of the best personnel to the rank of general after barely twenty years, is tightly linked to the new grading of the service. The old system in which a monopoly by the superiors existed during the grading of subordinates is to be replaced by a new system of grading, in which subordinates will also grade their superiors by means of a special questionnaire.¹³ These grades will be collected by the personnel department and processed, and then the arithmetical mean of the grade of the superior and the average grade given by the subordinates will be calculated.

This process should eradicate the old system and make it evident which of the superiors are accepted (or not) by the collective. At the same time, staff policies are to be made public, ensuring that the best candidates apply for jobs through this system of grading and published results (for the most attractive posts in command and headquarters). Parallel to this, it is hoped to open as many places as possible to the competitive employment of capable civilians, and thus avoid the nepotism characteristic of the former YNA. Thus, the attempts to democratise staffing policies with new standards are visible, for it was staffing policies (negative selection) which contributed greatly to the military failure of the former YNA.

Further "catalysts of standardisation" worth mentioning are those which in the process of reformation allowed a purge of older YNA staff who had become burdensome. To this end, administrative retirement¹⁴ was

introduced, allowing the retirement of those who have not served the required 40 years and who are younger than 55 years old.

A legal decree valid until the end of 1994 provides that any active officer who has served thirty years and any civilian in the employ of the AY who has 25 years of service can be retired if this is demanded by the "needs of the service" (to encourage retirement the pension amounts to 80 per cent of the basic pension and is increased every year by 0.5 per cent, to a limit of 85 per cent). From the position of the cut-off point (30 years of service), it can be concluded that the AY above all aim to retire those surplus high-ranking officers who make the promotion of younger officers impossible.

2.6 The new military doctrine - the search for a lost identity

The new President of the FRY, Zoran Lilić, the commander-in-chief of the AY, pointed out in his first major interview that "the purpose of the Army is to defend the country against external aggressors, while it is the duty of the police to defend the country's constitutional order, ensure the safety of its citizens and preserve order and peace within the FRY".¹⁵ His clear differentiation between the roles of the AY and the police did not stop the professional leadership of the Army from expressing a different opinion as to the current role of the AY. Chief of Staff Peršić sees the orientation of the officers of the former YNA towards "only fighting the external enemy" as the cause of the disintegration of the SFRY.¹⁶

Experiences from the war in 1991 and 1992 and the disintegration of the SFRY (which the YNA was unable to prevent) have led to the conclusion by General Radovan Radinović, head of the Centre for Strategic Studies of the AY, that the primary goal of national and republican defence is the protection of the existence of Yugoslavia (i.e. preventing its break-up into Serbia and Montenegro), while the secondary goal was to prevent the macro-break-up of Serbia into its composite entities (Kosovo, Sandžak, Vojvodina etc.).¹⁷ Such an assessment indicates that internal threats (and not external) are now regarded as the greatest threat to the existence of the FRY.

It is understandable that such assessments have given rise to the idea that the peacetime echelon of the AY must be equipped for, drilled for, and capable of efficient and speedy intervention in times of internal crisis, with the aim of preventing the spread of internal armed conflicts and eventual intervention

on the part of external forces. Only as a lower priority are the AY required to carry out operations during the initial phases of war against neighbouring countries, in the event of an attack on the FRY. In the most-demanding but least-likely case of war against a coalition (NATO or the UN), it is the task of the peacetime echelon of the AY to buy mobilisation time for the wartime army.

It has been seen that the Constitution envisages that the AY protect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the FRY, which in practice, in view of the internal crisis, means training the AY for the policing role that the YNA was unable to play successfully in 1991 and 1992. The role currently being filled by the AY, not only in Kosovo, but also in Sandžak and in the entire border area, where border units are fulfilling the function normally performed in other countries by the police, is indicative of the change of opinions as to the peacetime implementation of the AY. Another indication of the fusion of the roles of the AY and the police is the system of joint orders, which, following a decision made by the Supreme Defence Council, are signed by both Army commanders and the Minister of Internal Affairs.¹⁸

The key dilemma faced by the Serbian political elite in defining primary national interests, and their hesitancy as to whether to proclaim the union of all Serbian nations (Serbia, Montenegro, the RSK in Croatia, and the RS in Bosnia-Herzegovina) or whether to merely offer the RSK and the RS assistance in gaining independence and postpone union until the development of more favourable international relations, was also a major cause of polarisation amongst the military leadership.

Although commanders of the border corps have sometimes stated that the Army would support the local Serbian armies in the RSK or the RS in critical situations, (e.g. the statement to this effect made by General Biorčević for TV Novi Sad during the Croatian offensive near Zadar in 1993), General-Staff maintained the official position that the AY will not be involved in conflicts unless the assembly and the Supreme Defence Council decide so. At the same time, the AY have stressed that it is the patriotic duty of all ranking officers of the AY who were not born in Serbia or Montenegro (33.2 per cent of all personnel¹⁹) to leave the AY and join the armies fighting in the RS and the RSK. Not only the "temporary presence" of AY generals in the RSK and the RS (Admiral Rakić was the Minister of Defence of the RSK, while several "advisors" to the RSK are retired generals, such as Generals Domazetović and Radinović), but also the

numerous statements made by volunteers who fought in Croatia and B-H lead to the inescapable conclusion that they went there with the support of the AY, although the military leadership persistently maintains that they do not deploy soldiers to B-H.

3. (DIS)HARMONY BETWEEN STANDARDS AND REALITY

Relations between the AY and civil society manifest themselves on the institutional level through federal institutions: the Ministry of Defence, the Supreme Defence Council, the assembly committees supervising matters of defence, and the federal assembly (in which deputies more or less critically debate on occurrences within the Army, the financing of the Army, incidents in the Army and so forth). The other, non-institutional part of the relationship between the Army and civil society manifests itself through the functioning of political parties which occasionally also take an active interest in matters pertaining to defence and/or the Army. It is characteristic of the current situation that the political parties do not have the same position with regard to the leadership of the AY, as to the AY as a whole.

Official reports of the sessions held by the various committees, councils and assemblies on matters of defence and the AY are tedious, full of clichés and give no clear insight into the subject matter. More can be deduced from the statements made by leading politicians (in particular the opposition, who regard the AY as an extension of Milošević's regime) and the former soldiers of the AY who take part in these debates and quarrels. The new legislation has limited public political appearances by military personnel to members of the Information Service of General-Staff (who issue occasional public statements) or interviews and public appearances by the Minister of Defence, the Chief of General-Staff, and other leading military personnel. The AY no longer has representatives in the republic assemblies, political parties, defence committees, commissions, or elsewhere, as during the time of the YNA, when the Army had its own special political administration.

Current relations between the AY and civil society are subject to the problem that the staff of the AY is still comprised of personnel who were indoctrinated and passed through the screening mechanisms of the ideology-based YNA. Because of this, the public still have reservations about these personnel and their ties with the League of Communists' Movement for Yugoslavia, accusing them of nostalgic sentiments for the former Yugoslavia, a lack of Serbian patriotism and similar failings. These

accusations place the leadership of the AY in a situation where they are constantly forced to repeat that the AY are a depoliticised, non-party-affiliated, professional organisation, taking their orders from the government alone. In any case, the legacy left by the YNA still endures, and merits analysis.

3.1 The Legacy of the YNA

For a variety of reasons, there were many who were sceptical about the process of transformation when it was announced, especially concerning the way in which it would progress:

- (1) military experts who monitored the behaviour and moves of General-Staff in 1991 and during the outbreak of war in Bosnia were doubtful that the generals who made so many mistakes would have the knowledge and capability to carry out such complex tasks;
- (2) economic experts who assessed economic conditions in the FRY and the consequences of international isolation and the embargo, which were visible as early as the beginning of 1992, doubted that the economy was capable of providing the additional assets (about USD 600 million) necessary for this transformation;²⁰
- (3) others who estimated that even two years were not nearly enough for such an extensive project, and that at least five to six years would be necessary for the entire project.²¹

Furthermore, General-Staff could not count on the support of the public, for all public opinion polls showed that the public held a very negative opinion of the former YNA, its officers, and especially its generals, whom they frequently identified as the main culprits for the collapse of the former federal state. Even a conference of army experts organised in 1992 showed that this situation might change "only in the coming few years".²²

The political climate in 1992 when General-Staff of the YNA planned its transformation is well illustrated by the speech of the then commander-in-chief, President Dobrica Ćosić, given to the officers of the AY 1st corps: "Officers, gentlemen, you know that today we face an unusually turbulent political battle in our country, in the morass of party-politics and other tangled webs, and in such situations you are also exposed to degradation and humiliation of a civic nature, so that you do not even care to wear the uniform of an officer. Many party-affiliated people still see in you an ideological army (the former YNA, A.Ž.)."²³

A Serbian academic who carried out an in-depth analysis of the role of the YNA during the collapse of former Yugoslavia²⁴ defined five key errors made by General-Staff:

- (1) the use of tanks during the anti-Milošević demonstrations in Belgrade, March 1991 (the Army was used in the role of the police, A.Ž.);
- (2) support for the Milošević regime (demonstrating support for the SPS and the lack of respect by Serbia for the multi-party system, A.Ž.);
- (3) by supporting Milošević it openly threatened the other republics of former Yugoslavia (it showed that it would not be neutral in the process of the disintegration of the federal state, A.Ž.);
- (4) a month later it tolerated the import of arms to Croatia (attempting to correct the mistake it had made in March, 1991, and by restraining itself from taking action an even greater mistake was made);
- (5) it was utterly ineffective in Slovenia in June 1991.

This academic (who maintains the imminence of a military coup d'état) is opposed by all the top staff of General-Staff, their thesis being that the Army did not receive appropriate commands from the commander-in-chief - the President of the SFRY - and that it was just this commander-in-chief with his high treason who caused the breakdown of the federal state (which the YNA could not save). Such apologies were never accepted by the Serbian or Montenegrin public, nor by many Serbian military experts. The great majority were of the opinion that YNA General-Staff were responsible for the YNA not preparing for an "internal war", and they generally believe that two systemic errors caused this: (1) the overestimation of ideological factors and the cohesiveness of so-called Yugoslav society and (2) the underestimation of the negative influence of external factors.²⁵

That no essential changes arose in the public opinion of Serbia and Montenegro in 1993 either (although practically the entire composition of General-Staff was changed, and generals who had been on the western front came to the head of the AY) is shown by the statement made last year by the new Chief of General-Staff of the AY, General Momčil Perišić: "I accepted this duty so that with your help I could protect those honest people who gave themselves to this war, those who have lost everything they had, and that the unjustifiably lost trust, respect and dignity of the AY is returned to the level which they deserve.... and we justifiably expect from the government institutions, the Supreme Defence Council and our nation that the Army are acknowledged in their historical role, because at the time of the collapse of the state they preserved themselves, because they protected the Serbian nation outside the borders of the FRY against crime and

destruction and because they created conditions under which this nation could organise and successfully lead a battle, and because they cooperated in the formation of the FRY."²⁶

It can be seen from the statements of former-President Ćosić and the new Chief of General-Staff, Perišić (although the statements came one year apart), that there were no essential changes in public opinion. The AY still remained closely linked to the image of the YNA, and were still blamed for the collapse of the former state, although General-Staff made efforts to show they were defending the Serbian nation, that they had withdrawn in an organised manner and that in forming the armies of the RSK and the RS, they had created the conditions for the foundation of both states, as well as the FRY.

3.2 Attempts by the Military Leadership to Abolish the Legacy of the YNA

Observing the verbal duels among the generals of the former Yugoslav Army and between federal civilian leadership and amongst the generals, it is very clear, that there is always present the key question, who is responsible for the disintegration of the former state. The commanding officers of the Armies - who were deployed in Slovenia, Croatia and BH - are denying that they are responsible. Most of them are convinced that the General-Staff is responsible for its doing nothing and that it was only passively waiting for the decisions of federal civilian leadership. Some of them - like general Života Avramović - believe that corps' commanders were not enough motivated for the activities and that exactly their passive behaviour was the main cause for the defeat.^{26a} The others, like the commander of the Second Army of YPA, Milutin Kukanjac publicly confessed that he personally gave in time orders for the arming of the local Serbs in Croatia and BH, and that he had begun to withdraw his troops from BH and Croatia only because the General-Staff and the federal Presidency (as a supreme commander of the Armed Forces) gave him order for withdrawal. He is insisting on the fact that immediately after the international recognition of BH (6 April, 1992) there was constituted new state - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 27 April, 1992. In the light of these two facts, his Second Army of YPA was treated in BH like a foreign force, i. e. an occupation Army. As a body of evidence (that he and his soldiers were betrayed), he argued that not only General-Staff of YPA had forgotten him, but also the Serbian leadership of BH (it had been evacuated from Sarajevo to Pale and left him and his soldiers completely alone and encircled in Sarajevo).^{26b} Till this moment, the attention of mass-media has

been focused on similar stories of corps commanders and sometimes of army commanders, is only smoke-screen for camouflage of the responsibility of the General-Staff and what a part of former federal presidency (Kostić, Jović etc.) who was responsible for the decisions-non-decisions.

Amongst the generals of the former YPA is one who is explicitly accusing the General-Staff of the former YNA for the betraying of the troops' commanders and manpower on the battle-fields. It is a very well known radical Andrija Biorčević (he was retired at the end of 1993, after the "divorce" between Serbian premier Slobodan Milošević and his favourite "opponent" Serbian radical Dr. Šešelj). He is one of the rare former generals who is also now prepared to say that he was during 1991 in 1992 - "very successfully" cooperating with Serbian paramilitary units. He is explains that this kind of fighters were practically only a source to complement the units with manpower. This general openly and publicly accused the General-Staff and Ministry of Defense (namely general Veljko Kadijević) because they stopped his offensive against Osijek (as an overture for deep breakthrough into Western Slavonia).²⁶ The discrepancy between corps commanders and high echelon generals in Belgrade is evident and it is not possibly to exclude the initiation of a new process for definitive "purification" of the present Serbian Army of the former Yugoslav mortgage in the near future.

General-Staff of the YNA attempted to do away with the legacy from the former Yugoslavia and present themselves to the Serbian and Montenegrin public as a new institution making a more than verbal condemnation of the past. In taking such action, General-Staff of the AY employed three basic procedures: (1) promoting generals who had "distinguished" themselves in operations in the west; (2) retiring "incapable" generals en masse (particularly non-Serbian generals); and (3) placing the generals and officers to whom responsibility for failures was given on trial. There were naturally no trials held for war crimes (as the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Panić, would have stood trial for the destruction of Vukovar, Admiral Jokić for operations on Dubrovnik, General Kukanjac for Sarajevo and General Perišić for Zadar and Mostar).²⁷

Several military trials were held, by means of which the generals currently in command wished to prove that they were capable of "patriotic discrimination". The most famous of these trials were:

(1) The trial of General Vasiljević, the last head of the security service of the YNA. The trial was an attempt to charge him with having formed a

group under the name of "Opera" through which he betrayed military secrets to the Croatian Army, and of carrying out activities aimed against the AY and Yugoslavia. Attempts were made to implicate numerous other persons in this affair, and the retired Serbian generals Sredoje Urošević, Vido Šoškić, Pavle Jakšić and Milija Stanišić, who attributed defeat to "treason" amongst the leadership of the YNA, played an important part in the campaign launched by the "patriotic" press. This move marked the opening of the season of "cleansing" the Army of non-Serbs or non-Montenegrins.²⁸

This trial of General Aleksandar Vasiljević illustrates the general situation, because the new AY had accused him of having committed a number of crimes during the disintegration of the YNA, including misuse of his official position (distributing confiscated arms amongst friends and acquaintances, and similar deeds), cooperation with the "enemies" (this refers to the role he played in the exchange of hostages and his interventions with the police of B-H, who at the beginning of 1992 cooperated with the YNA in maintaining order, before giving full support to Izetbegović), and terrorism (allegedly, he gave the order in 1991 to plant explosives under buildings belonging to the Jewish community in Zagreb and the Jewish cemetery, to throw the suspicion of antisemitism on the Croatian authorities).

Both Vasiljević and the counter-intelligence service of the Air Force (also part of the "Opera" affair) were put on trial, the details being broadcast by the Serbian TV network, with the aim of demonstrating to the Serbian and Montenegrin public that the security service of the new army was capable of discovering and incapacitating double agents in the army, who, under the pretence of attempting to preserve Yugoslavia, had allegedly helped its "destroyers". The Opera affair is typical in that none of the allegations could be proven at the end of the trials, despite incidents such as keeping Radenko Radojčić (code name Ljudevit), who was accused of being the key civilian agent, in jail for 8 months.²⁹ Although all the accused were released from custody at the end of the trial, it was at this time that the coterie of "patriotic" generals, hiding behind this smoke screen and backed by the pressure of a public looking for scapegoats for Serbia's defeat, succeeded in purging the Army of all "not enough Serbian" generals and senior officers.

The generals also made use of the "spontaneous" outbursts of crowd demonstrations and the "patriotic" press, which accused the last Minister of Defence of the SFRY, General Kadijević, the last Chief of Staff, Adžić, Admiral Brovet, the last Chief of the YNA in B-H, Kukanjac and others from amongst the YNA's final leadership of being "Ustashi", "traitors" etc.

The pressure organised by radicals of the SRS and other right-wing parties, made it easier for the new Serbian coterie to settle accounts with their predecessors (which was also in the interest of Milošević and the SPS);

(2) the trial of the commander of the Varaždin Corps of the YNA, General Trifunović (he was accused of leaving large quantities of weapons to the Croatian Army and of giving priority to the rescue of the lives of his soldiers and not fighting to the death);³⁰

(3) the "Flowershop" affair, which made scapegoats of (ir)responsible officers, members of the housing committee which (after the defeats of the YNA in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia) allocated luxury apartments to the generals responsible for these defeats;

(4) the trial of Admiral Bocinov for negotiating with the Croatian Army during the siege of the Naval Academy in Split, and not doing all that was necessary to prevent Croatian officers from deserting to the Croatian side; and

(5) the trial of General Silić, for badly coordinating the Army and Air Force actions in Slavonia in 1991, due to which the Air Force attacked its own units etc.

Among the most audacious interventions of this kind was the move made by Judge Đorđe Dozet (his actual rank was captain), who in February 1994 announced to the Belgrade press the trial of all members of the supreme command of former Yugoslavia; they were to be accused of grand treason for rejecting the proposal of the then Minister of Defence, General Kadijević, for the proclamation of a state of emergency and general mobilisation, and for accepting the resolution on withdrawing the YNA from Slovenia.³¹

Another feature of the trials is the pile of memoirs and diaries with which the accused attempt to explain to the press how the entire affair proceeded. The most widely publicised of these are the memoirs of Generals Kadijević, Kukanjac, Vasiljević, Trifunović, and General Simović's secretary, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić.

The looting which accompanied the Dubrovnik campaign of 1991 was never investigated, although the yachts obtained as "spoils of war" were sold at public auctions (these yachts were evacuated to Boka Kotorska) and the

government of Montenegro later returned some of the paintings stolen from the Dubrovnik gallery.

If any public statements did mention war crimes, then only paramilitary units were cited as the perpetrators. But since these units were operationally subordinated to the army commanders and it was these who did not prevent their acts, nor later take any measures against these perpetrators, the commanders are also responsible. Paradoxically, only the Serbian Radical Party has raised the issue of war crimes in Vukovar (and that only when they were having a show-down with General-Staff Chief Panić, demanding his resignation).

Since the AY have accepted new symbols (a flag, coat-of-arms, uniform insignia, emblems, new uniforms, etc.), new ranks (former "junior officers" of the YNA are now non-commissioned officers) and new rules and regulations, they have not been capable of a show-down with their own past. The abolition of the political administration, the prohibition of parties within the Army, naming YNA generals (who were retired but not placed on trial) as guilty parties and blaming the collapse of the federal state on politicians (who formed the Presidency of the SFRY), were the only acts open to them. This is understandable, for the very perpetrators of the war crimes themselves now command General-Staff of the AY and the highest units. International war crimes of a particular kind were also continued by the AY in 1993 and 1994 by mobilising refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and then handing them over to the local Serbian armies.³²

It is typical that the AY looked for the reasons for its failures in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina principally among federal politicians and in the Serbian nationalist parties; it was the latter whom during the collapse of the Yugoslav Army insisted that Serbia should have its own army and that the Serbs should not fight under the flag with a red star, i.e. in an ideologically multinational army, which the YNA was at that time. The majority of AY military experts were of the opinion that the Army could not have been responsible for the unsuccessful mobilisation and the low morale of those who responded to mobilisation, and who later often left the battle grounds in entire units.

3.3 Changing Ethnic Composition of the Army

Although the Constitution stipulates that military service is a duty of all the citizens of the FRY, the repressive role of the AY in regions with

non-Serbian and non-Montenegrin inhabitants and tolerance of Serbian paramilitaries (acting as "self-defence forces" in certain regions for the Serbian inhabitants who terrorise the non-Serbs) mean that the call-up is not obeyed by the Albanian, Muslim, and, more rarely, Hungarian minorities. In principle, the professional ranks of the AY were to have the same composition as the entire country, but this could not be achieved, for the reasons stated above. According to the data presented to the public in 1993 by the General-Staff Chief, the professional AY was composed of 75.6 per cent Serbs and Montenegrins and 9.7 per cent "Yugoslavs",³³ leaving only 14.7 per cent of other nationalities which, according to official statistics, comprise 29.4 per cent of the inhabitants of the FRY.

The collapse of the YNA has led to an even greater Serbian and Montenegrin majority in the officer corps of the AY (before the war it was "only" 60 per cent Serbs and Montenegrins),³⁴ and a smaller and smaller response from Albanian and Muslim recruits, and even Serbs are more and more frequently avoiding military service. The commander of the Priština Corps stated in 1993 that of an annual contingent of 30,000 recruits only 2,852 Albanians responded,³⁵ while in Sandžak only 4 came to exercises out of the 2,300 that were called up.³⁶ In Vojvodina, there was a fifty per cent response³⁷ by recruits in 1992, which is better but still not satisfactory for the needs of the AY.

The Army leadership complain that this unresponsiveness is caused by the non-functioning of the legal state; for example, the police in Kosovo handed over only 5 per cent of those who avoided military service to the Army, while the administration prosecuted only 50 per cent of charged detainees, and only 46 per cent of all declared criminal acts.³¹ The data of international organisations confirm that the avoidance of military service is truly a mass phenomenon, and many refugees are seeking refuge with them (about 200,000).³⁹

The refusal to serve in the AY by those not of Serbian or Montenegrin descent led to a 50 per cent fall in the annual contingent of recruits. There is now a disparity between the ethnic composition of the recruited contingent, who are virtually all Serbs or Montenegrins, and the composition of the officers, 14.7 per cent of whom are not Serbian or Montenegrin. The newspapers are filled with letters openly appealing that these people be removed from the AY, leaving an officer corps of similar composition to that of the recruits, i.e. that they be ethnically cleansed.

The distrust of Albanians, Muslims, Hungarians, Gypsies and other non-Serbs or non-Montenegrins is also endemic to the military doctrine, which is explicitly concerned with the repression of armed anti-Serbian uprisings, terrorism, separatism and civil unrest of wider dimensions.⁴⁰

3.4 Relations between the AY and the political elite and political parties

The military leadership of the AY always maintained that they served the nation and respected the provisions of the Constitution, which is why their subsequent behaviour and the statements made by AY generals during critical moments of the struggle for supremacy over the newly-founded federal state amongst the Serbian political elite are all the more interesting. Since Milan Panić, Dobrica Ćosić and Zoran Lilić all at one time or another held the most important post in the federal state between 1992 and 1994, while Slobodan Milošević remained President of Serbia throughout, it can be concluded that the answer to the question of whose side the AY were on is closely connected with the position taken by the generals at these times. Initially, it seemed that the military leadership would support the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the FRY, Milan Panić. Even Panić himself stated confidently in several interviews that he was supported by the generals.⁴¹ Yet when Panić agreed (1991) to the withdrawal of the AY from Prevlaka, Milošević took advantage of this move and accused him of having "capitulated". This shook the military leadership (which had already counselled Panić against withdrawing from Prevlaka before this incident).

Milan Panić writes in his memoirs that following a meeting with him, certain generals informed Milošević that he had questioned them on the strength and equipment of the Serbian police, which was interpreted by "somebody" at the top of the SPS as preparation for a military coup.⁴² As part of the preventive measures taken, the Serbian police broke into the offices of the federal security service and confiscated all its documentation.

Previous to this event, owing to cutbacks in the military budget and the priority given to the Serbian police, there was a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the status of the AY within their ranks. Many had deduced that the Army were developing a tendency to support Panić, and that the police were in a way Milošević's army, but the AY failed to react to the break-in carried out by the Serbian police, indicating that the military leadership had distanced themselves from the dispute.

The passivity of the military leadership became even more evident when Serbian security agents broke into General-Staff, during which the newly-appointed chief of the security service, General Nedeljko Bošković, replaced General Vasiljević (who was later taken to trial). The elevation of Nedeljko Bošković, who had been in retirement for four years before the action was carried out (he was retired because of his Serbian nationalistic views), to the rank of general clearly showed that the Serbian regime had planned the manoeuvre in order to demonstrate their power over the leadership of the AY.

When more serious discord came about between President Panić, and Serbian President Milošević, and preparations for the elections were underway, the then Chief of the Air Force and candidate for the post of Chief of General-Staff, Božidar Stevanović, answering the question of whether he would take over the post of General-Staff Chief, replied that "no honourable and patriotic general would, under any circumstances, suffer the indignity of being in the government of the President of the FRY, Milan Panić".⁴³

The question of toward whom the Army leadership were inclined was answered when the removal of Čosić (just as with President Panić) showed that the initiatives for overstepping his constitutional authority came once again from the military leadership (with whom Čosić had called a meeting to which the other members of the Supreme Defence Council were not invited). Again a group of generals reported to Milošević that Čosić had invited them to a meeting, at which he had claimed that people in the streets were already asking him: "What are you waiting for, when you know that the AY would back you?"

The main role in both events was played by a group of three generals (Stevanović, Bošković, Domazetović), known for their close cooperation with the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, Dr Šešelj, supplying him with data on unreliable generals, who were in favour of the AY breaking off cooperation with the paramilitaries, having assessed that such cooperation brought few military advantages, as the paramilitaries plundered and carried out ethnic purges far more than they actually fought, compromising the Army as a whole (as they were nominally under the command of military leaders). The Serbian Radicals saw danger in this and began collecting information to discredit the generals supporting Panić and Čosić. Dr Šešelj, in order to neutralise the other generals and the existing Chief of General-Staff, Života Panić, (who were the opposition to the radical troika above),

began a strong media campaign against "crime in the upper echelons" of the AY, which ended with a summons to court and retirement for Panić.

The intensity of the campaign is shown by some of the demands put forward by the Radicals:

- All generals of the AY to be driven out of the elite Belgrade suburb of Dedinje (where housing had been allocated primarily to General-Staff members and the staff of the military academy), and relocated to Kosovo;
- Construction of housing for the military to be prohibited in Belgrade for the next four years and all garrisons of the AY to move out of the city into the areas where the Army train and/or which they must defend during war;
- All national servicemen from the RSK and the RS (except the wounded) to be prohibited entry into the FRY; etc.

At the same time, the AY officers born west of the Drina were under constant pressure in Serbia to return to their places of origin.⁴⁵

Only when the rift between the Serbian Party of Socialists (led by Milošević) and the Serbian Radical Party developed could it be seen that the actual influence of the SRP in the AY was only seemingly strong, and that the strings were really pulled by Milošević. During this show-down between the SPS and the SRP, all three of the "influential" generals encountered above were hurriedly retired, with their posts and the command posts of the basic strategic divisions being filled by a new, previously anonymous, pro-Milošević team. Some of those that were retired then joined the armies of the RSK and the RS.⁴⁶

It is characteristic that the General-Staff intelligence service, who had until then tolerated a number of outbursts by Dr Šešelj and his threats of retaliation by the AY against neighbouring countries (in the event of an attack on the FRY, A.Ž.), issued a special statement in which it was emphasised that the case of Dr Šešelj was a "classic case of uncontrolled judgement and supreme incompetence". At the same time it reprimanded him, saying he had no "monopoly on patriotism", nor was he authorised to divide members of the AY into "patriots" (those who thought like him, A.Ž.) and "those who are not".⁴⁷

An interesting insight into relations between the AY leadership and the federal and Serbian governments was also given by one of the bankers funnelling money to finance the operations of the Serbian police forces in the territory west of the Drina.⁴⁸ His assessments cannot be verified, but are

interesting, because he claims the reason for his flight from Serbia (on March 8, 1993) was not his criminal dealings (of which he was accused by the SPS), but the coup against Milošević allegedly being prepared by the military leadership. This banker maintains that the key person in the conspiracy was the Chief of Staff of the AY, Perišić, and states that he himself was a "liaison officer" between foreign intelligence agencies and the conspirators. He stresses explicitly that the generals cheated him, taking the money intended for the "coup" (USD 12 million) and reporting the entire matter to Milošević. The lightning advancement of the formerly unknown General Perišić (3 ranks in as many years) could also be explained as a reward for his part in this deception.

In all of Milošević's showdowns with his rivals, the AY distanced themselves from his opponents during the decisive moments of conflict, indicating that they are truly run by the Serbian President, and not their nominal commander-in-chief, the President of the FRY. This can also be seen now that the current President of the FRY is Zoran Lilić, commonly known to be Milošević's puppet.

The degree of control that the SPS has in the field of defence is also illustrated by the power struggles within the federal assembly's Board for Defence and Protection. Initially, a member of the opposition was appointed chairman of this committee, but when he discovered that the police force numbered between 70,000 and 90,000 and attempted to gain insight into the methods of repression they employed, he was soon removed from office and substituted by a representative of the SPS.⁴⁹

Many AY officers are today convinced that the AY are underestimated and that their "sacrifices" to date have not been sufficiently appreciated. To encourage officer recruitment, the new commander-in-chief, Zoran Lilić, put special emphasis on the "immeasurable contribution" which the AY as a whole gave to the survival of Serbian nationals in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, making only brief mentions of individuals guilty of cowardice and treason. During his appearance, he placed himself in defence of the AY⁵⁰, while at the same time mentioning that "some political factors" (the Radicals, A.Ž.) did not want to acknowledge the merits of the AY and that comparisons between the AY and the police (due to the higher salaries of the police, A.Ž.) were "done with malicious intent".⁵¹

It is generally conjectured Milošević's control of the AY proceeds through two channels:

(1) The Serbian Radicals are firmly convinced that the LC MY is still operating secretly within the AY. As Milošević's wife, Dr Mira Marković is the party's most important ideologist (she supports the Greater Serbia programme and treats it as the embryo which will make the establishment of a new kind of Yugoslav association possible), the Radicals believe that Milošević has detailed insight into the situation and events at the top of the AY.

(2) Because the security service of the AY lost members with the removal of General Vasiljević and subsequent purges, those working for Milošević's security service have returned to the AY service (which was formed by General Nedeljko Bošković and upgraded by General Dimitrijević), giving Milošević further insight into the situation in the AY from this aspect.

The Serbian Radicals, who in 1991, 1992 and the first half of 1993 successfully cooperated with the AY and therefore probably have a thorough insight into activities within the AY and the armies of the RSK and the RS, cite two typical cases as proof that the AY is now an instrument for the implementation of Milošević's personal manifesto:

(1) At the beginning of 1993, the Belgrade-Bar train was stopped at the village Štrpci, and 17 Muslims were removed and shot. The Radicals maintain that this crime was perpetrated by members of the special forces of the AY wearing Chetnik emblems in order to compromise the Radicals (whose party militia were in fact posted in this zone) and to justify entering into conflict with them;

(2) They also claim that the security services of the AY organised a military uprising in September 1993 in Banja Luka. The rebels criticised the government of the RS (in which the Radicals are dominant) as being too tolerant of crime, of not ameliorating the social conditions of veteran soldiers and their families, and so on. In contrast to the Radicals, who state that only the generals support Milošević, while the majority of the AY support the Greater Serbia idea and the Radicals, the remaining Serbian parties do not have such an aggressive public stance. In general, they are content to solicit the AY as a whole and do not try to create political disunion within the AY (i.e. win over to their side the officers and the lower-ranking personnel).

In analysing the relations between the AY and the political elite and political parties, the key questions in decisive moments are whose side the AY will

take and whether the split in society will also cause a split within the AY. The situation sharpened particularly in July 1994 when the clash between Karadžić and Milošević occurred (over the proposal of the international Contact Group for peace in B-H), followed by rifts within the RS and the FRY, where some parties supported Milošević and others Karadžić. When the Chief of Staff of the AY publicly supported Milošević, the question arose as to was whether the commander of the Serbian army in the RS, General Mladić, would also do so, or whether he would come out in favour of Karadžić. Until then, the Serbian Radicals had often labelled General Mladić as supporting the LC MY and with this, also Milošević, while the left-wing parties saw Mladić purely as a Greater Serbian nationalist, who has substituted the project of Greater Serbia for the communist ideal.⁵² With accusations being launched at him from both sides, with the expectation that he would clearly state his position, General Mladić remained silent, giving rise to additional rumours and guesswork. Official sources in Serbia hinted that Mladić would remove Karadžić from office at a key moment thus facilitating the implementation of Milošević's plan. The reward for his cooperation would then be the highest position in the AY, and he would not be put on trial for his war crimes, Milošević instead laying all responsibility for them on the Radicals and paramilitary forces who could then be jailed. The Serbian Radicals hinted the opposite, stating that General Mladić was getting ready to cross the Drina with a section of his forces, where he would be joined by a section of the AY for the march on Belgrade.

Naturally, there were also other rumours. Amongst the most fantastic was a claim that a "Serbian National Army" was "secretly" being formed in Serbia with the help of the RS and the RSK, and was getting ready to carry out a coup which would be joined by the paramilitary forces of the Serbian Radical Party, the Serbian Chetnik Movement, the Serbian People's Renewal Party and the Beli Orli (White Eagles). Supposedly these forces were to be under the command of the retired generals of the YNA, Andrija Biorčević and Radovan Radinović.⁵³ Although the entire matter remained just a rumour, it illustrates that by spreading rumours and exerting other kinds of pressure, political parties attempted to destabilise and split the AY. The leadership of the AY are, for the time being, supportive of Milošević, while the otherwise eloquent General Mladić remains persistently silent. In September, rumours arose that he was wounded, that he had been in a bad car accident or that he had been liquidated by AY agents, and so forth.

This case graphically illustrates the political games played with and around the Army in which the AY are always merely an object. It is very likely that

the above "information" on the preparations for a coup being carried out by the Radicals was spread by the Serbian security service with the aim of presenting the Radicals as conspirators betraying Serbia to the B-H extremists, thus turning public opinion against them.

3.5 Conditions within the AY

The elite generals of the YNA were removed from their posts entirely through a series of purges. Their places were taken by the new military elite, comprised mainly of former colonels, and less homogeneous than previously. Many of the members of this elite were informally linked to different parties, many of whom had and continue to have their own party militias (who operated in conjunction with these very colonels in Croatia and B-H). There are two basic groups within the current elite of generals: the first is comprised of the generals commanding the armies of the RS and the RSK, and the second is comprised of the generals who were promoted to their current ranks when their troops were withdrawn to the so-called FRY, where they supported Milošević in settling scores with his opponents. The leading figure in the first group is General Mladić, while the second group is headed by General Perišić. Of the two, Mladić without doubt enjoys the greater military prestige, as he gained his promotions on the battlefield, although Perišić's rise was no less meteoric, primarily due to his support of Milošević.

The current officer corps is extremely stratified:

- (1) The first group is comprised of officers who were living in Serbia and Montenegro before the outbreak of war, whose housing problems have in general been solved, whose wives have jobs, and who have status symbols (holiday houses, cars etc.) carried over from the YNA;
- (2) The second group is comprised of the officers who moved to Serbia and Montenegro from the current "secessionist" republics, where their living quarters and often also their families still remain;
- (3) The third group is comprised of officers who are living with their families in Serbia and Montenegro, but who go to "the front" (in the RSK and the RS) from time to time, and then use this to demonstrate their patriotism when applying for promotion;
- (4) The fourth group is comprised of the officers who remained with the local armies of the RSK and the RS. There is a large shortage of active officers in these armies, and the AY periodically organises campaigns in

order to persuade the officers born on the territory of Croatia or B-H to join this fourth group. These campaigns, however, are none-too-successful, as one third of the current officers in the AY were born elsewhere than Serbia or Montenegro. As there are not enough officers in the local Serbian armies, the officers there move through the ranks rapidly, and are overtaking their contemporaries in the AY.

As a result of this stratification, the officers of the fourth group consider themselves to be the elite of the elite. Among them, General Mladić has the greatest authority and his opinions carry a lot of weight - not only among the soldiers, but also among politicians. Within the AY, the second group of officers is most condemned, for setting a bad example to the officers from Serbia and Montenegro (who say they can not "trust them to defend Serbia and Montenegro if they are not willing to defend the places they were born in"). In connection with this, the appeal made by the students of the Military Academy in Belgrade, who demanded that the military command remove all the lecturers who came from the territories west of the Drina, is often mentioned.

The third group of officers are also condemned as "compromisers" and "opportunists", who have remained in the safety of the AY and only spent shorter periods of time in the west Serbian armies. As a rule, the families of these officers live in the FRY, and are also demanding FRY citizenship (through which they could resolve their status within the AY on a more permanent basis).⁵⁴

In effect, the AY do not have the means to defend themselves from public criticism, and the public still ascribe a number of the characteristics of the former YNA to them. An analysis of public opinion carried out by AY experts in 1994 showed that negative feelings dominated in the FRY (34 per cent), while those with a positive point of view formed the smallest group (22 per cent), and the remainder were sceptical (containing elements of both the first and the second assessments).⁵⁵

The more critical officers have concluded that although the AY have been cleansed of non-Serbs, everything has in general remained as it was:⁵⁶ (1) many officers have retained positions and duties for which they are neither motivated nor professionally competent, while the personnel capable of performing these tasks hold less important posts; (2) assessment of results has been pushed into the background, and priority in promotion is given to personnel who take pains not to incur anyone's displeasure and who give

uncritical support to their commanding officers; (3) capable officers with initiative are purposely pushed into the background, where they in turn try to introduce radical solutions and cause their commanding officers difficulties; (4) the staffing councils, which should function as advisory bodies for selecting the most capable personnel are in general still "levers" used by the commanders. In general, the atmosphere in the AY is still similar to that of the YNA, although the old generals have been replaced by new ones.

A considerable amount of dissatisfaction with the indecisive generals and federal politicians could be felt amongst officers below the ranks of general after the war in Slovenia (June 1991), as the former stuck rigidly to prescribed procedures. Statements made by the chairman of the association of veterans of the 1991/92 war, officers of the guard, and many others, indicate that the lower-ranking officers were actually preparing a coup in September 1991. The only reason the coup did not succeed was the inability of officers who had broken into the YNA General-Staff to persuade the highest ranking officer in General-Staff, chief of General Staff Adžić to change the Minister of Defence and other "indecisive" personnel and assume authority or organise trials against all those who occupied key command positions during the defeat. The dissolving YNA was effectively without a commander-in-chief during this critical phase of development, due to the paralysis of the Federal Presidency.

Despite numerous accusations made against the generals and politicians by officers, the AY could not summon the strength for a radical settling of accounts with those responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia. The chairman of the veterans' association, Colonel Milojević, proved that the lower-ranking officers in battle units were sufficiently self-sacrificing and motivated by quoting the figure that one quarter of all the casualties were officers.⁵⁴

The rising crime level in the FRY, the RSK and the RS, and the implication of politicians, paramilitaries and the police in various affairs connected with illegal trade in crude oil and cars, arms smuggling, drug dealing and so forth in 1992, forced the security forces to deal with a host of new problems. There was also growing dissatisfaction with speculators in the RS and the RSK, who were growing rich on the war and who had evacuated their families to the FRY. So far though, this dissatisfaction has not triggered any actions on the part of the AY against civilian criminals, as the jurisdiction of the officers is limited to the AY, with civilians under the

jurisdiction of the police.

Discord is also growing between the officers who until the outbreak of the war in Slovenia had lived in Serbia and Montenegro, and those professional members of the AY (30,000 including their families) who moved to this region during and after the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (50 per cent of the active professionals in the AY are homeless, and 86 per cent in the Navy).⁵⁹ Support for the Radicals is greatest in the second group, while SPS supporters predominate in the other groups.

The difference in status between the "newcomers" (who lost their homes and property in the former republics) and the "domestics" (who lived in Serbia and Montenegro and retained their property) is a cause of constant friction within the AY. The domestics assert that the newcomers have a privileged position (they have received aid and special benefits), while the newcomers see themselves as having made sacrifices that are not sufficiently appreciated. The pressure on officers born in Croatia and B-H to return back to their "home territories" and join the armies of the RSK and the RS is also strong.

The low salaries for military professionals were the consequence of the constant fall in the military budget, in direct proportion to the increase in the budget of the Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Internal Affairs and the fall in national revenues. By way of illustration, in 1993 the projected budget for the AY was 11.5 per cent of GNP (or three quarters of the entire federal budget), estimated to be about USD 12 billion. The actual amount was USD 10 billion, and additional restrictions contributed to this decreasing by a further 8 per cent. After allowing for the currency collapse, the final amount, which in 1991 amounted to USD 2.6 billion, dropped to about USD 400 million (barely 4 per cent of the GNP)⁶⁰. The average annual expenditure thus amounted to USD 4,000 on each member of the armed forces.⁶¹

Of the entire Army budget, nearly 40 per cent goes on salaries and 18.5 per cent on pensions, leaving little for more intensive military-industrial production or for transformation (about 20 per cent of the budget is allocated for this). This is why military-industrial production has fallen (by 40 per cent on average). Under such circumstances, the only solution open was a drastic cut in staff, and a transfer of the bulk of spending on soldiers to the salaries of professionals (including various benefits which do not count as salary) at the expense of lowering pensions.⁶²

Additional dissatisfaction amongst the military elite is caused by the Serbian police being financed by Serbia and not by the FRY. In contrast to the federal treasury, Milošević's government can afford to be generous. According to official data, the Serbian police (with a much lower average level of education than the Army) have a budget of USD 180 million for salaries, while the AY have only USD 160 million for the same purpose, the number of professionals in both cases being almost the same.

Speaking at the federal assembly in 1993, the Minister of Defence, Pavle Bulatović, disclosed that the AY had lowered their number of active officers by 32 per cent, non-commissioned officers by 34 per cent, and civil personnel by 48 per cent, and that in accordance with the new law they would make a reduction in the next year of a further 30 per cent.⁶³ At the same time he complained that the AY had become the largest debtor to the state (they receive only 40 per cent of expected monthly finances, and can no longer export weapons as an additional source of revenue), and that they had begun to spend the reserves allocated for actual conflicts, leaving some supplies at only 10 per cent of the levels needed for 2 to 3 months of hostilities. It is therefore understandable that the construction of military homes was frozen, increasing the dissatisfaction of the newcomers (who have been placed in the barracks with their families).

The poor conditions within the AY contributed to a 1994 budget of USD 800 million being approved for the AY (the explanation was that the AY received only 50 per cent of the minimum amount needed the previous year, and had fallen into debt which needed to be returned, that the Ministry of Defence has 2,400 officials for civil defence and that even the amount which had been approved is only 57 per cent of the amount necessary to satisfy minimum needs).⁶⁴ In the face of the housing problems it cannot be expected that relations within the AY will greatly improve.

The difficult conditions under which the professional soldiers work (up to 200 days in the field, long watches, and a high level of combat-readiness)⁶⁵, the low pay and the feeling of being neglected are not the only enemies of morale in the AY. A new factor is the high crime rate, which is not only widespread among civilians but is also becoming increasingly common in the AY.⁶⁶ Though the statement "the FRY is not involved in the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia" is constantly heard from the leadership of the AY, the massive quantity of weapons which the volunteers or returnees and members of the paramilitary units bring back from the front lines gives lie to this. From 1 March 1992 to 24 June 1994, 21,170 weapons were

confiscated from returnees from the front.⁶⁷ From 1 September 1991 to 1 January 1993, the military police in the Belgrade region alone confiscated 1,526 firearms, 2,441 grenades, 50 anti-tank rocket launchers, 24 rifle grenades, 70 infantry mines, 32 kilos of explosives and 180,000 rounds of ammunition.⁶⁸ With entire detachments going from Serbia to the front⁶⁹ and returning with their "spoils of war", armed conflicts sometimes arise between units of the AY and the paramilitary units. A good illustration of this is the group of 15 people who purchased enough weapons for a complete battalion of the regular Army from returnees, and then sold them.⁷⁰ Investigations revealed that these weapons were valued highest in Kosovo and Sandžak, where they were eventually sold.⁷¹

Not only the returnees are involved in crime, but also members of the Army. According to AY data, 45 members of the AY were convicted in 1992 for stealing weapons.⁷² A total of 358 firearms were stolen (among them 10 machine guns), 35,000 rounds of ammunition, about 100 hand grenades and a large quantity of fuel, radio transceivers and so on. A typical "chain" included 10 soldiers and civilians, where the dealers were not concerned about the nationality of the buyers, but only profit. This crime "base" was joined by the "white collar criminals" (in higher positions). An official was discovered who, through bribery and skirting of strict regulations, succeeded in distributing 43 Army dwellings to civilians (with a total area of 2,000 square metres). The anger of the homeless was such that the Chief of General-Staff had to give a (self)critical public statement on crime in the AY (he also stated that the crime rate in the AY was still lower than in society at large).⁷³

A crime of particular note is breaking and entering into Army dwellings; here, too, returnees from the front, invalids and others, are the most likely offenders, considering themselves to be worthy veterans (in comparison to the officers in Serbia, most of whom have not been to the front). The Serbian public were acquainted with the first such example of illegal entry when, in the previously mentioned "Flowershop" affair, one of the "worthy" majors moved into a flat which had been reserved for a general ("who had fled from the front"). Media attention was also given to other examples: invalids squatting in the Army hotel at Bežanijska Kosa (Belgrade), the so-called Valjevo case and a series of similar cases.⁷⁴ If these cases are taken together with the mass demonstrations by invalids who marched from General-Staff to the federal assembly and back, and demanded a solution to their problems, it becomes clear that there had to be an effect on the level of respect for the AY.

Murders and accidents, which occur more often in the AY than in the YNA (Danilovgrad, Niš, Apatine etc.), are responsible for the worst publicity the AY have had. Among the more recent of such events which upset the public was the murder of a soldier, Nenad Mitrović, at the "Deva" border post (on the Albanian-Yugoslav border, 27 April 1994); this was followed by the unexplained suicide of his unit commander (also a soldier), Miroslav Medić on 10 May 1994.⁷⁵ The public were also disturbed by the murder of a member of the Radical Party who was killed by a soldier on 14 June 1994. The police had to intervene at the site where this occurred, when the inhabitants of Golubac erected barricades.⁷⁶ The following cases are also well known: a volunteer, Damjanović, killed 9 people and wounded 4 in 1992; another volunteer, Stajić, kidnapped two policemen, killing one, in March 1993; a volunteer named Čović killed five people in March 1993; another volunteer named Vujić killed his wife and child in December 1993; a soldier named Jelić killed two lieutenant-colonels of the AY in August 1993; and a volunteer named Vukčević threw a hand grenade into a full bus ("because they didn't give him a cigarette") in May 1994.⁷⁷

It is very interesting that at the same time when previously mentioned court-martial cases against the betrayers (chapter 3.2) were presented to the public as a new effectiveness of military justice, many criminal cases of top generals were with minimum noise pushed from the public scene. One of typical examples is general Bora Ivanović's case; he was in 1994 a commanding officer of Novi Sad Corps. At the time when military justice system organized investigations about his criminal activities, the president of the FRY, Zoran Lilić intervened, stopped the investigations and even assisted in the extraordinary promotion of this general into a higher rank. Although an extraordinary promotion is very rare in every Army and it can be realized only after have been fulfilled very severe demands and conditions (also the abolition for criminal acts is very rare) both violations of the YA's regulations happened. It happened when the Chief of General-Staff and several senior officials were assuring to the public that the Army was transforming and working strictly according to the new regulations. The paradox of this case is in the fact that the president Zoran Lilić visited the Staff of Novi Sad Corps in order to be informed about general Boro Ivanović by his subordinates, but a very bad information (which was given by them) did not change his a priori decision. The military investigators discovered that general Ivanović was responsible for disappearing of 200 tons of fuel, more than 2 billions of cartridges (for infantry weapons), the borrowing the military cars register plates for "import" into FRY of the stolen cars (from Croatia and BH), for the engagement of the engineering

units of YA in the area of the logistic base of paramilitary units (Srbska dobrovoljačka garda) in RSK (Erdut) etc. All these illegal activities were connected with the military wing of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (mentor of the paramilitary units) and it is very probably the only reason for the abolition of this general who systematically violated the Code of officer's conduct.^{77a}

3.6 Relations between the AY and the party militias

Although General-Staff of the YNA had already united the units of the operational forces of the YNA and the Territorial Defence (TD) into the unified "armed forces of Yugoslavia" in 1988 and made efforts to place the entire area of defence under its control until the collapse of Yugoslavia, developments during the war forced them to change their opinions. This occurred gradually; it is characteristic that the relations between the leadership of the YNA and later the leadership of the AY and the party militias changed in keeping with the official Serbian policy towards the Serbs west of the Drina. In general, the AY dislike giving data on this aspect of the war and direct all those interested to the military wing of Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁷⁸

The attitude of the AY towards the party militias evolved through the following three phases:

(a) In the phase before the war in Slovenia in 1991, the YNA tried to confiscate the arms of all members of republican TD organisations, in an attempt to prevent the formation of republic armies (the YNA referred to these armies as "para-armies"). During this time, Serbian army units were being formed on Croatian territories with Serb populations, and the other inhabitants were also arming themselves. (The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs⁷⁹ and the security service of the Army cooperated in this action by distributing arms amongst the Croatian Serbs so that they could "defend themselves" against the "Ustashe authorities"). The newly formed units were controlled by the local Serbian party leaders (SDP), who demanded that the YNA leadership disarm the Croatian police and the National Guard (which was formed as a composite part of the police force). At this time, the YNA tolerated the newly formed Serbian units (even though they were not under their control, but under the control of local Serbian politicians) and turned a blind eye to the interventions carried out in Croatia by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

(b) During the war in Slovenia and the first phase of the war in Croatia, the leadership of the YNA wanted to carry out a full mobilisation. When this failed, due to the paralysis of the Federal Presidency (it was incapable of reaching a consensus on the matter) and because all the lists of conscripts and means were in the possession of the republican TDs, the YNA could only count on the support of Serbian and Montenegrin conscripts serving in the Army, of whom there were not enough. To make up the numbers, the YNA had to rely on mobilised conscripts of the Serbian and Montenegrin TDs. According to law, TD conscripts could only be deployed on the territories of Serbia and Montenegro, so the mobilised conscripts were informed that they were "volunteers", after which they were deployed without arms - together with genuine volunteers and accompanied by the Army and the police - to Croatia and B-H, where they were registered on the lists of Slavonian, Kordunian and other territorial defence organisations. By this process the conscripts were "legalised".

This also solved their problem of status (in the event that they were wounded or captured), while at the same time, they could deny all statements to the effect that Serbia and Montenegro were at war with Croatia and/or B-H. Because the conscripts knew as a rule what awaited them, they often fled from the front, and even entire units (e.g. causing non-arrival of relief units) fled the dangerous areas.⁸⁰ The SPO ("Serbian Revival Movement") and other Serbian opposition parties took advantage of such incidents to stage demonstrations, and put pressure on the Serbian government to get it to clarify publicly whether Serbia was at war or not. Combined with the well known protest marches of the mothers of servicemen in Slovenia and Croatia, who took their sons out of barracks and home with them, the Army were left almost without soldiers.⁸¹

The YNA were still trying to form a unit in which Croats, Serbs, Muslims and members of other nationalities would fight together in keeping with the ideas of the LC MY. This was the 6th Lika Division, which was to follow the traditions of the National Liberation War and become the core around which multinational units would form "to battle to preserve Yugoslavia".⁸² The best officers were sent from Belgrade in order to bring the unit up to strength, but the entire experiment failed because the Serbian nationalists from Croatia did not want to fight under "emblems of the reds" or together with non-Serbs.

The Serbian nationalists, headed at this time by the Chetnik leader "Kapetan Dragan" (Captain Dragan Vasiljković) achieved their success at this time.

Vasiljković, in cooperation with the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the local chief of the RSK police, Martić, and the local political leaders of the SDP, formed a special unit, a training centre and all the remaining infrastructure necessary to develop the local RSK army. This action enjoyed the strong support of the official media, and every other kind of support in Serbia, when the YNA were still being depicted as an ideological and multi-national army.

(c) In the final phase of the war against Croatia, the leadership of the YNA softened their previously negative attitude towards members of the Serbian party militias (the SRP, SPO and others), i.e. the Chetniks. A characteristic of these units was that they did not wish to place themselves under the command of the YNA and carried out independent actions against civilian members of other ethnic communities. The effect of this was that these crimes were attributed to the YNA. At this time, the nationalist Serbian parties accused the YNA of not protecting the Serbian nation and of not having shed its ideological communist past etc.

The deficit of regular troops motivated General-Staff to permit some militias of the "patriotic parties", whose leaders and staff did not want to wear the star or carry the Yugoslav flag, and who wanted to fight for "all that was Serbian", to register as "volunteers".⁸³ In addition to these paramilitary groups (who were under the command of the YNA), other paramilitary groups were also operating at the fronts. These were deployed and supplied by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The leadership of the YNA had numerous objections to these groups operating outside its control, and frequently accused them of pillage, rape, murder and other crimes.⁸⁴

This third phase was characterised by the leaders of the Serbian "patriotic" parties and "volunteer" units (Dr Šešelj, Arkan, Jović and others) appearing in the mass media together with high-ranking officers of the YNA, commanders reporting to them upon inspection of "their" units at the "Croatian front", their conveyance to the front with military helicopters, the appearance of their statements in newspapers and magazines, etc.

It is significant that Serbian paramilitary units had already acquired experience in the organised use of force in Serbia and Montenegro prior to their deployment to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, Željko Ražnjatović-Arkan, leader of the supporters of football club Red Star Belgrade, recruited precisely these supporters into the Serbian "Dobrovoljačka garda" (Volunteer Guard), many of whom were violent

hooligans having police files. The leader of the Beli Orli, Dragoslav Bokan, asserts that members of his unit, prior to their deployment to the front, had already torn down memorials to communist leaders in Belgrade (Lola Ribar, Moše Pijade, etc.), destroyed equipment belonging to the Yugoslav Television Network JUTEL (because they deemed it not "Serbian" enough), fired shots at the villa of the then federal Minister of Defence, Kadijević, and similar.⁸⁵ Although the YNA cooperated in equipping and deploying certain units to the front at that time, there was not always cooperation between the two forces on the battlefields. Incidents occurred where the paramilitary forces disarmed officers of the YNA, because they wanted to surrender, leave their units, or had refused to fight, as well as other incidents in which YNA officers killed members of the paramilitaries. Additionally, the relations between the local Serbian units who were fighting for their villages or homes, and the paramilitary units from Serbia who had come to Croatia and B-H to fight for Greater Serbia and had no understanding of local interests in the field were not always harmonious.

Cooperation between the YNA, the local Serbian police and the armed militia of the Serbian parties (in particular the Bosnian SDP) continued in B-H, where the YNA at first attempted to portray themselves as a "peace-keeping force". The withdrawal of the YNA from B-H was carried out in such a way that after the mobilisation of the Serbs was completed, a certain number of YNA officers (the same amount as were previously in Croatia) remained in B-H and formed the armies of the RSK and the RS. The paramilitary units from Serbia and Montenegro (the Chetniks of the SPO, SNO, SDG etc.) continued to operate on the territories of the RSK and the RS after the formation of these local armies, but not always under the operational control of the RSK and RS armies.⁸⁶

(d) Following the retreat of the remainder of the YNA from B-H to the territory of the so-called FRY, and the formation of the AY, direct contact between the AY and the Serbian party militias ceased, as the role of the former YNA was taken over by the armies of the RSK and the RS. The preparation of these units, their training, the supplies for their training, the medical costs upon their return and so forth were "maintained" in the institutes of the AY, but the overall supervision and financing were entirely controlled by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Relations between the AY and the party leaders became strained in the second half of 1993, following the clash between Milošević (SPS) and the leader of the Radicals, Dr Šešelj, when members of the SPS accused Dr Šešelj of perpetrating war crimes. The result of this was that the leaders of the paramilitary forces at

whom the accusations were aimed began accusing each other, ascertaining who had violated conventions most (or least), and who had been the greater heroes and earned most credit for Serbian victories in the west and so forth. The best known of these is the dispute between Šešelj and Arkan, in which they accused each other of criminal actions before a court.⁸⁷

During the time when relations between Milošević's party and the Radicals became strained, an incident occurred in Pljevlja in the Montenegrin part of Sandžak. Because the Montenegrin police had jailed one of the leaders of the Chetnik units (the bases from which they operated in B-H and to which they returned with their booty were located in Sandžak), the Chetniks blocked off the entire town of Pljevlja, including the barracks and police station. The tension almost led to armed conflict between units of the AY and the paramilitaries. The main protagonist in this incident, the Chetnik warlord Ćeko Dačević accused the Montenegrin authorities and the AY of persecuting "innocent patriots". In contrast to the paramilitary forces of the Radicals, who were often involved in similar incidents with the AY, the paramilitaries of the Serbian Dobrovoljačka Garda enjoyed model cooperation with the AY. The main HQ of their leadership was stationed in Baranja (Erdut), on a former military training ground. Because the paramilitary could afford to pay the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who had crossed over to them from the YNA and later from the AY better wages, a number of articles condemning these tactics appeared in military gazettes.

This was also when official military sources began describing the crimes perpetrated by the paramilitaries in Croatia and B-H for the first time, and the police began confiscating the weapons of the paramilitaries in Serbia.⁸⁸ This was followed by accusations from the ranks of the Chetniks that the real fighters for Serbia were being persecuted and imprisoned. These accusations, however, failed to elicit the desired response, as Milošević's regime had a firm grip on the mass media. When the dispute between Karadžić and Milošević over the proposal of the international Contact Group came to a head in August 1994, the media of the regime launched another campaign on the crimes committed by the paramilitaries. This time the Serbian Radicals did not react with accusations against the AY, their leader, Dr Šešelj, instead calling upon all members of the Army and the police force to prevent the arrival and operations of the international monitors in the event that Milošević should decide to allow them supervision over the border crossings to the RS.

It is therefore evident that the AY have always followed national policy and that the attitude of their leadership towards the paramilitaries varied from tolerance (as a "necessary evil") through active cooperation and alliance, to indifference, and finally hostility. Typical of the final period is the New Years' interview given by Chief of General-Staff Perišić, when in 1994 relations between the governing SPS and the opposition had become tense, in which he classified the paramilitary (seen by the Army as the "children" of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs) as a threat to the internal security of the FRY.

4. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

During the collapse of the federal multi-national state, the YNA withdrew from Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in stages, without suffering any great military defeats or disintegration. Instead of a general breakdown (characteristic of the collapse of the Royal Yugoslav Army in 1941), there was an organised withdrawal of units and evacuation of material assets and military-industrial equipment to the territory of Serbia and Montenegro. Nearly 50 per cent of the land forces disintegrated, while the Navy, Air Force and Air Defence units withdrew nearly unscathed. After the withdrawal of the last units of the YNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the government of the newly-formed Serbian-Montenegrin federation ordered General-Staff to immediately form the new AY from the remnants of the YNA, to be founded on the military traditions of Serbia and Montenegro as part of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia from the Second World War.

The reformation process was opposed by certain generals sharing the opinions of the Serbian Minister of Defence, General Tomislav Simović, and many members of the SRP, who judged that it would be better if each of the two federal units formed a national army (into which they could incorporate a corresponding part of the YNA), with their own territorial defence forces at the core. As Serbian President Milošević defended the continuity of Yugoslavia at this time, General Simović and his supporters lost the battle; he himself was retired (even though during the war in Croatia he sent weapons to Serbian rebels in Knin and enabled the training of volunteers). Parallel to this, another purge was carried out by the AY, removing all those generals and higher officers (Jurjević, Hočevar, Vasiljević, Kolšek, Kandić and others) whom they assessed as incapable of adapting to the new conditions or unsuitable on the grounds of their nationality ("Yugoslavs").

Local Serbian armies were formed from those parts of the YNA who had remained on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, supported by paramilitary units and volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, engaged in battle with the Croatian Army and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and carved the rough borders of the Serbian para-states within three years. Until July 1994, these local Serbian armies cooperated closely with the AY, from whom they had received logistic, intelligence and other types of assistance. At the time of writing they control 25 per cent of the territory of Croatia and 71 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. General-Staff of the AY maintain that this would not have been possible if those individuals now at the head of General-Staff and the strategic divisions of the AY had not at critical times conveniently defined the word "National" and supported the western Serbs. In practice, this means that during the critical period in 1991 and the first half of 1992 there were Serbian generals (since they were at that time at the front) who supported the "Greater Serbia" project and Serbian President Milošević. This is why the present military elite who remained faithful to Milošević during all the Serbian political in-fighting, now expect him, as the real centre of political power, to guarantee the financial means and political climate for the transformation of the YNA into the new AY. In reality, this is becoming less and less likely, for the economic situation in Serbia and Montenegro is worsening steadily.

The part of transformation referring to the etatisation of defence, and the Serbianisation and Montenegrinisation of the AY was the most effectively carried out programme. The attempt to rid the AY of ideology resulted in the former multi-national communist ideology being replaced by the ideology of Greater Serbia. Although the FRY declared itself a democratic state with a multi-party system, the government of the FRY is actually in the hands of the SPS (comprised mostly of former members of the Serbian League of Communists). The real centre of political decision-making in the new country is not the federal government but Milošević, who has TV Serbia, the police, foreign policy, financial policy and the Army strongly in his grasp, and through his agents in the secret service controls and directs factions within the opposition and the AY as well. It is obvious that in such an environment the AY could not change essentially, for former select ideas and persons have been replaced with other, similar ones. This is why the transformation to date has been only one of form.

The strengthening of the Serbian police, the ever-lower funding for the AY and their technological stagnation show that Milošević has attempted to equalise their powers. Using the Serbian intelligence service to monitor the

AY, and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs to support paramilitary actions in the west, Milošević averted the possibility of AY General-Staff becoming too powerful, complementing this with purges of unreliable generals. It is absolutely certain that Milošević would, in the event of some Minister of Internal Affairs showing he wished to have greater influence, use the AY to neutralise him. However, it may be said that Milošević's policy has led to a situation where the police are becoming increasingly militarised (a Police Academy where police officers are being trained for ground fighting has been established, the police have received armoured vehicles, helicopters, heavy mortars etc.), while the AY are engaged in police work (readiness to intervene in internal crises, demonstrations etc.).

Furthermore, the technical and technological task of equipping the AY with new weapons and the development of the Air Force, Navy and other infrastructure will not be possible, because of the embargo and the lack of funds. The same applies to professionalisation, as younger, more-capable personnel are opting for civilian careers because of the poor living conditions and the low salaries in the AY, meaning those who do respond to recruitment drives for professional soldiers are usually unemployed and poorly-educated, and do not meet the requirements for becoming genuine professionals.

Although the former political administration of the YNA was disbanded, and the Army elite were presented to the public as a depoliticised professional army, the events and processes occurring within the so-called FRY force them into political activities. From this aspect, the tradition of the former Serbian army is continued in the AY, with its division into "Obrenovićians" and "Karađorđians", the "Belorukci" (White Hands) and "Crnorukci" (Black Hands), those who supported Duke Paul and those who supported Prince Peter etc. The dynasties may have waned, but political factions still exist (supporters of Šešelj, Milošević, Jović etc.); the military elite are searching for common interest. Among the eclatant examples of recent AY politicisation are the political moves and statements from generals during the conflicts between Serbian President Milošević and the Prime Minister of the FRY, Milan Panić, the second President of the FRY, Dobrica Ćosić and, finally, with the leader of the Serbian Radicals (SRP), Dr Vojislav Šešelj. On all these occasions generals who supported Milošević's rivals had to reckon with the majority of the military leaders. Thus, the leadership of the AY did not behave neutrally in these examples of internal inter-party conflict, and did not support the President of the federal state (to whom they were subordinate), but the real centre of power, the President of one of the

federal units, Milošević.

Such an orientation leads to the conclusion that in the event of a break between Milošević and Karadžić, the leadership of the AY would in all probability support Milošević. Last year's September army revolt in Banja Luka (during the Croatian "Divoselo" operation) contained many elements indicating that this was a rehearsal for a military coup against Karadžić (it was carried out by the military police, and Banja Luka was visited by the chief of the security service of the AY, General Dimitrijević, just before). The rebels made use of mass media, accusing the Serbian Bosnian government of misusing the "spoils of war", of black marketeering and profiteering, particularly using fuel and army reserves, etc. There has been no military revolt in the RS this year but the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RS (citing reports by the Serbian security service, which collected data on smuggling in Serbia by Karadžić's ministers) again voiced the demand, just before the expiry of the deadline for accepting the proposal of the international Contact Group, that corrupt ministers be brought to trial. Both this year's move and last year's Banja Luka revolt are effectively internal coups against Karadžić. Karadžić is hindering the lifting of sanctions against the FRY, and with his challenging behaviour is also threatening the safety of Milošević, making it likely that he will be the victim of a "spontaneous" military uprising, such as the one at Banja Luka last year.

The decision by General Mladić to support Karadžić will also have an impact on further developments to the current situation. In this respect, it is worth recalling the rumours spread amongst the Radicals in Serbia that a section of the Bosnian Serbs' army has been preparing to cross the Drina, and would be joined by officers and soldiers of the AY supporting the integration of all Serbs in one country. These and similar rumours are used as means of putting pressure on Milošević. The reality of the Banja Luka revolt suggests that a coup against Karadžić is more plausible (reports from Belgrade maintain he was offered a post at General-Staff and suggested he could assume a similar role to that of De Gaulle in Algeria). The methods by which Milošević politically disarmed first the leader of the RSK, Milan Babić, and then Milan Panić, Dobrica Ćosić and Vojislav Šešelj in the FRY, is convincing proof that no opponent has really presented a threat to him, and that he would certainly not be threatened by Karadžić. Karadžić is also aware of this, taking preventive measures such as ordering the retirement of General Lisica (commander of a training centre in Banja Luka) during the intensification of the dispute with Milošević. This action was probably taken with the intention of defending himself against a repetition of the events of

last September. Admiral Rakić, the RSK's Minister of Defence has evidently also been forced to retire.

It is important that during the process of transformation, under the influence of changes in Milošević's policies, changes in the doctrine of the AY have already come about twice. Both times the changes were the consequences of changes in the balance of power in the Serbian internal political scene.

The first turnaround in AY doctrine came about at the time of coalition between Milošević's SPS and the Radicals (SRP). It was then that General-Staff judged that because of the Serbian offensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was great risk of an attack by the international coalition against the FRY. This is why many AY generals, for the purpose of deterring such an attack, competed with the Radicals in their statements on retaliation against targets in neighbouring states (in the case that the FRY or the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were attacked). Immediately after NATO began its "Deny Flight", "Maritime Monitor", "Sharp Guard" and "Parachute" operations and units from the United States arrived in Macedonia, Milošević silenced the Radicals (such statements continued to be made only by the generals in the RSK and RS). After the final "divorce" of Milošević's SPS from the Radicals (he accused them of war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), the generals who had previously made the threatening statements were retired. Their places were taken by new leaders, who condemned the personnel of the AY who did not want to return to "their" regions and fight in the west, and stated that "the western Serbian army was strong enough to successfully establish the borders of their state on their own".

The second about face in doctrine was the judgement of the new military leadership that internal revolts (by Albanians, Muslims, Hungarians and other non-Serbs) and other internal national security problems were more likely, and thus a greater threat, than external aggression; it became obvious that the AY had taken over the function of preventing all non-Serbian or non-Montenegrin political parties from attempting to proclaim independence.

The AY, who changed from former competitors for budgetary funds into partners, began to cooperate more and more closely with the police. This role for the Army, which many opposition leaders in Kosovo, Sandžak, Vojvodina and even Montenegro consider to be an "occupation", contributed to the drastic reduction in the annual contingent of recruits; the reserves activated in general mobilisation would also be fewer. The repression in

which the AY participated, intended to increase the security of the FRY, actually caused a strengthening and radicalisation of the opposition (who, out of fear of the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were accelerating in arming themselves), completing a vicious circle where the activities of the AY not only exhaust the already impoverished coffers, but also strengthen the opposition and, through this, decrease the stability of the state.

The incompetence and unpreparedness of Milošević's regime for solving the internal problems of the FRY by political means opens up the possibility for revolts and disorder. This is why the AY now have the priority task of preventing the opposition from committing radical actions, thus contributing to the preservation of a "status quo" and with it Milošević's authority. Since the radical moves of Serbian leaders in the RSK and the RS could cause escalation of the war and its expansion to the territory of the FRY, it can be expected that the AY will attempt to influence the leaders of the RSK and RS to contribute to stability. The new "passive defence" strategy of the armies of the RS and the RSK is actually nothing more than an attempt to preserve the territorial "status quo". In the event of a major offensive by the Croatian Army or the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it could be expected that the AY would leave responses to the armies of the RS and the RSK, and for this purpose would send them "volunteers", while taking over the role of a strategic reserve and logistics coordinator. This method of waging an indirect war (successfully performed by the People's Republic of China in Korea, the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, the Cubans in Angola and Mozambique and many other countries and movements in the past) is more suited to the FRY and the AY at this moment, for it gives Milošević the greatest possibility of retaining power, promoting the war in the west and, at the same time, keeping Serbia out of the war and presenting himself as a peace-maker.

It is necessary to emphasize that there are only three Serbian political parties which have aspiration to control the YA: (1) Milošević's SPS evidently manifested that it was and it is also now capable to control the senior officers effectively; it dismissed the trouble-making generals when it was necessary; (2) Šešelji's SRS was very loud in the propagandistic claims for "strong support among the officer's corps", but the general-officers who were its supporters, were very easily purged by Milošević's supporters; (3) the leaders of CP (Communist Party) officially argued that they had not aspirations to act inside YA, but at the same time they claimed that in the case of the infiltration of the SRS into the YA - they would organise three "Communist cells" to each radical "patriotic cell". If we try to reconstruct

the political polarization of the YA, then - on the basis of these "assessments" - we could conclude that about 20% of YA - personnel supports radicals (that means Karadžić and the other supporters of Great Serbia), 60% of it supports the Communist idea of reintegration of the new Yugoslavia (with the Serbian leading role) and the others support Milošević.⁸⁹ But in the real situation it is evident that the top echelon of the YA supports only Milošević and not Mladić and Karadžić.

From the aspect of possible developments in civil-military relations in the coming short-term period, the following three hypotheses can be formulated: (1) relations between the AY and the federal authorities will proceed in the direction of subordination of the AY to the federal authorities, and the adoption of their constitutional role, that of the defence against an external aggressor;

(2) relations between the AY and the federal government will proceed as they are presently, indicating that the AY were actually under the control of the ruling party of Serbia;

(3) relations between the AY and the civilian authorities will result in dominance by the military leadership, in the form of a coup d'état, either taking power themselves or (il)legally supporting the opposition.

The present state of affairs amongst the political parties in Serbia suggest that the second hypothesis is the most likely. With this, the existing regime, in the event of strengthening opposition, will lean on the AY, whose leadership could change sides if they judged that the current regime had no hope of retaining power and/or the opposition promised a resolution of the status of the Army and its modernisation. In conjunction with the AY, the opposition parties in Serbia would support the programme of Greater Serbia, and there would be no changes for the AY in this respect.

For the time being there are no conditions for developments along the line of the first hypothesis, because the Milošević-led SPS govern Serbia and Montenegro, and the current federal President Lilić is merely a puppet of Milošević. There are also slim chances for events developing according to the third hypothesis, as the Serbian military security service have been considerably weakened since non-Serbs left, while the Serbian national security service (SDB), which was not affected by the disbanding, has infiltrated the AY. This is why Milošević can at any time trigger a campaign in the mass media, with which he would do away with Napoleonic trends while the Army leadership were hesitating whether to support him or the opposition. On the basis of this reasoning, it is most likely that the

impoverished and diminished AY, for whom the embargo and economic crisis allow no modernisation, will continue to remain a kind of reserve police force which Milošević could use for the removal of his opponents west of the river Drina, and the suffocation of the opposition in Serbia and Montenegro.

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83. This possibility was used by the Chetniks of the SRP, the Dobrovoljačka Garda and the SNO. Their status was made equal to the status of soldiers fighting in the YNA units. (Vreme, 9.3.1993, pp 18 - 21; Vreme; 30.3.1992, pp. 22 - 23);
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THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EASTERN ADRIATIC COAST IN THE 20th CENTURY

Ljubljana, December 1994

1. INTRODUCTION

Analyses to date of the problems of the collapse of former Yugoslavia and the processes and phenomena accompanying this collapse place a characteristic emphasis on the analysis of the characteristics of the events on land and in the airspace over this land. There are very few authors concerned with the naval aspect of the collapse, who have analysed and described the actions of the multinational naval forces implementing and monitoring the embargo. There are even fewer authors who have discussed the activities of the warring parties on the sea. The purpose of this article is to bridge this gap. The author sets himself the task of presenting the significance which the Adriatic has had to date for the actors involved in these conflicts, and the significance which the sea and the coast could have for the further outcome of the Yugoslav drama, over which dark clouds of regionalisation still linger after three years - despite the ray of hope which the Washington agreement brought. Here, the author leans on the general hypothesis that change in the Adriatic - as in other narrow seas - has always been a consequence of changes on land.

This article comprises four chapters: the first describes the (geo)poli(tical)tectonic changes which have taken place in the Adriatic in the 20th century, with the emphasis on the processes which these changes brought about. The second chapter illustrates the evolution of the significance of the sea and the coast by phases and stages of the war which broke out in June 1991 and which is still raging. Emphasis is placed on the desires and operations of the warring parties, through which they wanted to protect corridors to the sea and/or prevent their rivals from doing the same. The third chapter describes the problems and critical regions which in all probability will over the next ten years in one way or another influence the moves and behaviour of the state leaderships and the political parties in the newly created Adriatic states. The last chapter discusses general findings and some new facts which will have to be considered by those concerned with the problems of the Adriatic.¹⁾

2. ADRIATIC POLI(TICAL)TECTONICS IN THE 20th CENTURY

When the Ottoman Empire began to collapse at the end of the last century and at the beginning of this century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with German support, attempted to reach Thessaloniki through Sandjak, Kosovo and B-H and also to seize the smaller Balkan states (Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece), which had the similar territorial goals. At the same time, they all together intended to divide the European remains of the "sick man of Europe" (Macedonia, Albania, the Aegean islands).²⁾ The efforts of these states came at the same time as the efforts of Italy, which was forcing itself into the region of what was then the Turkish North African province of Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaika). It is very important that from 1912/13, Montenegro successfully operated with its main forces in the direction of Shkodër and Serbia with smaller forces in the direction of Ljuša, while the Greek fleet protected the transport of the Serbian Coastal Corps from Thessaloniki to the Albanian port of (San Giovanni di) Medova. The then great powers (Great Britain, France, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Germany) thus blocked the Montenegrin and Albanian coast with a special multinational fleet, ensuring that the Serbs evacuated their corps. The Montenegrins also had to withdraw from occupied Shkodër. Although the Balkan armies were successful, the great powers did not allow Serbia or Montenegro - supported by Russia at the time - to partition Albania and spread towards the Adriatic Gibraltar - Otranto gateway.³⁾ After this war, Italy and Austro-Hungary supported the establishment of Albania, which was (protected and supported by them) to be a kind of barrier against the expansion of Serbia, Montenegro and Russia in direction of South.

During the First World War, the Adriatic region was a composite part of the global theater of war between Antanta and Central forces. The so-called Isonzo Front was next to the sea in the north of the battlefields, and the Thessaloniki Front in the south, while the Otranto gateway became the area of a special blockade operation (because of the transit significance for Austro-Hungarian and German submarines in the Mediterranean). After the collapse of Austro-Hungary, the first larger architectural intervention took place in the Adriatic. The changes fitted the fact that Italy fought in the war on the side of the victorious coalition and that this coalition greatly supported the fact that the Kingdom of the SCS (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was to become the strongest Balkan state. After the First World War, two Adriatic states disappeared from the maps, (Austro-Hungary and Montenegro), while two new states were founded: The Kingdom of SCS and Albania.

Italy, in accordance with the Treaty of Rapallo, got the Slovenian coast, part of the Slovenian interior (Notranjska), Istria, Lošinj island, Zadar and Lastovo Island.⁴ The newly founded Kingdom of SCS had an important role in the European balance of power, which had the goal of preserving the victories of the First World War. We must mention that Italy and then Yugoslavia fought for influence in Albania until the outbreak of the Second World War by supporting specific Albanian teams, and a few times even intervened militarily.

Between the two world wars, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had an important role in the plans of Great Britain and France, who saw it as a pillar around which other Balkan countries would gather. This would cripple the revisionist desires of defeated Bulgaria and, at the same time, prevent increasing German and Italian influence. So the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had an important role in the Balkan Pact (1934), in which Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey were joined.⁵ The same holds for its role in the Small Entente between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania,⁶ to neutralise the desires of the Hungarians for a revision of the conditions and provisions imposed on Hungary (after its defeat in the First World War). Although the Balkan Pact and the Little Entente had no practical value either during the attack by Mussolini on Albania and Greece, or during Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia, both these creations prove that, between the two world wars, such links also had a significant influence on the Adriatic. The reason for the lack of success of the mentioned two pacts was the attempts by the existing Yugoslav government - due to the involvement of Italy in the war with Greece and Hitler's march into Austria - to avoid at any cost the war, into which the Allies could drag them.

After the general Simović March putsch (27 March 1941), which prevented the attempt by the government to join the Axis powers, and after the brief April war following the putsch, the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic was occupied by Italy. Parts of the coast from Kraljevica to the Zrmanja river and to Omiš to Konavle and the islands of Hvar, Brač and Pag were then handed over by Italy to the so called Independent State of Croatia (NDH). After the surrender of Italy (1943), the coast was occupied by the Germans. The General Headquarters of the (Yugoslav) National Liberation Army (NOV) and the National Guerrilla Units (POJ) and the government (AVNOJ) moved from the mainland to the island of Vis, establishing contact with the Allies in Italy. The Adriatic region was then an extremely important connection between the allied Apennine front and the units of the National Liberation Army (NLA) in Yugoslavia.

During this time, western oriented politicians who migrated from Central Europe to Rome met and planned the post-war architecture of Europe. Slovenians were part of this process: together with the Polish, Czechs, Hungarians and others, they believed that there would be some kind of confederation between the Baltic and the Adriatic ("Intermaria"), which would be most appropriate for post-war Central Europe.⁷ Meanwhile, the great powers reached an agreement in Yalta, in which the post-war order of Europe was outlined.

In the operations for the final liberation of Yugoslavia, serial of NLA amphibian operations in the Adriatic in 1945 liberated the islands, Istria, Rijeka and Trieste as soon as possible, joining them to the newly founded federal republic. Contact between the western allied forces and the NLA was established in Trieste. NLA units had to withdraw from Trieste after they had liberated Istria and the eastern coast of the Adriatic under pressure from the western allies, in accordance with the provisions of the Yalta agreement.

The territory of Trieste and western Istria was divided by the allies into two zones: zone A (Trieste) was occupied by British and American units, zone B (from Trieste to the Mirna river) was controlled by Yugoslav units. The western allies then founded the Free Territory of Trieste (STO) in 1946, and were even prepared (due to increasing cold war tensions) to turn over the entire territory to Italy.⁸

Until 1948, Yugoslavia closely cooperated with the Soviet Union, which gave the Adriatic area an important place in its geostrategical approach to the exposed belt from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Let me mention as an illustration that the first Yugoslav fleet programme for the development of the Yugoslav Navy (VM) planned the construction of a fleet about hundred submarines, some tens of cruisers, tens of destroyers, etc., and a comprehensive system for training naval personnel was established in such a way (according to the Russian model and with Russian trainers) that the neighbouring allied countries (Albania, Bulgaria, etc) were also educated there. This factor also escalated the cold war between Yugoslavia and the West.⁹

When in 1948 the Informbiro called for an end to relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, this initially had no influence on STO, for which both Italy and Yugoslavia still had aspirations. The Soviet pressure on the borders of Yugoslavia, and the dependency of Yugoslavia on western military, economic, humanitarian and other aid contributed to the fact that

the Yugoslav government did not want to escalate the issue of Trieste for some time. Only when Yugoslavia founded a defence union with Turkey and Greece in the Treaties of Ankara (1953) and Bled (1954), so that the Adriatic became part of the "Rimland" (which connected Italy with Greece and Turkey), did relations calm down to the extent that the Treaty of London (1954) could be signed, under which zone A became part of Italy and zone B became part of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ The signing of this agreement removed the crisis which had for some time threatened to turn into an armed conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia.

When Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact (1954),¹¹ its geostrategic position became a potential bridge (link between Italy and Greece) on the southern flank of NATO and an important element of the bloc balance. With the development of a strong defence system, it blocked Soviet and Warsaw Pact access from Hungary to northern Italy (Lombardy) and, at the same time, cut off the route to the Mediterranean as well. Given that, in the 60s, Yugoslavia became one of the co-founders of the non-aligned movement, and that Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, a regional balance arose in the Balkans, the so-called three pairs. It is characteristic of this regional balance that Greece and Turkey were members of NATO, Bulgaria and Romania of the WP, and Yugoslavia and Albania of the non-aligned movement. This system of preserving security functioned successfully until perestroika, since it suited both the USSR and WP, and the United States and NATO.

Tensions only rose occasionally in the Adriatic during this period, when the Yugoslav government - under pressure from those members of the non-aligned movement which were involved in wars - to allow the Soviet Union to use its airports and air space as a logistic "springboard" and a transit corridor for the support of "natural" allies in Africa and the Middle East. The overhaul of Soviet fleet ships in Boko Kotorska was a similar factor. The same role was allocated to the Naval Academy in Yugoslavia for training naval staff of those Arab States which (as Libya did for some time) supported Palestinian terrorist factions, proclaimed a "world anti-imperialist revolution" or voluntarily proclaimed an important part of the Mediterranean as their domestic waters. Apart from these brief periods, cooperation in the Adriatic was an example of good-neighbourly relations. Cruises by fleets and the military exercises were usually followed by their visits to ports in neighbouring countries.

It must be stressed that until the signing of the Treaty of London (1954) and

up to the beginning of armed conflicts in the region of former Yugoslavia (1990), there were hardly any territorial disputes in the Adriatic. Some fishing disputes did occasionally erupt, and there were even some victims among fishermen fishing in prohibited waters. But this only encouraged legislation under which the maritime borders would be defined for all countries. This was according to the Yugoslav legislation the first 10 miles (1965); this provision was later coordinated with the standards of other countries and was extended to 12 miles (1979). The symmetry of the Adriatic was precisely defined with the neighbouring states, whereby every Adriatic country received part of the continental basin. Under the Treaty of Ossimo (1975), which represented the continuation of good-neighbourly cooperation, issues concerning the property of those who after the Second World War decided to leave Yugoslavia (and go to Italy), as well as some other issues were dealt with. As a result, the period in which the Adriatic region became a model of successful cooperation between countries with different social systems was successfully concluded.

Even in 1980, the internal fragility of Yugoslavia was evinced by the unrest in Kosovo, and it became even more obvious with the gradual collapse of the bipolar balance. After the first free multi-party elections, an interior polarisation of forces arose between those who wanted to change the former one-party system of the centralized federation into a decentralized (a)symmetric confederation with a free market and free flow of people and ideas and those who were aware that they would lose their former positions and privileges thus blamed supporters of reform, who were trying to turn Yugoslavia into a decentralised democracy integrated into Europe as soon as possible.

Europe did not understand at that time that two conflicting ideas were emerging in Yugoslavia at that time: the idea of a unitary state (such as, for example, when the Serbian leader Milošević stated in 1990 that "either the country will be united" - which meant firm centralisation - "or there will be no country!") and the idea of a liberal state (whose supporters pledged for decentralisation and saw in this violence the end of Yugoslavia). When the YPA (in which about 70% of the officer corps were Serbs) took over the "defence" of Yugoslavia against its nationalities - except against the Serbian "state-forming" majority nation - it was clear that both the liberal and democratic and the unitary ideas would, in the end, be defeated. No idea could win, both collapsed at the same time.¹²⁾

3. THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE ADRIATIC SEA AND THE COAST IN THE PROCESS OF THE COLLAPSE OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The place and role of the sea and coast and their interactions changed during the process of the collapse of Yugoslavia in line with the changes in the balance of the armed forces. This balance changed in stages ("step by step"), always from the west towards the east. During the phase of Slovenia gaining independence the sea was exploited to evacuate units of the YNA to BH and Montenegro. During the war in Croatia the Yugoslav navy performed sea blockade operations, while units of the land forces of the YNA attacked key coastal regions, so as to isolate Dalmatia from other parts of Croatia and, at its extreme southern point create the possibility of renewing the Dubrovnik republic (as a kind of buffer zone between Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia). During the phase of war in BH the YNA first attempted to cut off western Herzegovina and the Neretva valley from the sea ports with offensives and, in this way, isolate the entire territory of BH from possible outside logistic assistance. The units of the Croatian Defence Council succeeded in time in constructing a new diverted highway between the coast and central Bosnia through western Herzegovina and the very difficult mountain terrain. It is no coincidence that in October and November this year the worst battles once again erupted in the Neretva valley (Mostar) and at the western edge of western Herzegovina - "the roof of BiH" (Kupres), since for these areas, this involves the control of links between BH and the Dalmatian ports, which are a 'conditio sine qua non' for the survival of BH. The specificity of each of the above stages and phases requires a more detailed description and analysis.

3.1 The War in Slovenia (June 1991)

Even before the planned advance of the YNA against Slovenia the GHQ of the YNA were aware that the wedging of Slovenia between Italy, Austria and Hungary and its link with Western Europe represented - in a possible intervention by the YNA - a source of risk. The mass deployment of YNA units would offer the West a chance to accuse the leadership of the YNA of overstepping constitutional restrictions (i.e. siding with Milošević). The support of the YNA for Milošević was in fact already demonstrated by the YNA when it moved its tanks in on the anti-Milošević Beograde's demonstrations in March 1991. This is why they activated only a few motorised units as a support for federal police units and custom officials) after the proclamation of Slovenian independence; they expected a clean and

quick breakthrough to the border crossings and thus to cut Slovenia off from the neighbouring countries and then, after this, they expected the Slovenian government to fall.

When this operation did not work, the surprised GHQ of the YNA analysed three options.¹³⁾

(1) The first option foresaw the attack of a land corps from neighbouring Croatia. They assessed that this task could be performed by two infantry brigades and one paratroop brigade, which would rapidly break through to Ljubljana and then, with the existing Maribor and Ljubljana corps, create the possibility for the YNA to withdraw undefeated from Slovenia, and then exploit this situation in negotiations with the Slovenian government.

(2) The second option foresaw air attacks and artillery and rocket shelling of sensitive strategic targets. The existing (in Slovenia 2 corps) of YNA would appear only if necessary or if the Slovenian government did not give in to the demands of the army.

(3) The third option only foresaw pressure with the threat of using military force (for which the Slovenian side could not know that it would remain on this level, for the threat was very convincing) and with other means of psychological warfare.

The key factor which contributed to the fact that they used the third option was fear of the fact that Western forces would use the battle employment of YNA for airplane and other deterrent attacks against military targets, and in the same way - as seen in the then failures in the first campaign - the fear of a partisan war in which the YNA would become involved in Slovenia. Precisely for these reasons the GHQ of the YNA had as early as 18 July 1991 decided to withdraw its units of the YNA from Slovenia.

The YNA first tried to withdraw by land, but the sea then appeared to be safer in August 1991. The point is that armed clashes had already erupted in Croatia during August, which the commanders of the withdrawing units - also under pressure from the parents who were coming for their children in Slovenia - wanted to avoid at any cost. Since the Croatian shipping companies did not want to cooperate in transporting the YNA, while the Montenegrin shipping companies and the Yugoslav navy did not have enough ships, the YNA had to hire foreign ships. With these transporters and the services of the Port of Koper, the GHQ of the YNA relatively

successfully organised the withdrawal of the Ljubljana and Maribor corps. They first evacuated their stocks and equipment, and then the units which protected their withdrawal. The withdrawal was ended on 25 October 1991 without any major incidents. The withdrawing convoys were accompanied by escort ships of the Yugoslav navy, and were protected until their disembarkation at Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegrin ports.¹⁴⁾

After the independence of Slovenia and the withdrawal of the last units of the YNA from Slovenian territory, the question of demarcating the border with neighbouring Croatia arose. An important part of this complex issue refers to the border on the coast and the consequent link to the maritime border. In political discussions to date we have heard very diverse arguments, among which the most extreme Slovenian view favours the borders of the former Free Trieste Territory (according to this view the border would be on the river Mirna, and Slovenia would have an exit to the open seas).¹⁵⁾ All other views are either founded on land survey criteria or on the practice to date (fishing zones which the Istrian municipalities had in the past and retained to the present day), or at the borders which were current before the collapse of Yugoslavia and so on.¹⁶⁾ Three proposals have been presented to the broader public so far: the Slovenian maximalist variant, in which Slovenia opts for several settlements south of the present border (Škodelin, Buže, Skrile, Mlini) with a total of 80 inhabitants and 0.92 km². The Croatian maximalist variant claims a space between the present border and the mouth of the small River Dragonja in Piran bay, which lies about 2 km north of the present border. The cause of this discrepancy is the fact that the Dragonja used to flow into a low marshy region where the river bed and outflow into the sea changed frequently. Following the regulation of the river, two branches exist (the canal of Saint Odorik, where the present border lies, and the old river bed which exits to the sea further north), with a number of canals in between. There most certainly exist other possibilities for the solution of this problem besides that of land survey, which will probably be considered in the continuation of the work of the expert groups.^{17),18)} Another factor is that the Sečovlje salt pans was always a single biological entity.¹⁹⁾

At the end, it is necessary to say that the role of Adriatic factor in the development of Slovenia will not only depend on the (de)escalation of the war in former Yugoslavia (in this case, bypass Adriatic sea lanes of communications will substitute the land communications). In the case - if in the next decade - the old strategic Axis (New York - London - Paris - Berlin) will be complemented with the new one (Tokio - Shanghai -

Singapore) and the economical cooperation between Europe in the Asian Pac Rim (Pacific Rimland) will be expanded, the European role of Adriatic ports and the sea lanes of communications (SLOC) will be reexamined and very probably emphasized (for instance, the cruising time between Asia and Adriatic ports is about 5-6 days shorter than the cruising time between Asia and Rotterdam).^{19(a)}

Because the economical progress in the Pacific Rimland is a strong dynamic factor which has and will very probably have global implications in the next decade, and century it is very possible that - in the context of the expected Europe - Pac Rim cooperation - the role of Adriatic factor in Slovenian development will be more important than it/is to-day when nearly all discussions and debates about the future of Slovenia are concentrated on the land mass - precisely on the building up new highways (including the selection of priorities of North or South connections) and the final determination of land borders.

3.2 The War in Croatia (August 1991 - December 1991)

Even before the declaration of Croatian independence (1990), the Serbian rebels in Knin and in Lika had set up barricades on the roads and railways lines. This very rapidly brought about the situation where the most direct links between Dalmatia and the other parts of Croatia were no longer useful (the units of the YNA placed themselves between the Croatian police and the rebels, so as to "maintain peace", while they actually desired to preserve the status quo). All traffic between Dalmatia and the other parts of Croatia had thus to redirect itself to ferries and diverted land links from Split via Šibenik and Zadar to Rijeka, or through the Neretva valley and Bosnia. Because of the outbreak of war this connection no longer came into consideration either, so that only ferries remained, and these were controlled by the Yugoslav navy.

After Croatia proclaimed its independence, the units of the Yugoslav navy found themselves in an essentially different situation than the units of the YNA land forces. These had been used since 1990 for "maintaining order" in the zones where the local Serbian inhabitants, with the support of the paramilitary from Serbia, disarmed the local Croatian police. All the navy garrisons were allocated in Croatia to those towns and islands where the Croats were in the majority, and apart from this, the majority of the naval officers were non-Serbian (in contrast to the land forces, which were mainly Serbian). Furthermore, the naval garrisons were allocated to urban centres,

thus the Croatian units could effectively neutralize them by cutting off their electric power, water, telephone lines and by setting up barricades. The existing defensive antiamphibian doctrine of the former Yugoslav navy assisted in this. In accordance with this doctrine, the deployment of the Yugoslav navy and coastal defence units was as a cordon (along the entire coast), shallow (the hinterland was defended by the land forces) and along a front directed to the open seas (from where they expected an assault from the sea).²⁰⁾

So as to avoid the blockading of the fleet in the only completely equipped naval base of Lora (it included training areas, simulators, imitators, school centres, ambulances, storehouses, workshops and other infrastructure), the command of the Yugoslav navy moved the Fleet to the island of Vis and Lastovo.²¹⁾ The Knin corps of land forces which was subordinated to the Yugoslav navy was - after this withdrawal - subordinated to the newly formed strategic grouping in Sarajevo ("2nd army district"), to which numerous units which had withdrawn from Slovenia were subordinated.

For the first stage of the war in Croatia it was characteristic that the GHQ of the YNA ordered its blockaded units only to defend themselves, for it wanted to avoid accusations from the international public that it was planning to attack Croatia and overthrow the legally elected Croatian government.²²⁾ Simultaneously with this passive defence, the YNA's GHQ in Serbia, BH and Montenegro began to prepare the main forces which it planned to deploy only when the Croatian units attacked the besieged barracks.

For the second stage of the war in Croatia it is characteristic that it began in 1991, or, immediately after the Croatian units began their general attack on those barracks of the YNA which were in regions with a Croatian majority of inhabitants. During the attacks on the blockaded Šibenik, the Croatian army confiscated 29 ships of the Yugoslav navy, of which the greater part were in dock.²³⁾ The Yugoslav navy confined its activities during this to blockading the coast, so as to prevent the transport of units by sea, their supplies with weapons and ammunition and to protect the withdrawal of those navy garrisons which could not last through the siege. The GHQ of the YNA, which was waiting in Belgrade for the message that the Croatian army had launched a decisive attack on the besieged garrisons, planned a strategic operation in time, which was explained to the public as an operation to unblock the blockaded unit. From the later published memoirs of the then defence minister - general Veljko Kadijević - it is evident that the

real and very ambitious goal of this operation was the destruction of the Croatian army.²⁴⁾

The strategic operations of the ground forces of the YNA were carried out by 5 newly mobilized corps (supplemented with Serbian recruits, while the Muslims from BH, the ethnic Albanians, the Muslims from Sandžak and the Hungarians from Vojvodina did not respond to the mobilization). The GHQ set these corps the task of defeating the Croatian army and thus permanently protecting the then existing territorial achievements of the Serbian rebels in Croatia and, at the same time, consolidate the situation in BH.²⁵⁾ In this way - by military means - the conditions for the preservation of the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, BH, parts of Croatia under the control of the Serbian rebels) were created.

The main role in the southern wing of the strategic deployment was played by 3 different corps: the Užice, Podgorica and Knin corps. The Užice and Podgorica corps had, in cooperation with the Navy's coastal sector of Boka Kotorska and the fleet, attacked in the direction of Dubrovnik, Pelješac and the Neretva, while the Knin corps attacked in the direction of Zadar, Šibenik and Dubrovnik. The fleet meanwhile - with logistic support on the island of Vis and Lastovo - blocked all Croatian sea lanes of communications. In comparison with the Novi Sad corps (which was bogged down in Vukovar) and the Banja Luka corps (which was to break through to Virovitica, but got bogged down only after a few dozen kilometres), the aforementioned three corps broke through most deeply. Since in the north these corps had successfully cut the ground links between Dalmatia and other parts of Croatia (they established a hold over Knin, they destroyed the well known bridge at Maslenica, and the bypass bridge to Pag island was also heavily damaged), and in the south broke through to Dubrovnik and surrounded it (at the same time the fleet cut alternative maritime communications), Croatia - where the Serbian rebels near Karlovac controlled its only land link between Rijeka and Zagreb (here the Croatian territory along the Slovenian border was only 15 km wide) - cut into three parts.²⁶⁾

Although the Croatian army was not destroyed by this operation, the GHQ of the YNA concluded that without this operation Croatia would never agree to peace and the start of operations of the UN peace-keeping forces (UNPROFOR).²⁷⁾

After the mediation of the international community and after the arrival of UNPROFOR to those areas which were then controlled by the Serbian

rebels, the situation in these regions was "frozen". This means that Croatia not only remained without 30% of its territory but that it could not use the roads and other communications, nor the power, water and other resources in these regions. The traffic between the southern part of the country and the north could only proceed via ferries even after the start of the UNPROFOR operation (the YNA withdrew from Vis and Lastovo islands and from the Dubrovnik zone only one year after the war had ended in Croatia).

We should also mention that the attempts of the YNA to found a new "Dubrovnik Republic" in the region of occupied Dubrovnik region (the retired judge Aleksander Apolonio headed this) collapsed ignominiously.²⁸⁾ In the opposite case a buffer zone between Croatia and the FRY would have been established, for this "Republic" included all the space from Klek Neum (Croatian and BIH boarder) up to and including Prevlaka.

Following the withdrawal of the YNA, two questions still remained open that are linked to the sea and the coast. The first relates to the exit of the so-called Republic of the Serbian Krajina (RSK) to the sea, and the second the borders with the so-called FRY. With regard to the first question we must mention that the YNA already broke through to Zadar and surrounded it in 1991, so that they had complete control of the airport, the waterworks and the region between Zadar, Vransko Jezero and the Sea of Novigrad (Novigradsko more). After the withdrawal of the YNA this area was occupied by the units of the RSK ("camouflaged ex-YNA"), which is why today they still have the Zrmanja river, the coast to the north of Novigrad and the Sea at Karin (Karinsko more) under their control. This involves approximately 20 km of the coastline, and the only exit from this "bottled sea" to the open sea is through the extremely narrow Masleničko Ždrilo and the Ljubačka Vrata, which are controlled by Croatia. Although this is an unimportant and very small section of the coast under the control of the RSK, we can expect that they will attempt to capitalise on this section of coast during all the negotiations (with a minimal demand for a corridor to the port of Zadar etc.).²⁹⁾

The second current question refers to the border between the Republic of Croatia and the so-called FRY, or between its federal unit of Montenegro and Croatia. Since the southernmost part of Croatian territory - the Prevlaka peninsula - has such a position that it offers control over ships exiting Boka Kotorska and ships coming in (this is the only remaining naval base of the Yugoslav navy), while at the same time it is encircled by imposing Montenegrin mountains, the question remains open what the status of this

peninsula will be in the future.³⁰ For now, the monitoring units of the multinational forces are in this region, seeing to its demilitarization, but both Croatia and the so-called FRY have prepared measures that will prevent any capture by force by the opposing side.³¹ The Yugoslav generals stated many times that the demilitarization is only a temporary solution³² and the YNA control of this peninsula is a question of "to be or not to be". From the many statements by Croatian diplomats we can read that Croatia would be prepared to exchange this territory for the greater safety of Dubrovnik.^{33,34}

Another of the political consequences of the war in Croatia is the strengthening of regionalist desires in Istria and Dalmatia. These are regions where a large number of exiles (from the Croatian territories occupied by Serbs) were sent, and these are also at the same time regions which felt the pressure of the government and the ruling party from Zagreb more strongly than other parts of Croatia.³⁵ The leadership of the "Istrian Democratic Assembly" (IDS) and the "Dalmatian Action" stand for the strengthening of the regions and see in these regions the basic lever for integrating into Europe.³⁶ Such an approach was assessed in Zagreb to be a weakening of the defensive power of Croatia and they frequently hinted that this represented an attempt by these regions to instigate secession and/or emancipation at some later stage. The leaders of the IDS (some in Zagreb called them the "5th column of Italian imperialism") stress that this was a fabricated accusation and stressed that Istria was a transnational region which includes Croatian Istria, Slovenian Istria and Trieste and simply by the nature of its structure was interested in cooperating with all three countries - Italy, Slovenia and Croatia.³⁷ In this context we must mention that the representatives of the Italian right wing parties (Aleanza Nazionale) also frequently exerted pressure for a revision of the Ossimo agreement, which could bring about the internationalization of disputes.³⁸ This is why it is understandable that both in Slovenia and in Croatia many understood the Italian awarding of citizenship and pensions in Istria as a kind of bribe for votes at the possible coming referendum on the autonomy and possible independence of Istria.³⁹

It is very important to stress that the leaders of the IDS (Istarski Demokratski Sabor - Istrian Democratic Assembly) on every occasion publicly deny that their "transregionalism" is directed against the national interests of neighbouring states. On the contrary, they insist on the catalyst's ("glue's") role of Istria in the process of European integration and as an important lever in this process, they put the accent on the demilitarisation of Istria. But because Croatia is still in the position that it could be involved

in war, this IDS's political orientation is an additional factor for increasing tensions between local Istrian authorities and ruling elite in Zagreb.^{39/a)}

3.3 The War in BH (April 1992 - ?)

It was already clear during the war in Croatia that the military leadership of the YNA was planning to keep BH in the composition of rump Yugoslavia at any cost (although the command of UNPROFOR was already based in Sarajevo). This was also visible from the (re)deployment of YNA units in BH, the strengthening of these units by withdrawing units from Slovenia and Croatia and the subordination of the Knin corps to the 2nd army district in Sarajevo.⁴⁰⁾ When after the proclamation of independence and the international recognition of BH, the Serbs (the "Serb Republic") as well as the Croats (Herceg-Bosna) formed their para-state creations, the YNA rushed to distribute weapons to the Serbs, so that the newly formed VRS (The Army of the Serb Republic) - after the withdrawal of the YNA from BH - might perform its function and achieve the goal instead of the YNA. The condition for such an orientation was the break of communications between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which back in 1991 forecasted that in the case of war in BH, it would support the BH Croats. After the outbreak of war the YNA carried out convergent attacks of task forces of various corps in the direction of western Herzegovina to cut off the strategic communications: on East - between the Croatian port of Split and on West - between the Croatian port of Ploče and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- task groups of the Knin corps took Kupres (the "roof of BH") and in this way, cut communications between Split and central Bosnia,
- battle groups of the Užice corps cut the eastern communications through the Neretva valley from their position near Mostar,
- battle groups of the Banja Luka corps were to break through to Prozor.⁴¹⁾

During the preparations of the YNA for the "battle for Bosnia", the Croatian leadership faced a dilemma about where to direct the focus of its support to the Croats in BH: the Posavians, who defended the Sava corridor and prevented the RS from linking to the northern part of Serbia, or those of Herzegovina, who defended the region west of the Neretva and in this way protected central Dalmatia.⁴²⁾ The view prevailed that the destruction of the most important Serbian connections between the river Drina and Banja Luka on the tanks and armoured units transit territory was more risky and less

sure of success than the defence of the Karst, which at the same time allowed the whole of Dalmatia to become a logistics basis for the defence of Herzegovina and Central Bosnia. Among other factors, this is probably why the focus of Croatian support was directed towards Herceg-Bosna. This had a long-term effect, for the Serbs - through the Sava corridor - linked the Banja Luka region with that of the Drina and achieved a compactness of territory of the RS.

BH successfully survived the consequences of these attacks (when it was cut off from the logistics base in Dalmatia at Kupres and Mostar), only because the reserve land connection (a secret bypass road) was constructed in time.⁴³⁾ This road, connecting Split through Imotska and Posušje with Jablanica and Prozor, was cut through very difficult mountain terrain (the mountains of Vrana and Čvrsnica are over 2000 m) and it was a true construction feat, which created the possibility for BH to maintain a pincer pressure at Kupres and Mostar.

During the first phase of the war in BH, the battles between the Croatian army and the units of the RS, who planned to keep the Croatian territory (to the South of Cavtat), from which - in accordance with the agreement between Croatia and the so-called FRY - the units of the YNA had to withdraw. The units of the Herzegovina corps of the RS first experienced in the first half of 1992 a defeat when attempting to take the coast of BH (at Klek-Neum) and cut off the Dubrovnik coast from the Neretva valley,⁴⁴⁾ and then they were once again defeated at Cavtat,⁴⁵⁾ when they tried to fill the vacuum after the YNA left and to dig in to their positions.⁴⁶⁾ They were pushed from the coast, but they still retained a position from which they could now shell the coastal regions.

During the war in BH, the units of the RS carved up the territory of BH into a number of pieces, which were not physically contiguous. The Cazin enclave, which was surrounded by the RSK to the west, and by the units of the RS to the east, used for the whole period of the war the Croatian port of Rijeka as its exit to the sea. This of course would have been impossible if its then leader Fikret Abdić (Bosnian Petain) had not cooperated with the Serbian and Croatian governments, and had he not also been prepared to remain in the composition of the rump Yugoslavia, together with the RS and RSK.

The escalation of armed conflicts between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims (1993) brought about a calming in the conflicts between the Croats and

Serbs. The mass expelling of the inhabitants of other ethnic groups which had already begun in the first stage of the war in the regions that were taken over by the Serbs then became even more intense. The river of refugees and exiles flowed chiefly in the direction of Dalmatia, which became the logistic base for the implementation of international humanitarian operations.

During the conflicts between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, who were supported by Croatia, it appeared that the survival and successful operation of the BH army would depend above all on the (un)preparedness of Croatia to allow them supplies through its sea ports, and on the preparedness of the local Croatian administrations in Herceg-Bosnia, so as to allow them transit aid through the territory of Herceg-Bosnia. This is why the units of the BH army directed its attacks towards Mostar, the key to the valley of the river Neretva.⁴⁷⁾ Only when the Washington Agreement (1994) allowed the formation of the Muslim-Croat federation and the confederation between Croatia and BH, were the possibilities established for the start of an unhindered operation between the coast and central Bosnia for the needs of the BH army. The influence of this could already be seen in the autumn of 1994, when the BH army for the first time since the war in BH broke out began offensive operations. It is no coincidence here that in the south the goal of these offensives was the protection of the roads from Split to Ploče and to the interior of BH.⁴⁸⁾

The importance of the Adriatic ports and the land links from these ports to the battlefields in the hinterland depended strongly on both external and internal factors. Among the external first place should be given to the embargo. If (when) this embargo is lifted, both the parties to the conflict will be forced to solve their problems in a new way. The army of the RS will have nothing left but to try to break the link between Split, Ploče and the hinterland. For this reason we can expect it to attack to the west of Herzegovina and Mostar.

Among the internal factors the most important are the (in)stability of the Croatian-Bosnian coalition.⁴⁹⁾ This is not nearly as firm as was shown in the Washington Agreement. Due to the disputes between Herceg-Bosnia and the Bosnian government, the leadership in Sarajevo desires a free path to the sea and is persevering to maintain the corridor from Ploče to the territory under the control of the BH army.⁵⁰⁾ The possible spread of the war to Sandžak and/or Kosovo could also have an influence on the relations between Croatia, Herceg-Bosnia and BH.⁵¹⁾ The river of refugees from this region would flow from Serbia to BH, and once again change the ethnic structure

of the inhabitants in the territory of Herceg-Bosnia and very probably trigger a conflict between allies such as broke out in BH in 1993.⁵²⁾

We should mention that the Croatian army attempted during the war in BH to repair the hopeless situation which was a consequence of the broken land links between Dalmatia and the other parts of Croatia. For this purpose operations "Maslenica" and "Divoselo" were organised in the hinterland of Zadar in 1993, but with the aim of removing the units of the RSK from the area where they planned to install a pontoon Maslenički bridge⁵³⁾ or protect the road which was within range of the VRSK (The Army of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina). No operation achieved the necessary depth of breakthrough, so that in Dalmatia a territorial status quo was preserved that was similar to 1991.

When armed conflicts arose in 1993 between the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims, it appeared that this dispute also had a naval dimension. In the composition of former Yugoslavia BH already had a part of the coast in the Klek Neum bay (between the peninsula of Pelješac and the mouth of the Neretva river). The coast measures 9 km as the crow flies, and the entire coastline about 23 km.⁵⁴⁾ This section of the coast is in territory where there is a majority of Croats and the Croatian (para)state in BH - Herceg-Bosna - claimed it as a part of their territory. Since their then leaders proclaimed "urbi et orbi" in 1992 that Herceg-Bosna would be united with Croatia, while in 1993 they proclaimed that the Muslim desire for an exit to the sea was "irrational",⁵⁵⁾ they came into conflict with the government of Sarajevo.⁵⁶⁾ The RS also (with weapons) showed an interest in "their part" of the sea of the "Avnoj BH",⁵⁷⁾ but the attacks of these units of the Croatian army were repulsed back in May 1992. The leaders of the RS did show a certain bargaining flexibility, for they did not insist on getting the coast of Klek Neum; they mentioned that a part of the peninsula of Prevlaka to the Molunat peninsula could also be theirs.⁵⁸⁾ They counted on the fact that they would have to retreat from Dubrovnik and Cavtat because of this. They were convinced that in this barter with Croatia they would have the support of Montenegro and the so-called FRY.⁵⁹⁾ But in any case Klek Neum is desired both by Croatia and BH as well as the RS.⁶⁰⁾

Since the only land link between Dalmatia and the Dubrovnik coastal regions passes through this section of the coast, while it has no suitable road or railway connection with the network in hinterland of BH, it is obvious that this part of BH is at this moment only a potential "window to the world". The Croatian port of Rijeka had this function in former Yugoslavia (for the

northern part of Bosnia) and the Croatian port of Ploče (for the southern part of BH). It is precisely this geographical crossing of Croatia's strategically important longitudinal land communications with the transverse Bosnian strategic approach to the sea which is an open problem that the two countries will have to resolve when affairs have calmed down. The peculiarity of this case lies in the fact that in this section of the Bosnia-Herzegovina coast the borders of the territorial or inshore waters were never defined, and that all nautical routes leading to this section of the coast are within the already defined borders of Croatian territorial waters.

4. GENERAL CONCLUSION

Looking at the poli(tical)tectonics of the Adriatic in the 20th century, it would appear that the focus of geostrategic changes has moved from the west coast of the Adriatic (where the principal changes of the 19th century had taken place) to the east coast and its hinterland. Compared to key changes, which until the disintegration of the second Yugoslavia had occurred under the influence of war (the Balkan wars, First and Second World Wars), those of today occurred because of the disturbed balance between the two blocs, but above all on account of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and of the former USSR.

Observing the frequency of changes, it strikes us that they occur on average every nine years. Affected by these changes, large countries have been disappearing and smaller ones emerging. At the beginning of the century, three great states (Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Italy) and one small country (Montenegro) shared the Adriatic coast. During the period that stretched from the end of World War I to the final destruction of the two-bloc balance, one great state (Italy), one medium-size country (Yugoslavia) and one small nation (Albania) were located in the area. Now there are as many as five countries in the region, besides Italy: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania. In addition, two Serb para-states (Republic of Serbs in Croatia and Republic of Serbs in BiH) are demanding access to the sea.

It is therefore obvious that a progressive geostrategic shredding of the Adriatic east coast has been taking place. Thirty per cent of the integral former Yugoslav territory is claimed by two or more newly-founded states or para-states, while we find increasing demands for autonomous regions (Istria and Dalmatia in Croatia, Sandžak, Vojvodina and Kosovo in FRY,⁶¹)

Albanian "Ilirida" in western Macedonia where the majority population is of Albanian origin, the southern part of Albania having a Greek majority). This leads to the conclusion that politectonic processes are still in progress and that the risk of spreading these processes to the southern crisis are has not yet diminished. In this case, it is highly probable that the existing (un)finished war may be reactivated to the west of the Drina and involving FRY, Albania, Greece and Turkey in the conflict.

The influence of the above-mentioned shredding of state formations can be felt in the Adriatic too. The coast line (mainland and islands) of former Yugoslavia is now distributed according to (non-)temporary borders, so that Croatia is assigned 94% of the integral coast (about 6,000 km), FRY 5%, Slovenia 0.65%, and BH 0.34%. It should be noted here that there are 5 critical points and areas along the east coast to which at least two parties aspire simultaneously. These include the problems of defining: (1) the Slovene-Croatian border at the bay of Piran; (2) the Croatian-Bosnian border and corridors to the sea in the Klek Neum, the Neretva and the Croatian harbour of the Ploče areas; (3) the Croatian-Montenegrin border in the Prevlaka zone; (4) two additional issues triggered by the Serb para-states within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who wish to win their own access to the sea or at least customs-free zones at harbours (those nearest to these para-states) by bargaining with their military gains on land. In the course of events, these aspects of border definition and possible territory exchanges⁶² may be augmented with border problems in the epicontinental basin, which will become very topical once or if speculations on the supposed oil resources under the Adriatic⁶³ have definitely been confirmed. And there is of course also the problem of Istrian autonomy, as well as the problem of (non)revision of Osimo agreement and it's adaptation to new circumstances.

Despite the present relatively peaceful situation in the Adriatic, possible future complications are to be expected which threaten to transform the whole hinterland's area into a new Afghanistan. More plausible than the radicals marching on Belgrade⁶⁴ or the overthrow of Milošević are three scenarios: (1) potential complications in the event of the Montenegrin liberals' gaining power, whose goal is an independent state of Montenegro.⁶⁵ In this case, circumstances similar to those in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992) can be expected also in Montenegro, as substantial JLA forces are based in its territory; (2) although the Bosnian Federation has been founded (bringing together territories controlled by the Sarajevo government and Herzeg Bosna), many indicators point to the fact that real cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats is still

non-existent. Should the situation escalate and new conflicts occur between the present (non)allies, the only remaining option of the Sarajevo government would be to persist in their demands for access to the sea at Klek Neum. Since the only corridors to the coast run through Croatian Herzeg Bosna - which would be supported by republic of Croatia, as they have done thus far - this could sooner or later lead to conflict; (3) if armed conflicts in Kosovo and/or Sandžak take place, Albania will eventually become involved, consistent with its announcement that it would not remain passive. Air-force and army actions would embrace the territory from Boka Kotorska to Otrant with the key strike points at the harbours of Dürres and Medova (Shengjin). This would - without doubts - signify a new naval dimension to the present conflict.

If we observe the present place, role and meaning of the sea and compare them with the situation before the war, it becomes evident that Croatia - despite its having 94% of the coast line - has lost the most in this war. It is not just the problem of refugees and deportees housed at tourist resorts. Almost a third of its southern territory is, due the wedged position of Serbian Krajina (between BH and the Karin sea), cut off from the rest. Considering that Serbian units at the Karlovac gate (the distance between Karlovac and Slovenian boarder is only 15 km) have effective control over the only communication line between the Croatian coastal region, Istria, the Rijeka harbour and Zagreb, that they disconnected the Krk-Sisak oil pipeline, and that they also control the shortest routes from harbour of Rijeka to Zagreb and to eastern Slavonia, the conclusion may be drawn that any normal development of the country is hardly possible. This refers not only to tourist activities on the Adriatic coast or the shipbuilding industry, but also to the supply of electricity, water, etc.^{60,67} FRY is no better off. As a consequence of the embargo, it has lost both sea transport contacts with the world and lost its entire merchant fleet due to the embargo and blockade.⁶⁸ Furthermore, its sole sea harbour is linked to the interior via railway through BH, which could cut it off totally from its central area (in the case of a changed distribution of power in BH). Almost all of the Yugoslav navy have been transferred to the Boka Kotorska zone, causing this region to lose a large part of its tourist trade, ecology and other potential areas of development.⁶⁹ Under the new circumstances, only the Slovene economy could prosper, which is accounted for by the annual trade of Koper Harbour which had a 5 million ton seatraffic (import + export + transit) last year, whereas the Croatian harbour of Rijeka, which achieved 3-3.5-times better results before the war (1991), is stagnating around the 3.5 million ton mark.

It should be mentioned that Macedonia has suffered from the consequences of Yugoslavia's disintegration as well. Since FRY is subject to the international embargo and Macedonia's relations with Greece are poor (it has had no success in improving them),⁷⁰ it was forced to strategically re-orient its operations towards the Greek harbour of Thessaloniki, which has so far represented Macedonia's only "maritime window" to the outside world. The Greek threats which include the closing of borders and other economic, non-military pressures on Macedonia have forced the Macedonian government to re-direct their imports and exports to Albanian and Bulgarian harbours. This has made the construction of transit communications from the Adriatic to the Black Sea (which had been of decidedly less importance) a priority business⁷¹. This has given way to new forms of cooperation, and ferry communications between Dürres, Koper and other Adriatic harbours has become extremely important for Macedonia's links with Europe.

It appears from the features of the interventions carried out so far by the international community (operations Deny Flight, Parachute, Sharp Guard, Maritime Monitor, etc.), which decided not to identify and punish the guilty parties and not to put out the fire at its base, but rather by exercising embargo, blockade and other measures to prevent the spreading of the fire towards the south, that Serbia has been the most successful in taking advantage of the existing local strategic distribution of power (leaning on the arms inventories of the former JLA and the embargo on importing arms for the victims of aggression)⁷². Serbia has used its military power, the clefs and contradictions within the UN and in the relations between the US, the European countries and Russia to set the borders of its future state. However, since these victories won in a strategy of indirect approach (where the principle role was played by local Serb forces supported and armed by JLA) have not been helpful in its gaining international recognition, but rather contributed to its becoming a sort of outlaw expelled from the international community, all factors suggest that the conditions are ripe for it to ditch the plan for a "Greater Serbia" (providing that international pressure continues). Only in this case will issues of the definition of maritime borders according to European standards become relevant.

As far as the development of Slovenia is concerned, it may be expected, in accordance with the anticipated intensifying of the processes of European integration, that its past role (that of being an integral part of the Adriatic Rimland, which it played during the Cold War) will be replaced by one in which it is a transit area, a crossing of influences from Mittel Europa, the Central European Initiative and numerous regional integrations like Alps-

Adria and similar. Development should therefore be planned in accordance with Central European values, taking into account the risks of (un)solved conflicts to the south of Slovenia. Any other kind of policy giving priority to connections with the south would be highly unrealistic and would cause a slowing down in development, a further lagging behind the rest of Europe and a sinking into quagmire out of which Slovenia - indeed at the cost of a 30% fall of the GNP, but with a negligible death toll and material damage - had already successfully climbed.

From long-range view, we must also take into consideration the future changes in the broader international environment of Slovenia and Europe in general. The progressive increase in per year's GNP of the Pac Rim's countries (which is about 3 - 4 times higher than in Europe and in the USA) is a warning that we can expect in the next decade changes in the international exchange of goods and particularly a higher volume of seatraffic on the routes between Pac Rim and Europe. And because the ships (on the route Pac Rim - Europe) are reaching the Northern Adriatic ports in about 5-6 days sooner (and according to this cheaper) than the Atlantic and North sea's ports, we can expect that the Adriatic sea and particularly its northern ports and land communications between them and the Nearland of Europe will be for Europe very probably more important than they are today. It means that in the not so distant future, the Adriatic factor could have higher importance not only for Slovenia, but also for Europe and European integration in general.

5. SUMMARY

From the changing dynamics of the distribution of power in and around the Adriatic shown and the consequences displayed at sea and on the coast, we can draw the following extremely general conclusions:

(a) In the 20th century the focus of geostrategic changes has moved from the west coast of the Adriatic (where the principal changes of the 19th century had taken place) onto its east coast and the hinterland. Affected by changes in the wider area (disintegration of Otoman Empire, of Austria-Hungary, disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR) this century has seen the changing of national borders, the disappearance of old and the emergence of new countries (at an approximate rate of every 9 years).

(b) After the end of the Cold War, the territory of former Yugoslavia lost

the geostrategic importance it had in the eighties. The former system of balance in the Balkans, characterised by three pairs (a pair of non-allied countries: Yugoslavia and Albania; a pair of Communist Bloc members: Bulgaria and Romania; and a pair of NATO members: Greece and Turkey) lost its significance, as all countries had organised free elections and introduced multi-party societies, free markets and the free flow of people and ideas. The end of the Cold War encouraged the superpowers and Europe to lose their former interest in the Yugoslav territory and in preserving the status quo within Yugoslavia.

(c) The disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-199?) is in progress at a time when Western Europe is establishing increasingly close internal ties and attempting to formulate a new European framework which will include former Warsaw Pact members and countries emerging from the ruins of USSR. It found the UN, USA and Europe unprepared and disharmonious (as regards diagnosis as well as therapy). These clefts and conflicts within the international community were used by Serbia, which in a strategy of proxy war realised its "Greater Serbia" project. However, all its victories and sacrifices remain pointless unless it succeeds in achieving the abolition of the embargo and international recognition.

(d) During the multi-stage process of the disintegration of the former state, past experiences have been reaffirmed, according to which narrow seas and the distribution of power at sea and on the coast are decisively affected by results achieved on land.

(c) International peace-keeping forces and operations executed on land, at sea and in the air (UNPROFOR, Sharp Guard, Maritime Monitor, Parachute, Deny Flight) were successful in preventing interventions by principle strategic forces of FRY, but could not prevent the planned metamorphosis of JLA into the Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Army of the Srpska Republic, the deployment of "volunteers", logistic support and other forms of involvement which the Serb armies used to occupy 30% of vital territory in Croatia, and 70% in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(f) As a consequence of the disintegration process in former Yugoslavia, the strategic distribution of power at the east Adriatic coast has changed drastically; former Yugoslavia gave birth to four internationally-recognised countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia), the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro), 3 para-states (Herzeg Bosna and the Srpska Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of

Srpska Krajina in Croatia), and one confederation (Croatia and BH). Taking into account that there are 5 more candidates for the status of autonomous region (Istria in Croatia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandžak in FRY, Albanians in western Macedonia) and that the Serb para-states in Croatia and BH have the intention of entering into a (con)federation with FRY, it can be concluded that the process of disintegration is not yet complete.

(g) Taking into account the territorial claims of new countries, the conclusion can be drawn that some 30% of the integral territory of former Yugoslavia is claimed by 2 or more countries involved in armed confrontations so far, and that a risk still remains of the war spreading to the "south crisis area" (Sandžak, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania), and of possible regionalisation of the war (involving Greece, Turkey and others).

(h) Along the east coast of the Adriatic the newly founded countries hold the following shares of the integral former Yugoslav coast line and islands (6,116 km): Croatia, 94%; FRY, 5%; Slovenia 0.65%; Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.36%. Along the coast there are 5 points and areas of potential conflict, including: the bay of Piran, Istria, the Karin sea, Klek Neum and Prevlaka. It can be expected that with a possible abatement of land confrontation, problems of defining borders at the coast may move to the fore, as well as issues of the distribution of the epicontinental basin and territorial waters, of identifying safe shipping corridors, and others.

SOURCES

1. This paper does not deal with structures and tactical operations of small tactical units of the coastal defence and fleet. They are more thoroughly described in Slovene and Croatian professional magazines (Obramba magazine - Ljubljana, Hrvatski vojnik magazine - Zagreb) and in well known foreign professional magazines such as Navy International, Jane's Intelligence Review and Rivista Marittima. This subject as most frequently been dealt with by Dr Milan Vego, dr. James Gow etc;
2. Balkanski ratovi (The Balkan Wars), Vojna enciklopedija (VE)- (Encyclopedia of War), Belgrade, 2nd issue, Book 1, pages 449 - 458;
3. Balkanski ratovi, VE Belgrade, 2nd issue, Book 1, pages 449 - 458;
4. After WWI there were approx 300,000 Slovenians living in Italy (which was 1/3 of the entire Slovenian population at the time). Until the beginning of WWII around 70,000 of them fled to Yugoslavia, around 30,000 emigrated to South America and 5,000 to places elsewhere in Europe. Currently there are about 40,000 Slovenes still living in Italy.
Professor Gregor Tomc, Ph.D.: Okupacija v treh slikah (Occupation in Three Pictures), Delo, Ljubljana, November 5, 1994;
5. Vojna enciklopedija (Encyclopedia of War), Belgrade, 2nd issue, Book 1, page 459;
6. Mala Antanta (The Czechoslovakian-Romanian-Yugoslav Entente), VE (Encyclopedia of War), Belgrade, 2nd issue, pages 233-234;
7. Jure Apih: O Medmorju, Delo, Ljubljana, November 5, 1994, page 40;
8. VE, Belgrade, 2nd issue, Book 10, page 147;
9. A.Ž.: Vzpon in padec JVM (Rise and Fall of the Yugoslav Navy), Obramba, Ljubljana, 1994, pages 8-11;
10. The end of the cold war between Italy and Yugoslavia was influenced by a significant improvement of the relationship between the superpowers. We can say that the Free Territory of Trieste never did actually exist, because zone A was controlled by Allied forces (7,200 soldiers) and zone B was controlled by the Yugoslav National Army (3,000 soldiers).The

superpowers divided Trieste between Yugoslavia and Italy and Yugoslavia received US\$ 20 million for development of Koper port.

Miro Kocjan: Zadnje ure cone A in B (Last Hours of the A and B Zones), Republika, Ljubljana, October 30, 1994, page 23;

11. Balkanski savez (The Balkan Union), VE (Encyclopedia of War), Belgrade, 2nd issue, Book 1, page 459;

12. Nationalists of Greater Serbia at first used the following slogan for outlining their aspirations: Yugoslavia will be able to preserve itself only if Serbia is strong. Therefore the leadership of the Yugoslav National Army tried hard to protect the existence of the state. The slogan "Powerful Serbia = Powerful Yugoslavia" was in its first stage actualised by abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In May 1991, when Yugoslavia still existed, a union of the Bosnian Krajina and SAO (Serbian Autonomous Territory) in Croatia was declared, with the stress on the fact that the "union of all Serbs is an imperative task". Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence a month later.

Slobodan Ivić: BiH nije srpska dedovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a Serbian Inheritance), Borba, Belgrade, November 12-13, 1994, page IX;

13. Yugoslav Army Headquarters decided on the first possibility which was refused by the majority of the Presidency of Yugoslavia with the explanation that there would be no political support for mobilisation in Serbia and Montenegro ("to force Slovenians to stay in Yugoslavia if they do not wish to do so"). The third possibility was adopted in the end.

Veljko Kadijević: Moje viđenja raspada (My Views on Disintegration), Politika, Belgrade, pages 120-121;

14. An interview with State Secretary Žnidarič, Head of the "Departure of the Last Yugoslav Army Soldier from Slovenia" operation, Slovenska vojska, Ljubljana, October 21 1994, pages 5-8;

15. A statement by the leader of the Slovene Nationalist Party Zmago Jelinčič, Politika, Belgrade, October 17 1994;

16. Famous Slovene expert, Dr Bogo Grafenauer, Ph.D., based his view on the historical fact that the Gulf of Piran was always a fishing area of the Piran municipality (until 1797 Istria was a union of towns), that the salt-pans of Sečovelje are a homogenous organism (also biologically) and a great mistake was made in the Piran municipality in 1948 and 1952 when the land

registration books for Kaštel and Savudrija were handed over to the Croatian municipality of Buje (Mlini village was divided into 10 houses that remained in Croatia and 20 that remained in Slovenia). He also maintains that the Slovenian character of the territory south of the border of the Piran municipality cannot be proved.

An interview with Dr Bogo Grafenauer, Ph.D., Republika, Ljubljana, September 25, 1994, page 11;

17. Several different criteria have been used so far. The Slovene side claimed that the Gulf of Piran - which has been a fishing area for the Piran municipality for ages - is controlled by the Slovene police. The Croatian side opposes this fact, arguing that on March 13 1973, the Croatian port authorities (Pula) issued a resolution on the rescue of the Italian ship stranded on the Piran coast of Savudrija peninsula. In connection with this, the Law on Rescue at Sea and Waterways (from 1966) was quoted and the argument was disputed by the Slovene side, stating the fact that the Koper port authorities called in the tugboats, police and customs officers so the whole problem was solved, etc.

Boris Šuligoj: Čigav je v resnici Piranski zaliv? (Whose Property is the Gulf of Piran in Reality?) Delo, Ljubljana, September 28 1994, page 2;

18. An interview with Dr Hrvoje Kačić, Delo, Ljubljana, June 29 1994;

19. Pomorska enciklopedija (Maritime Encyclopedia), Zagreb, 2nd issue, Book 6, pages 43-44;

19/a. A very well known John Naisbitt in his interview (Delo, Ljubljana, 12. 11. 1994, p. 27) stresses the thesis that in the next century the economical, political and cultural momentum will be in the Pac Rim. The other elements and possible implications for Slovenia future are presented in the Mr. Ermin Kržičnik's and Mrs. Dita Kastelic's article "Iliria is in the Europe's Heartland" (Delo, Ljubljana, 10. 12. 1994, p. 28-29);

20. Admiral Nikola Ercegović, the Head of the Yugoslav Navy described this situation in the following words: "The Navy found itself in a completely reverse situation - it was forced to retreat from the coast where it should receive support (meaning, in this context, the naval bases, comment by A.Ž.).".

An interview with Admiral Ercegović, Vojska, Belgrade, October 22, 1992, pages 10-11;

21. The island of Vis is around 90 km² in size and has two suitable ports (Vis, Komiža) where light naval forces can be based. The role of the infrastructure was taken over by the logistic ships (tankers, water tankers, repair floating docks, etc.). Because the island is 10 miles away from the island of Hvar and about 30 miles from the shore, control over sea lanes of communications between north and south Adriatic sea was possible. Pomorska enciklopedija, Zagreb, 2nd issue, Book 8, page 477;

22. Federal Secretary of People's Defence, Veljko Kadijević explains why Croatia was left with the initiative for the first attack (on the military barracks) - if the army attacked first it would be accused of being a "Greater Serbian aggressor" and the Croatian forces would be portrayed as victims. In this case the western forces could use the "Gulf model" for attacking the Yugoslav army. The peacekeeping role of the Yugoslav army at the time (the army intervening between the Serbian rebels and Croatian units) was just some kind of a trap to provoke Croatian units. When this happened the Yugoslav army began a retaliatory offensive. V. Kadijević, Idem., page 87;

23. Željko Rogošić: Tvornica HRM (the HRM Factory), Globus, Zagreb, March 13 1992, pages 14-16:

24. Veljko Kadijević: Moje vi|enje raspada (My Views on Disintegration), Politika, Belgrade, 1993, page 134;

25. Veljko Kadijević: Moje vi|enje raspada, Politika, Belgrade, 1993, pages 134-137;

26. This breakthrough was supposed to protect the entire strip which connects liberated Vukovar with the port of Bar thus linking Serbia with the Podonavje area and the Adriatic sea. Vukovar is a very important river port on the Danube. The renovation of the Vukovar - Ilača railway link was planned in this relation.

S. Berić: Luke Vukovar i Bar povezati železnicom (Railway Connections of the Ports of Vukovar and Bar), Politika, Belgrade, December 19 1992, page 20;

27. Veljko Kadijević, Idem., pages 142-143;

28. An interview with Zvonimir Kisić, Globus, Zagreb, October 28 1994, pages 42-43; Politika Ekspres, October 24 1994, page 14;

29. This was attempted in the field of foreign affairs. Contacts were made with the Italian right wing in Trieste and Rome and the Italian support for the autonomy of the Republic of Srbska Krajina and Istria was discussed.

Agency news Delo, Ljubljana, June 20 1994, page 10;

An interview with the President of the Republic of Srbska Krajina Milan Martić, Intervju, Belgrade, June 10 1994, pages 8-9;

30. Former president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated (due to problems that occurred because of the support to the Yugoslav People's Army when withdrawing from this peninsula with only 0.9 km² of surface area): "I have a good mind to destroy this piece of land (small not inhabited land - comment by A.Ž.), never to exist again!"

At first the maps showed that the border goes from the Cape Prevlaka to the open sea. When the Montenegrins accepted that, the statement made by the President of the Croatian State Commission for Borders Dr Kačić made a great impact when he said that the border actually goes from the Cape Kobila which was bought by the Dubrovnik republic from Montenegro years ago. (He also mentioned the price of 12,500 ducats).

D. Vuković: Odluka bez posledica (A Decision without Consequences), Aktuelna kopija, Borba, Belgrade, May 22 1994, page 12;

31. Mine oko Prevlake (Mines around Prevlaka), Vreme, Belgrade, October 31 1994, pages 4-5;

32. A statement made by commander of general headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, Borba, Belgrade, October 17-18, 1992, page 3;

33. An interview with the adviser Professor Dušan Bilandžić, Politika, Belgrade, November 4 1994, page 7;

34. The President of the Republic of Srbska Dr Radovan Karadžić in this respect showed his readiness to exchange some 250 km² of the territory in the Dubrovnik hinterland for 30 to 35 km of the coastal strip between Prevlaka up to the Molunat peninsula.

An interview with Dr Radovan Karadžić, Večernje novosti, Belgrade, June 17 1994, page 5;

35. An interview with Dr Anđelko Milardović: Prijeti li Hrvatskoj raspad? (Is Croatia on the Verge of Disintegration?), Globus, Zagreb, June 4 1992, pages 42-43;

Globus, Zagreb, December 11 1992, pages 39-40;

Globus, Zagreb, September 4 1992, pages 12-13;

36. Dino Debeljuh: IDS (Istrian Democratic Assembly), Arkzin, Zagreb, October 28 1994, pages 6-7;

37. Trieste is considered to be the capital of Istria by the Italian neo-fascist leader Roberto Meni, who openly stated that the primary task of the Italian government should be an annulment of the Osimo Agreements (1975) and Istria, Rijeka, Zadar and Dalmatia should be returned to Italy.

An interview with Roberto Meni, Globus, Zagreb, November 6, 1992, pages 35-37;

Slovene and Croatian nationalists also consider autonomous Istria to be a zone of power.

Globus, Zagreb, September 18 1992, page 47;

38. Representatives of the Italian right-wing party (Movimento Sociale Italia), which got 40% of votes at the last election in Trieste, argued for Istria and Dalmatia to be annexed to Italy again at the parliamentary session on October 22 1991. They believe that Italy signed the Osimo Agreements in 1975 just because NATO was afraid that Yugoslavia would open its bases to the Soviet Union fleet. Ettore Greco wrote in more detail about the Italian views on the Osimo Agreements: Italy, the Yugoslav Crisis and the Osimo Agreements, the International Spectator No. 1, Rome 1994, pages 13-31;

39. It is estimated that every seventh citizen in Istria (out of the total of 220,000) applied for Italian citizenship because this enabled him to get employment in Italy. At the last elections in Istria 72% of votes went to Istarski demokratski sabor (Istrian Democratic Assembly), this was registered by the officials in Zagreb as a possible beginning of a secret invasion.

M. Durić: Krstenice seju paniku, Politika ekspres, Belgrade, September 27 1994, page 2;

39/a. Nenad Klapčič: Autonomne regije onemogućit će ratove, ARKZIN, zagreb, 9. 12. 1994, str. 13;

40. The Army District II at the time had about 1,500 cannons, 450 to 500 armoured carriers and 5 corps (Sarajevo, Bihać, Tuzla, Knin and Bileća corps), the operative group Mostar and a part of the Podgorica and Užice corps. The Croatian army owned 250 tanks, 150 armoured carriers, 400 cannons, some airplanes and about 20 vessels. These forces alone would not

be sufficient to make an offensivem, therefore the arrival of the UNPROFOR troops saved Croatia and helped it buy some time.

Boris Komadina: Vreme je namaknulo snagu (The Time Gained Strength), Danas, Zagreb, November 15 1994, pages 14-15;

41. Marko Marković: 7 dana na užarenom hercegovačkom kamenju, (Seven Days on the Heated Rocks of Herzegovina), Globus, Zagreb, May 1 1992, pages 6-7;

Marko Barišić: Operacija "Trojanski konj" (Operation "Trojan Horse"), Globus, April 17 1992, pages 8-9; Globus, Zagreb, May 1 1992, pages 6-7;

42. These dilemmas are implicitly stated in the interview with General Antun Tus, adviser to the Croatian president. Globus, Zagreb, November 4 1994, pages 3-4;

44. Globusov stožer: Uskoro pada Ilijina kita! (The Braid of Ilija Is Soon To Fall), Globus, Zagreb, June 19 1992, pages 14-15;

45. Marko Marković: 7 dana na užarenom hercegovačkom kamenju, Globus, Zagreb, May 1 1992, pages 6-7;

Marko Barišić: Operacija "Trojanski konj", Globus, Zagreb, April 17 1992, pages 8-9; Globus, Zagreb, May 1 1992, pages 6-7;

46. According to the Yugoslav Army official version, the Yugoslav Army prevented the Republic of Srbska army from occupying this part of the territory and was accused by the Serbian extremists of "treason of national interests". (P. Janičić: Dva pečata na Prevlaku, Borba, October 17-18 1992, page 8). According to the Croatian Army version it was a case of a successful raid right into the rear of the Chetnik units which were forced into a panicky retreat (ST, Zagreb, September 25 1992, page 43);

47. Željko Rogošić: 6. korpus Armije BiH započeo obkoljavanje Mostara! (The 6th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina began its Encirclement of Mostar), Globus, Zagreb, July 9 1993, pages 3-4;

48. Džemaludin Latić: Radi li se o srbsko-hrvatskoj zamci? (Is it a Case of a Serbian-Croatian Trap?)

An interview with the commanders of the 7th and 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Hrvezgovina Army, Ljiljan, Sarajevo, November 9 1994, pages 2, 5-6, 8-9;

49. The Muslim scepticism about the firmness of such a coalition is based on the estimate of the sources close to Izetbegović who claim that the alliance of Muslims either with the Croats or the Serbs prevents the realisation of the concept of the unified Bosnia-Herzegovina because Herceg Bosnia would always be tied to Croatia and the Republic of Srpska to Yugoslavia. They are bothered by the fact that the abolition of Herceg Bosnia and its army did not occur and common operations are still far away. Joining forces at Kupres was more of an exception than a rule.

B. Marić: Najuticajniji Ljudi Alije Izetbegovića (The Most Influential People of Alija Izetbegović), Večernje novosti, Belgrade, September 21 1994;

50. Ahmed Salihbegić: Hrvatsko inzistiranje (Croatia Insists), Ljiljan, Sarajevo, October 26 1994; pages 20-21;

Muslimani hoće Ploče (Muslims Want Ploče), Politika ekspres, Belgrade, October 26 1994, page 2;

51. There is a plan in Serbia for the settlement of some 100,000 refugees and exiles from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in Kosovo. Because the density of population in Kosovo was already twice as high as the average in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it is obvious that the relations with the majority Albanian population will become strained. This will contribute towards the deterioration of the situation which was critical even before that. R. Barjaktarević: Na Kosovu domovi za 100.000 izbjeglica (Homes for 100,000 refugees in Kosovo), Borba, Belgrade, November 11-13, 1994, page 6;

52. An interview with Professor Radovan Pavić, Ph.D., Globus, Zagreb, December 10 1993, pages 5-8;

53. Željko Rogošić: Uskoro porinuče Masliničkog mosta (Launching of Maslenica Bridge to Occur Soon), Globus, Zagreb, May 1 1992, pages 37-38;

54. Željko Rogošić: Hoće li Bosnia pasti u Neumu? (Will Bosnia Be Defeated in Neum?), Globus, Zagreb, April 3 1992, pages 43-44;

55. M. Mišić: Završnica u Sarajevu? Politika, Belgrade, September 20 1993, pages 1-2;

56. Željko Rogošić: Zar će u samo srce Hrvatske biti zabodena zastava s polumjesecom? (Will the Flag with a Crescent Moon Stab the Very Heart

of Croatia?), Globus, Zagreb, October 1 1993, pages 7-8;

57. A statement by Dr Radovan Karadžić, Borba, Belgrade, September 12-13, 1992, page 10;

58. Davor Butković: Diplomatski poraz u Ženevi (Diplomatic Defeat in Geneva) Globus, Zagreb, August 27 1993, pages 2-4;

59. An interview with Dr Haris Silajdžić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Globus, Zagreb, September 24 1993, pages 3-4;

60. Maroje Mihovilović: Neum neće biti pod hrvatskom kontrolom! (Neum Will Not Be Controlled by Croatia!), Globus, Zagreb, August 20 1993, pages 4-5;

61. Albanian leaders in Kosovo demand a confederation with Albania and the Serbian authorities by no means agree. Such a confederation might be a cause for a general attack of the already deployed military and police forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and for a repetition of the events that took place in April 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

An interview with Dr Ibrahim Rugova, Borba, Belgrade, November 10 1994, page 1;

R. Barjaktarević: Ujedinjenje sa Albanijom (Union with Albania), Borba, Belgrade, September 13 1994, page 6;

62. Nikola Trklja: Finale teritorijalne raspodele bivše Jugoslavije (The Finals of Territorial Division of Former Yugoslavia), Politika, Belgrade, September 8 1993, page 7;

63. The Balkan News Service, Ljiljan, Sarajevo, November 2 1994, page 9;

64. Threats made by radicals to put Milošević away because he betrayed the Serbs on the west bank of Drina are illustrated by one of them who made the following statement over a year ago: "If you fail us we can always kill Duke Ferdinand and you will be at war!" It sounded absurd at the time but it makes political sense today, because the role of Ferdinand (Habsburg) as it was at the outbreak of WWI would be taken over by the UN forces, Albanians in Kosovo, Muslims in Sandžak and others who would be massacred by the Chetnik groups.

Luka Mičeta: Forsiranje Mladića (Enforcement of Mladić), VJ; NIN,

Belgrade, September 2 1994, pages 9, 21;

65. The formation of the greater Montenegro which is to include Montenegro, east Herzegovian Serbian autonomous territory controlled by Vučurević (with the capital of Trebinje) and part of Metohija.

D. Vuković: Više od ritualnog ponavljanja (More Than Just a Ritual Repetition), Borba, Belgrade, October 19 1994, page 13;

66. Željko Rogošić: Bez Peruče se Dalmacija gasi! (Without Peruča Dalmatia is in Darkness) Globus, Zagreb, July 3 1992, pages 6-7;

67. Dalmacija umire od žeđi (Dalmatia Dying of Thirst), Globus, Zagreb, September 28 1992, pages 34-35;

68. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had to import 85% of crude oil products in 1991, 55% of raw materials for ferrous metallurgy, 47% of raw materials for metal-processing industry and 50% of raw materials for mechanical industry. Due to international sanctions and the end of economic cooperation between the states on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the period from 1991 to 1993, the national product fell by 53%.

Z.M. "Krvna slika" uvoza i izvoza ("Blood Panel" of Imports and Exports, Politika Ekspres, Belgrade, September 13 1994, page 2;

69. Pressure by the Montenegrin public and the reproaches to the Yugoslav Navy for "occupying the pearl of Adriatic sea - Boka Kotorska" - contributed to the fact that the construction of the new naval base in the Gulf of Valdano near Ulcinj began.

Karlo Jeger: Gradi se nova velika baza (A Big New Base under Construction), Globus, Zagreb, July 29 1994, pages 12-13;

70. Complexity of problems in this part of the Balkans is clearly seen in the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still believes that the border with Macedonia is not definitely set (about 10,000 of hectares land are mentioned in connection to only one point of dispute).

Taking into account the oft repeated statements made by Milošević on confederation with Greece and the Greek pressure on Macedonia, as well as the statements by the extremist Albanian leaders on the essential establishment of the autonomous Albanian region, it becomes clear that any incident might lead to war between the Albanians and "the rest" or between the Macedonians and "the rest".

M. Antić: Bojazljiv pogled na jug (A Cowardly View of the South),

Večernje novosti, Belgrade, September 7 1994;

71. Dr Boris Nikodimovski: Pat za idniot milenium, Odbrana, Skopje, July/August 1994, pages 10-11;

72. Proofs that the embargo is not water-tight are the naval operations that are underway for a third year in a row and the fact that the fighting has not stopped yet. According to NATO official records there were 42,000 vessels checked in the Adriatic sea and weapons were found on only three of them. M. Zarić: Alarm među saveznicima (Allies Alarmed), Večernje novosti, Belgrade, November 13 1994, page 10.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - THE END OF THE BEGINNING OR THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF WAR?

Ljubljana, December 1994

'Spero lucem,
post tenebras!'

1. OPENING REMARKS

Reports from the Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefields and the statements of politicians and the warring parties directly and indirectly involved in armed clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the third consecutive year, call to mind the Bosnia-Herzegovina uprising of 1875-1878 and the international crisis it precipitated. Bosnian Serb leaders in particular are trying to create such an impression. With regard to the idea of the "national liberation fight of all Serbs for their unification in a single country", which was very current at that time, they often use the word "Turks" when referring to the Bosnian Muslims. Croatian Herzeg-Bosnia leaders acted similarly when fighting between Croats and Muslims flared up in 1993. Serbian leaders are blaming the "Švabi" (Schwabens - a general name for Austrians and Germans) and the Vatican for assisting the "Turks" and for all their other problems. They believe they are using Croats and others to implement their anti-Serb plans. They are recalling the framework of the Catholic-Islamic anti-Orthodox "conspiracy" and the German-Austrian ("Švabski") geo-political concept, in use at the turn of the 20th century ("Drang nach Osten"). The aim of the "conspiracy" is to nullify the results of Serb victories and territorial gains to date. This shows that this is an attempt to consider the current events, processes and relations as equal to those which actually took place in the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Balkans and Europe in the seventies and eighties of the last century.

When we take into account the popular Balkan's visits and statements by Russian opposition leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, certain Russian generals and militant politicians (of whom Filatov is the most prominent one), that Orthodox Russia is defending itself in Bosnia-Herzegovina; similar statements, but from the opposite pole, by Otto von Hapsburg who declared in an interview for the Zagreb-based Globus magazine that there would be no peace in the Balkans until Russian political influence predominated there; and the passionate Croatian demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy in Zagreb, led by former Croatian foreign minister Zvonimir Šeparević, we can assume that many people are under the impression that developments and phenomena from not so distant past have returned to take place once again.

The drawback of such an approach lies in the fact that it 'per analogiam' leads to the conclusion that the events and processes which are expected to take place in the future in the areas south of Slovenia are bound to follow a scenario identical to that of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina uprising (1875-78). This uprising was immediately followed by a war between Serbia and Montenegro on one side and Turkey on the other (1876/77), Russia's entry into the war (siding with Serbia and Montenegro) against Turkey, the Russian victory in the Balkans (1877/78), and retaliation from the European powers who put pressure on Russia in order to thwart its influence in the Balkans. By removing Russia from the Balkans, a new balance of power in Europe was established and a war involving the whole of Europe, such as the Crimean War (1850-53) had been, was averted.

Since the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis was a crisis in its proper sense, developing from a local uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a regional Balkan war and threatening for some time to turn into a European-wide war, a very pessimistic conclusion may be drawn from this deterministic approach: that the real war has yet to begin and that the Balkans will not be able to avert it.

The aim of this article is to present the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Balkans and Europe in the period of these wars, ending with the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and using the comparison between this case and today case to prove that some similarities between the two periods (separated in time by 120 years) indeed exist, but that there are an even greater number of differences between them. These differences are a powerful factor which will prevent history repeating the apocalyptic scenario of 1878 (when Europe escaped an all-out war by a hair's breadth) in the areas south of Slovenia.

2. STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE BALKANS AND EUROPE BEFORE THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA UPRISING

During the period from the beginning of the 19th century, when Europe was shaken by Napoleon's wars and conquests, to the 1870s, a number of bourgeois revolutions and wars took place. The most important events were the victory of the Western coalition over Russia in the Crimean War (1853-56), the unification of Germany, the unification of Italy, the transformation of the unitary Austrian empire into a dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the disintegration of Turkey, which was, on the one hand, accompanied by risings of Bosnian feudal lords against Porta and, on the

other hand, meant the beginning of the nation-state formations in the Balkans (Serbs, Montenegrins, Greeks and Romanians). Since the territories of these nation-states were considerably smaller than the territories where the nations who established these states were settled, the frictions between these and Porta were constantly increasing. Serbia played the main role. The last Turkish units left Serbia as early as 1867. During this time it formed a number of alliances with other Balkan states: with Montenegro in 1866, with Greece and the Bulgarian revolutionary committee in 1867, with Romania in 1868. It had thus, in a way, become the key factor in anti-Turkish opposition in the Balkans. At the same time it presented a threat to Austria-Hungary, which in 1866 transformed its unitary state into a dual monarchy but refused to afford the Slav nations the equal treatment which was then afforded to Hungarians.

Despite the fact that, with the Treaty of Paris (1856), the Great Powers had ensured the territorial integrity of Turkey, they could not stop its inner disintegration and economic decline. In the Balkans, Turkey continued to have at its disposal a solid and compact territory, stretching from Bosnia-Herzegovina, across Sandžak, Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria to Constantinople. As a Balkan regional power, Turkey represented a bulwark against the expansion of Austria-Hungary and Russia, its only European neighbours with military potential seriously to threaten it. However, in 1875 Russia and Austria-Hungary were not motivated for war. Russia was still under the strong influence of defeat in the Crimea war (1853-56), when the Western European Powers had shown Russia that they would not allow its expansion towards the Balkans, Bosphorus, Dardanelles and the Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary also witnessed two consecutive defeats in the West. The one by one defeats in Italy (in the war with France) and in the war with Prussia (1866) influenced the fact that in its foreign affairs Austria-Hungary gave priority to an Eastern strategic orientation ("Drang nach Osten"). A common feature of Turkey and Austria-Hungary (both were nationally very heterogeneous) was that they included very large Slav populations. Russia had been traditionally presenting itself as a protector of all Slavs and of the Orthodox religion, which led the two countries to an anti-Russian foreign policy. However, ties were not so strong that they led to an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

The situation in relations among Great Britain, France and Turkey was different. Both Great Britain and France considered Turkey to be the most important strategic bulwark against the expansion of Russian influence towards the Mediterranean. For this reason they were doing their best to

increase Turkish military power and helped Turkey to implement its internal reforms, urgently needed in order to transform Turkey from a semi-feudal Eastern country to a state fulfilling Western criteria.

The successful first stage of the unification of Germany after the war with Austria (1867) and the political and economic consolidation of Germany - above all, territorial claims over Alsace and Lorraine - led to conflict with France. As soon as French Emperor Napoleon III had assessed that, after the unification of Germany, he was threatened from the south (Prussia had designs on the Spanish throne in league with the German dynasty), he declared war on Germany, which ended with the complete defeat of France (1870/71). Germany came out of this ultimately unified and became one of European great powers.

France and Great Britain established closer relations due to the consolidation of Germany. German Chancellor Bismarck responded with an attempt to create an alliance with Austria-Hungary (which was in fact achieved in 1879) and Russia. When the successor to assassinated Russian Tsar Alexander II established closer ties with France and Great Britain, the German Chancellor concentrated his efforts (1882) on the creation of the triple alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). This alliance controlled the area between the North Sea, Baltic and Adriatic.

This dynamic process demonstrates that international relations in Europe in 1875 were very strained and turbulent. In fact, no stable relations existed. The situation of Russia and Turkey was particularly difficult, since they had internal economic difficulties and directed all their efforts to their own transformation according to the criteria of the Western European countries. Neither Russia nor Turkey wished to get involved in a war, since they had many internal problems and were economically exhausted: in 1861 and 1863/64, Russia crushed two Polish uprisings, and in 1820/22, 1826/28, 1832 and 1850 Turkey quelled as many as four risings of the local Muslim feudal lords and five peasant uprisings in Bosnia-Herzegovina). This was not within the spheres of interest of other European countries, which were creating their colonial empires in Africa and Asia.

In this period, a bad time for all, the uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina began.

3. THE COURSE OF THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA UPRISING (1875)

The repression carried out by the Turkish authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the crushing of a number of previous peasant uprisings, and the redoubled obligations placed on the peasants - in addition to the state tax and compulsory labour, they had to meet additional obligations to the landlords, former feudal lords - created great tension among the farming population throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina following the catastrophic drought of 1874. The awareness that there were no Turks in the territories of Serbia and Montenegro and promises by Serb and Montenegrin political leaders to offer support in case of uprising had an impact on the readiness for another armed rebellion.

Ideas about the liberation of all Serbs and Balkan nations in general from the Turkish yoke undoubtedly influenced the most intellectual members of the committee preparing the uprising. These ideas then became the foreign policy programme of both Serbia and Montenegro (Ilija Garašanin's "Načertanije" plan).

An optimistic opinion prevailed among members of the uprising leadership and national political parties in Serbia and Montenegro that Turkey was facing its final collapse and that the uprising should take place as early as possible in order to prevent the consolidation of Austria-Hungary, and (in the name of peace) in order, to prevent Austro-Hungarian occupation of BH.

Bosnia-Herzegovinan leaders of the uprising had several contacts with the Montenegrin and Serb court in 1874 during the preparations for the general uprising. They were aware of the fact that the former peasant uprisings in Bosnia-Herzegovina had failed above all because they were confined to narrow regions and because the rebels were not strongly linked to Serbia and Montenegro. Advice from Montenegrin Duke Nikola was very significant, since, due to his previous defeat in the war with the Turks in 1861/62, he had suggested to the impatient leaders of the uprising that they wait for more favourable circumstances, or that they synchronise the uprising with Russia's attack on Turkey. With this he prolonged the preparations, which was the reason why the Turkish intelligence service learned about them. Leaders of the uprising from Herzegovina had to flee to Montenegro. Austria-Hungary tried to save the situation by advising the Turkish authorities to begin their reforms. However, the preparations for the uprising continued in two directions: the logistic support during the preparations in Bosnia was provided by Serbia, and in Herzegovina by Montenegro.

The uprising began on 9 July 1875 in Herzegovina ("Nevesinjska puška") and later in Bosnia. Rebels first attacked feudal estates and border police stations. When the regular Turkish army appeared, the rebels were forced to establish their stronger units and troops to combat the Turkish army. Command of large units of rebels was taken by Montenegrin and Serb officers, who were sent in secret to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Serb and Montenegrin authorities. The Serb and Montenegrin authorities did not wish to expose themselves to criticism from Europe for their interfering in Turkish internal affairs. The Western European Powers attempted to quell the fighting and mediate between the rebels and the Turkish authorities, to avert a possible mass military action by Russia. They were afraid that Russia would again take advantage of this possibility and settle in the Balkans, using the salvation of its Slav orthodox brothers as a pretext. Public opinion in Europe was at that time greatly on the side of the rebels, which was reflected in the large number of committees operating in Rome, Venice, London, Vienna, Trieste and elsewhere which were responsible for collecting aid.

Due to the spread of the uprising, Turkey concentrated its strong military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and intensified the repression of the civilian population, which was on the side of the rebels. Austria-Hungary thus started placing pressure on Turkey to remove the causes of the uprising with reforms, and on Montenegrin Duke Nikola to stop supporting the rebels. Since Prince Nikola demanded, as compensation for this, territorial expansion of Montenegro at the expense of Turkey and the recognition of independence, the agreement was never reached. The rebels maintained that the Austrian proposal for a general amnesty, a one-year exemption from tithe duties and a two-year exemption from other tax was not realistic enough. In addition, they demanded that the Turkish authorities distribute one-third of the land to farmers of the Christian religion, that Turkish units remain only in large towns, and that Russian and Austro-Hungarian observers take up the supervision of the implementation of the agreement. As the rebels could not arrive at an agreement with the Turks, the fighting continued.

During the fighting many areas of conflict arose among individual rebel factions, lessening the rebels' success. The main committee in Zagreb, mostly including Herzegovinian Croats, was striving for the implementation of the so-called Austrian solution or the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia after liberation. The main committee in Belgrade advocated the integration of Bosnia with Serbia, just as the committees in Montenegro

advocated the integration of Herzegovina with Montenegro. Along with agents of the ruling dynasties of Obrenović and Petrović, the representative of ex-Serbian dynasty Petar Karađorđević (under the name of Petar Mrkonjić) appeared on the battleground. His supporters wanted to proclaim him the future chief commander and the ruler of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a special rebel assembly, this Serb dynastic dispute was prevented by prohibiting Karađorđević from staying in Bosnia and appointing Slovene Miroslav Hubmajer as chief commander (he was replaced soon afterwards).

The governments of Serbia and Montenegro, closely monitoring the development of the uprising, the unsuccessful mediation of the European governments and the public support for the rebels, assessed, after the first quarter of 1876, that the time was ripe for an all-Balkan uprising against the Turks and for the liberation and unification of all Serbs. They began with the final preparations. In practice it soon became clear that neither Romania nor Greece nor Bulgaria were willing to cooperate. For this reason Serbia and Montenegro signed a secret agreement on joint military action against Turkey in Venice on 16 June 1876. They demanded from Turkey that it peacefully cede Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro, while Porta would maintain the supreme authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey rejected the demand and Serbia declared war on Turkey on 30 June 1876. Austro-Hungarian diplomats tried to persuade Montenegrin Duke Nikola not to enter the war, but failed. A consequence of the entry of Serbia and Montenegro into war was that the rebel actions in the hinterland of Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified.

The initial operational plan of the coalition was fairly unusual. It envisaged an offensive from divergent directions. To avert strife between the Serbian and Montenegrin armies in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to avoid the smaller Montenegrin army being subordinated to a Serb army (that was almost six times as large), which is what would have happened if the two had attacked Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Montenegrin units directed their main assault on Herzegovina and the Serb units on the "old Serbia" (the areas of Niš, Vranje, Prokuplje and Pirot). The commander of these forces was Russian general Černjajev, who was granted Serb citizenship to this end. It was a paradox that Serbia was engaged in northern Bosnia (these were main rebel forces) very weak forces and they were beaten at the very beginning (near Bijeljina). Instead of being sent relief units, the rebels were given "assistance" by the Serbian and Montenegrin active officers, who took the lead in the uprising.

In Herzegovina the operational cooperation between the Montenegrin army and the rebels was exemplary. They achieved two important victories (Vučji dol, Fundina). However, these two victories could not alter the fact that the Turks succeeded in beating the main Serbian forces (near Đunis) on the Serbs' southern border. A Russian ultimatum on 1 November 1876 saved Serbia from the new Turkish occupation. This ultimatum created conditions for a ceasefire between Turkey and Serbia.

In spring 1877 the Turks succeeded in beating the rebel groups in Bosnia, which had been forced into engaging in frontal combat by a commander from Serbia instead of the partisan manoeuvres behind Turkish units which had proved to be successful up to that point. Due to its victory and peace agreement with Serbia (28 February 1877), the Turkish army could redeploy its main forces in the direction of Montenegro and Herzegovina with a view to doing away completely with the Herzegovinian rebels and the Montenegrin army. A very critical situation occurred, which had not been envisaged by the initial Montenegrin war plan. It was based on "strategic axioms", which soon proved a great failure - an offensive on the two fronts and an alliance of all the Balkan states. Instead of carrying out an offensive, Serbia had to defend itself on its own territory, while not a single ally (with which Serbia had signed agreements before the war) entered the war.

4. RUSSIA ENTERS THE WAR AGAINST TURKEY AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN (1878)

Wishing to force Turkey to start reforms and thus avoid difficulties with the Western European countries, Russia suggested several times that Christians in Turkish territory be protected by the collective action of all the European forces. As early as August 1875, Russian diplomats proposed the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under pressure from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Russians accepted a reduction in demands or the memorandum of Berlin (May 1876). The memorandum demanded from Turkey that it cease its military operations for two months and start negotiations with the rebels. The memorandum was not submitted to Turkey at all, since Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey in June.

Turkey rejected the call for reform made by the signatories of the Protocol of London (31 March 1877). The project on the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina faced a similar fate. All the European countries supported it except Great Britain, which persuaded Turkey to reject it.

Russia then accelerated its secret diplomatic activities. A secret convention with Austria-Hungary (March 1877), in which it ceded Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, gave Russia assurances of Austro-Hungarian neutrality in the case of a war between Russia and Turkey. Russia promised Great Britain not to occupy Constantinople and the coasts of Bosphorus and Dardanelles or to use Serb territory during the war. It had thus succeeded in isolating Turkey.

On 24 April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey, which was forced to distribute its forces to several fronts: against the rebels in Herzegovina and Montenegro, to secure the border with unreliable Serbia and Montenegro, against the Bulgarians (who by then had started their guerilla actions), on caucasus and against the main part of the Russian army, which was rapidly advancing across the Danube towards Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The suspicious Russian army had to set aside substantial side-wing reserve detachments to prepare itself for the eventuality of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain (which sent its fleet to the Gallipoli area in case) entering the war, notwithstanding the agreement. Military operations thus slowed down and were completed only on 29 January 1878, when the Russian units broke through to the outskirts of Constantinople.

In the Russian-Turkish war, the Serb and Montenegrin units fought with the third-rate Turkish units, since Turkey had to use its main and able units on the eastern front against Russia. It is not surprising that the Serb and Montenegrin units were more successful in 1877 than in 1876. Serb units, which again entered the war on 15 December 1877, had isolated Niš and occupied Kuršumlija and Pirot, thus making the Russian occupation of Sofia easier. Austria-Hungary warned Montenegro that it would not tolerate its invasion of Herzegovina. For this reason the Montenegrin units redeployed to the south and occupied Nikšić, Bar, Ulcinj and the islands on Lake Skadar (Lake Scutari).

Russia forced a peace agreement on defeated Turkey in San Stefano on 3 March 1878, envisaging the establishment of a new state, Greater Bulgaria, which would be the chief ally of Russia in the Balkans. Having been granted access to the Aegean Sea near Salonika, the new state included a greater part of Macedonia (up to Tetovo, Ohrid, Kumanovo and the estuary of the Vardar river) and some Serb districts (Pirot and Vranje). A consequence was a rapprochement between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The "Russophile" policy of Serbia was soon substituted by an "Austrophile" one.

This peace agreement was in the interests of neither Austria-Hungary, since Greater Bulgaria was preventing its expansion to the east, nor Great Britain, which considered the access of Greater Bulgaria to the coasts of the Aegean Sea to be the Russian search for a "loophole" in the preceding secret Russian-British agreement. This situation also did not suit Germany, who wished to meet its long-term strategic goals by pushing Austria-Hungary into the vacuum created by a disintegrating Turkey.

Therefore, it is no surprise that German Chancellor Bismarck took the main diplomatic initiative in organising the Congress of Berlin (13 June - 13 July 1878), at which the European Powers of that time (Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia) and defeated Turkey took part. This congress nullified what Russia had achieved in San Stefano. Exhausted Russia could not offer any resistance, since it was not ready for another Crimean War. Serbia and Montenegro were not invited to the congress.

The one country enjoying the fruits of victory was Austria-Hungary, which obtained consent from the Great Powers for the occupation and pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the deployment of its garrisons in Sandžak. With this, it physically separated Serbia from Montenegro.

The Treaty of Berlin caused the collapse of the Russian San Stefano plan for a Greater Bulgaria and the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should have become some kind of buffer zone between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (in actual fact it was a compromise under which autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina would belong neither to Austria-Hungary nor to Turkey nor to Serbia). Serbia and Montenegro were internationally recognised at the congress and Serbia maintained four districts (518 km sq) that it had occupied during the war (Niš, Pirot, Vranje, Leskovac). At the same time, it promised Austria-Hungary that it would construct the Belgrade-Niš railway and links between the Salonika and Constantinople railway sections within three years. After this war Serbia was in a more difficult geostrategic situation than before. In the north, west and south-west it was surrounded by powerful Austria-Hungary, in the east by Bulgaria, and in the south by Turkey. This situation brought popular Serb geographer Jovan Cvijić to the conclusion that "Serbia is surrounded and the Serbs are a nation under arrest."

Serbia and Montenegro's war of liberation against Turkey and their unrealistic plans for a pan-Balkan uprising and the liberation of all Serbs living in the European part of Turkey had collapsed in two years. Serbia and

Montenegro had to approve the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak, and Serbia accepted its integration in the European railway system. But these were only minimal goals. In practice it became evident that Serbia's gratitude to Russia (which had saved Serbia from again being occupied by Turkey before the defeat near Dunis in 1877) ended as soon as Russia included the Serb districts and Macedonia in the Russocentric geostrategic body of Greater Bulgaria.

Montenegro obviously benefited more from this war, since, it doubled its territory after the Congress of Berlin. It gained Nikšić, Kolašin, Spuž, Žabljak, Podgorica and the port of Bar, and through very flexible bartering in 1880, exchanged the insignificant regions of Gusinje and Plav for Ulcinj. In contrast to Serbia, which after the Congress of Berlin embarked on an Austrophile policy, Montenegro maintained its Russophile policy and later attempted to turn to Italy.

One of the consequences of the war was fiercer struggle between the dynasties of the Russophile Petrović, the Austrophile Obrenović, and the Russophile Karađorđević (who in exile established dynastic relations with the Russian and Montenegrin courts). Last but not least, among the aftermaths of war, there was demoralisation among those involved in the Bosnia-Herzegovina uprising. They had failed to achieve unification with Serbia and/or Montenegro and autonomy within Turkey, and in the end had to realise that they were only the "strategic small change" paid by Serbia and Montenegro for Serbian and Montenegrin territorial expansions to the south.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Comparison of the outlined events and processes dating back to the Conference of Berlin and the situation today indicates that the current "new world order" is not so different from the old "European order". To be sure, there are many international security institutions today which did not exist before (the United Nations Organisation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, WEU). It is also true that the world has, in terms of information flow, become a "global village". However, all this does not guarantee that the war going on in the southern part of Europe will last less than the one over a hundred years ago.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, security on the

fringes of Europe has not increased. On the contrary, there have been conflicts in Kavkaz (Chechnya, Nagorny Karabakh, Georgia), Moldova, Asia Minor (the Kurdish question) and the Balkans. Similarly, the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism is underway in the Middle East and North Africa, and is threatening to spill over into Europe (via immigrants). In these circumstances, the developed part of Europe is primarily striving to maintain peace and stability. The euphoria and optimism, which were greatly felt in the "interventionist" period of the Gulf War (1991), when the USA and the Western allies took joint action against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein after the latter's invasion of Kuwait, soon disappeared. These were substituted by a disconcerting feeling that the pompously declared "new world order" is not as new as it was at first generally believed to be under the impact of the Gulf War.

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been living proof for three years that the world and the stable part of Europe is willing to send humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to verbally opt for peace but is not prepared to abolish the embargo on exporting arms to the victims of aggression and to take concrete action to alter the strategic balance of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina (about which this author wrote in detail last year). In this regard, the antimilitarist writer Erich Maria Remarque's 'All Quiet on the Western Front' becomes 'nothing is new on the Western front'. This strategic apathy will last until the West and the rest of the world realise that no one is immune to the virus spreading in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is significant that in all strategic analyses dealing with a possible international military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a peace-making operation), historic experience appears as a powerful deterrent. From 1875 to 1995, war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has thrice led to the breakup of the initial BH's coalitions in place, resulting in their reorientation against the external powers seeking to impose peace. In 1878, for instance, when Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with the provisions adopted at the Congress of Berlin, an uprising by Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina against Austria-Hungary took place. Both groups clashed with Serbia, Montenegro or Turkey, who accepted the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina while the rebels demanded autonomy. Similarly, in the spring of 1941, many Muslims and Croats welcomed the Nazi occupation and the establishment of the NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska- Independent State of Croatia) puppet state as their liberation from Serbian domination. Despite this, Bosnia-Herzegovina became very soon a crucial area in which the political leadership of the KPI

(Communist Party of Yugoslavia) began implementation of its programme of establishing large mobile military units (brigades, corps) and uniting all forces in the territory of Yugoslavia to fight in unison against the occupying forces and quislings. The current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that the Bosnian Muslims and Croats have established a federation, but their alliance is very fragile (Fikret Abdić, the popular Muslim leader of the Cazin area, collaborates with the Serbs) and may deteriorate again, leading to internal clashes and a situation similar to that of 1993, to which 'bellum omnium contra omnes' could be applied. However, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina are all convinced that the UN troops do not support them, or that they support the "opposite side". Since in previous conflicts (in Vietnam and Afghanistan) all local forces united against the Americans or Russians, and a similar thing happened to the UN peace-keeping operation in Somalia, it is in some way understandable that dispassionate military experts consider a military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina an extremely risky move, to be averted at any cost.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was, from 1875 until now, an integral part of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "AVNOJ Yugoslavia" - Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), which all broke up in the course of this century. It is thus only natural to find a certain degree of similarity between the processes and events of 1875 and the current situation. Between two points in time, 1875 and 1995, the following could be considered to be similar situations (in addition to the fact that Europe was in both cases passively observing the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina for three years):

- (1) a great number of parties involved in the conflict;
- (2) the interference of the neighbouring countries;
- (3) the lack of trust among the warring parties and their unwillingness to create firmer coalitions, where possible;
- (4) great losses of civilian population;
- (5) hyperproduction of unsuccessful international peace appeals and other initiatives;
- (6) diversity in stance of the leading world and European powers concerning the strategic diagnosis of the causes which led to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, accordingly, the solutions necessary for establishing peace and preventing a repetition of the current developments in the future.

Despite the fact that the USA is the only superpower left, that Bosnia-Herzegovina does not border Turkey, Austria and/or Germany, and

that Russia is not directly linked to the Balkans (between Russia and the Balkans are the two new states of Belarus and Ukraine), many relations and situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, characteristic of the last century, are being repeated.

In relation to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia is currently in a similar situation to the Russian Empire in 1878, which succeeded in defeating Turkey and breaking through to Constantinople but failed to verify its victory at the international negotiating table. The Congress of Berlin (1878) nullified everything that Russia achieved by the Treaty of San Stefano. In the same way, Karadžić and Serb hardliners are experiencing the international contact group plan on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a ratio of 51% to 49% (at the expense of Serbs).

Serb-held positions today are near Karlovac and Zadar among others, while Zadar, Zagreb, Osijek, Šibenik, Split and Dubrovnik are within the reach of Serb tanks and missiles and yet the Serbs have not achieved: (1) international recognition of the RSK (Republic of Serbian Krajina) and the RS (Republic of Srpska); (2) the abolition of the embargo against FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); (3) permission for unification of all Serbian para-state formations (RSK, RS) with FRY. Slobodan Milošević, Milan Martić and Radovan Karadžić have today, like the Russian Tsar in 1878, not established links with any country and are not militarily strong enough to successfully confront "the rest of the world". The exhausted Serb economy and internal strife among Serbs are very similar to the frictions in 1878 between the Bosnia-Herzegovina rebels, desiring autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina at any cost, and the Petrović and Karađorđević dynasties who were, like Milošević today, prepared to accept the minimum. It is no surprise that the hardline Serbs from the area west of the Drina river criticise Milošević, who is becoming increasingly more involved with (con)federal ties with the southern Balkans (Greece, Macedonia) and the "consolidation" in Kosovo and Sandžak, for selling them short. The hardline Serbs from Kosovo (Šolević and others) have openly told Milošević the same. They are afraid of being the next in line to be bartered for the consolidation of Milošević's authority and the salvation of Serbia.

Similar statements and accusations were voiced by the disappointed rebels in 1878, when Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred instead of the promised unification with Serbia or at least the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The idea that they were bartered for Serb and Montenegrin expansion to the south was very prevalent and they thus sought

a solution in terrorist methods.

Searching for an answer to the question as to why these anachronistic paradigms have been revitalised right now on a global scale, American scientist Samuel Huntington went furthest. In his wellknown study, "The Clash of Civilisations", he predicted, with a large dose of fatalism, that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and its attendant ideological polarisation (being a constant feature of international relations from Yalta to "perestroika") would unleash clashes at the points of contact between civilisations. Observing the locations of current combats, it would be difficult to argue against this hypothesis. The areas of the Middle East (where the Jewish and Islamic civilisations meet), Kavkaz (where the Orthodox and Islamic civilisations meet), Kashmir (where the Islamic and Hindu civilisations cross), Bosnia-Herzegovina (the crossing-point of Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic civilisations), and the southern wing of the Balkan crisis (including strife between the Islamic and Orthodox civilisations), are those in which such processes are already underway.

Just as the former architects of Europe, wishing to create the basis for stable peace, established the structure of the Balkans in 1878, the present mediators and authors of peace plans (Lord Carrington, Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, Torvald Stoltenberg, Charles Redman, Jimmy Carter, etc.) have had a very difficult task. It is quite obvious that many current international efforts to resolve the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina follow the example of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, since it preserved European peace until 1914. At first, the idea about a status quo was very much present (the independence of the "AVNOJ Bosnia-Herzegovina" was recognised), but when Bosnian Croats and Serbs started proclaiming their "own states" (Herzeg-Bosnia, RS), then the European architects offered a compromise idea: the creation of cantons. When this proposal, which ignored the existence of the national states within Bosnia-Herzegovina, was rejected by all the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the clashes between Croats and Muslims started, along with the clashes of Croats and Muslims against Serbs. The idea that this reality, and the separation of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, must be taken into consideration, started gaining ground among the mediators. Under pressure from the US, the Croat-Bosnian federation was forced into existence. It would, in confederation with The Republic of Croatia, neutralise Serb predominance in the Bosnia-Herzegovina association (of which the RS also wanted to become a part). Since Fikret Abdić upset the 51% : 49% partition by "stepping over" to the Serb side, new "recipes" have been sought. The idea of the association within Bosnia-Herzegovina

(also including Serbs) was evidently not based on the notion of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a buffer zone between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand and Croatia on the other, but on the concept of cooperation, which would have transformed Bosnia-Herzegovina into a bridge of cooperation between Croatia and FRY.

A paradox is that the Bosnian Serbs do not wish to accept the peace plan offered by the international contact group, whereas Milošević has publicly supported the plan but failed to fully seal off the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to disrupt supplies to the Karadžić-led army (it is hard to believe that the new anti-aircraft missile system that NATO and the UN peace-keeping forces found in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not come from Serbia or Montenegro). Since the European countries (jointly with Russia) disagreed with the US plan of using force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the US was faced with the dilemma of whether to give priority to attacks against Serbian targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina or to the unity of NATO. The situation in the US is getting complicated now because the Republicans have just recently won a majority in congressional elections for the first time in several decades. If the White House decided on an attack in Bosnia-Herzegovina now, then the current government would surely have a slimmer chance of winning the forthcoming presidential elections. In this respect, Jimmy Carter's move could be seen as: (1) an effort to prevent the escalation of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; (2) an internal US move; and/or (3) an attempt to establish new relations within the European "five".

The essential difference between the former and present situation is that in 1877 Russia was ready to militarily force Turkey to start reforms, and that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain were prepared to turn a blind eye to it (both were given prior assurances by Russia that it would not jeopardise their vital interests). But now, neither the US nor any European country is willing to expose its soldiers and bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most they were prepared to do was to impose the embargo (which affected above all the victims of the aggression), preventing the fighting from spreading to the west and south, and waiting for the warring parties to exhaust themselves and then agree on a solution to the problem by themselves. Despite the fact that the initial proposal on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the 51% : 49% principle put forward by the international contact group initially had the characteristics of an ultimatum ("take it or leave it"), it has then gradually become clear that the problem has remain unsolved. The Serbs, controlling 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are in a better position, since they can force a

quantity-for-quality type of exchange.

In contrast to Serbia and Montenegro, which in 1876 declared war on Turkey, Milošević did not declare it on anyone. He managed to get the withdrawing YNA (Yugoslav National Army) to cede its weapons to the RSK and the RS. Later he offered substantial support in terms of logistics and volunteers to the RSK and the RS, thus disguising the entire aggression and avoiding the consequences, which the Serb and Montenegrin rulers could not have done in the last century.

Local Serbs (in possession of YNA weapons) took control of over 25% of the territory of Croatia and 70% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the moment, the international contact group is doing its best to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept 49% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory. But they are not satisfied with this. As compensation for their acceptance, they have demanded that they be given access to the sea, a relevant percentage of natural resources, industrial, communication and other installations, and positions from which they could defend their gains. Since the Bosnian federation (between Croats and Muslims) has already associated itself in confederation with Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs persist in their demands for an equivalent association with Serbia and Montenegro. If these associations in confederations are implemented, and if the original plan of the Washington Agreement is consistently implemented (under which Bosnia-Herzegovina would be an "association of Serbs, Croats and Muslims"), this will be a very unusual association of four former Yugoslav republics. This would be a more or less loose association between Croatia and the Muslim-Croatian federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, between the Muslim-Croatian federation and the RS, and between the RS and Serbia and Montenegro.

From this point of view, Carter's visit is very interesting, since his aim was evidently to collect the "complaints" about the maps to date, and thus, on the grounds of making new corrections, to enable both behind-the-scenes and public dialogues. These have ended up a blind alley due to Karadžić's rejection of the proposal by the contact group.

The brisk U-turn in Milošević's actions is probably a result of the increasingly serious situation in Russia, which means that in the long run it would become more and more difficult for Russia to support Serbia, or that it would desert Serbia or even sacrifice it. Since the US, because of criticism from the Arab allies that they are not taking due consideration in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, supports the Izetbegović idea on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milošević must find other allies. With regard to the current strength of the European countries (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia) a new European balance of three pairs may be formulated in the long run (since the association of three countries against one would not be balanced). The combination would be:

- (1) /Berlin + Moscow/ : /Paris + London/,
- (2) /Berlin + Paris/ : /London + Moscow/,
- (3) /Berlin + London/ : /Paris + Moscow/.

It is likely that, on the basis of such or similar combinations, Karadžić gave the well-received statement at the end of last year that "the only obstacle for good relations between the Serbs and Germany are the Croats." It is highly probable that Milošević is ready to take a turn in this direction, stimulated by the fact that many leading European politicians are making statements to the effect that the key to peace in Bosnia is Belgrade, which would implicitly mean peace in the Balkans too.

Milošević, who as a well-versed political acrobat has understood that the US, Russia and other European countries are primarily interested in peace, and are even prepared to tolerate conquests gained by force, continues to persecute his former recent allies (militant radicals) at home and to carry on peace actions on the foreign affairs scene (after the breakdown of links with Karadžić).

When Milošević "proved" that he "no longer had anything to do with the Bosnian Serbs", he once again offered a (con)federation to Greece and Macedonia. Because of the strife between Macedonia and Albania, and between Greece, Albania and Turkey, there is an implicit anti-Albanian and anti-Turkish dimension present. Due to the unclear status of the current Serb para-state formation of the RSK, the situation in Croatia is becoming increasingly more complicated (the West has actually prohibited Croatia from liberating its territories). The situation following the unsuccessful offensive by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is similar to the Croatian-Bosnian relations within the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and in its relations with Croatia. For this reason, Milošević is evidently trying, by pillorying Karadžić and by offering (con)federations to all sides, to create the impression that he is the one and only leading player in future Balkan integration, the one on whom everyone is counting, and this goes for outside the Balkans too. Even his adversary, former FRY Prime Minister Milan

Panić, is supporting him in this. Milošević's recognition of Croatia would mean a U-turn, similar to the one Serbia made after the Congress of Berlin (1878). Compatriots in Bosnia-Herzegovina were forgotten about and the economic aspects of cooperation with the West were given priority. Plans on the unification of all Serbs in a unitary state were then left to the opposition, and their implementation postponed to another time. It is surely not a coincidence that Charles Thomas, US representative in the international contact group, said in the middle of December 1994 to a group of Belgrade foreign affairs commentators that the US would like to see Yugoslavia without sanctions, and as a member of the Partnership for Peace or even NATO. Taking into consideration as well the visit of Thomas's colleague Charles Redman to Pale, the visit of former US president Carter to Zagreb, Pale, Sarajevo and Belgrade, and Milošević's interview on CNN, it is clear that the US is taking the lead and not Russia.

Carter is known for his great contribution to the signing of the Camp David Agreement and for being successful in mediating where official political talks had failed (North Korea and Haiti last year). Therefore, a positive development of events following his visit to Milošević and other key figures could not be completely ruled out. In this (very unlikely) scenario, Carter would be a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize and become a US Bismarck, finding a peaceful solution and cutting the Bosnian and Croatian Gordian knot after the three-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the end of this analysis, it is very important to underline that the Bosnian crisis problem - solving methods which were executed about hundred years ago, are now completely different although in both cases the superpowers of adjacent time were highly motivated to save the European peace. About one hundred years ago the first one was successfully executed in the form of international recognition of two new states (Serbia, Montenegro), but in the same time, these two states were disabled for eventual integration (i. e. Austro-Hungary occupied the Sandjak region), and encircled by stronger guardian states (Austro-Hungary, Turkey) in order to neutralize a possible Russian penetration to the Balkans. The last year's Washington Agreement - as *forma Americana* (non)intentionally inspired by the congress in Berlin - is not based on the divisions (like previously described division and very well known malign divisions after WW II - Germany, Korea, Vietnam); on the contrary - it is founded on benign paradigm of unification and integration. It is from day to day more and more evident and clear, that the key postulates of Washington Agreement is territorial conservation of BH - as an independent state (composed of Croatian, Serbian and Muslim

entities) - and its step by step confederal-like connections with neighbouring countries (Croatia, so called FRY). This approach is identified as a 'conditio sine qua non' for their common integration into the new World and European order. The uncertain future with actual sad cases (Chechenya, Somalia, Haiti etc.), will very soon show if this reprisal of global approach - which was effective one hundred years ago - will be a fruitful turning point in today practice or the events will go in the opposite direction i. e. in the direction of balkanisation of the World and Europe in general.

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